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1 Introduction 
We live in the “biotech century” (Rifkin, 1999). Modern biotechnological methods and 
products are part of our everyday life. In the supermarket, we buy biotechnologically 
engineered food such as pest resistant vegetables and fruits. We drink beer which was 
manufactured with the help of genetically engineered yeast, and wine from grapes of 
gene-manipulated vines, and we use cups of biodegradable plastics produced by modern 
biotechnological processes. The clothes we wear and the paper we write on are 
manufactured by utilisation of biomolecules such as enzymes gained from genetically 
engineered bacteria. At the pharmacy, we purchase drugs and diagnostic tests which are 
developed, tested, and produced by modern biotechnological methods. On the dark side, 
the media remind us of the danger of “bioterrorism”, that is, the possibility that 
terrorists will employ the new technology to engineer deadly bacteria and viruses which 
may become the cruelest weapons ever known. 
The importance of biotechnological products for our daily life is even more impressive 
if we consider that the modern biotech industry is only a quarter of a century old. The 
first biotech firms were incorporated in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the USA, and 
the industry did not emerge substantially before the mid-1980s. In Europe, the biotech 
sector is even younger and most firms were founded in the 1990s. Although some 
companies such as Amgen and Genentech in the USA have become extremely 
successful and today employ thousands of people, the industry is still highly 
entrepreneurial and mainly consists of small and medium-sized firms which are far from 
profitability.  
Since modern bioentrepreneurial ventures are characterised by long product 
development cycles, high technological and market uncertainty, and a high capital 
intensity, starting a biotechnology firm is among the most complex entrepreneurial 
tasks. The failure rate of firms is high and it has become clear that success factors which 
are important in the context of other industries are only partially relevant for young 
biotech firms because of their specific characteristics. Instead, novel strategies such as 
extensive inter-firm co-operations and strategic alliances between firms have emerged. 
Due to the newness of the industry we have so far only limited understanding of the 
process of successfully founding and growing young biotechnology firms. Such 
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industry-specific knowledge is of utmost importance in order to facilitate the 
development of the sector as a whole as well as the development of individual firms in 
the most efficient way. Researchers must provide insights for biotech practitioners such 
as managers, investors, and politicians. For management scholars, systematic research is 
necessary to develop and empirically verify management and entrepreneurship theory 
specific for the biotechnology context. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to analyse 
important and cutting-edge topics of bioentrepreneurship research. 
In the remainder of this introductory part I will describe the emergence and economic 
importance of the biotechnology sector in the USA, Europe, and particularly in 
Germany, the context in which the studies of this thesis are conducted, in more detail 
(Section 1.1). I will then illustrate the topics and structure of this thesis (Section 1.2). 
1.1 The emergence and economic impact of the biotechnology 
industry 
Modern biotechnology has its roots in the USA. The webpage of Genentech, which is 
often referred to as the first biotech firm in the world, describes the birth of the sector as 
follows (Genentech, 2004b): 
“Genentech, Inc. was founded in 1976 by venture capitalist Robert A. Swanson 
and biochemist Dr. Herbert W. Boyer. In the early 1970s, Boyer and geneticist 
Stanley Cohen pioneered a new scientific field called recombinant DNA 
technology. Excited by the breakthrough, Swanson placed a call to Boyer and 
requested a meeting. Boyer agreed to give the young entrepreneur 10 minutes of 
his time. Swanson's enthusiasm for the technology and his faith in its commercial 
viability was contagious, and the meeting extended from 10 minutes to three 
hours; by its conclusion, Genentech was born.” 
Drawing on recombinant DNA technology Genentech succeeded in 1977 in the 
production of the first recombinant human protein, somatotropin,1 in genetically 
engineered bacteria. In 1978, Genentech produced human insulin, which, after its 
                                                 
1 Somatotropin is a growth-regulating hormone essential for normal human growth. Therapeutically, it is 
used against dwarfism. Before recombinant production was possible, somatotropin was gained from the 
pituitaries of dead persons. 
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introduction to the market in 1982, replaced pig insulin. At that time pig insulin was the 
state-of-the-art treatment for diabetes, but was often rejected by the body of patients. 
Recombinant human insulin was cheap to manufacture and, since it was identical to 
insulin produced by the human body, had no side effects. Genentech out-licensed 
commercialisation rights for recombinant human insulin to the pharmaceutical company 
Eli Lilly. After introduction to the market, human insulin became an overwhelming 
success. When Genentech went public in 1980, stock prices rose from 35 $US to 80 
$US within one hour. Many investors had already recognised the enormous economic 
potential of the new biotechnology (Genentech, 2004b). Today Genentech employs 
more than 5200 people (Genentech, 2004a). In 2002, the company earned revenues of 
2.6 billion $US and had a market capitalisation of 19.4 billion $US (Genentech, 2003). 
After the inception of Genentech the US biotechnology sector grew continuously. 
Besides other factors (Cooke, 2001), one precondition for the development of the 
biotech industry was the existence of venture capital (VC) investors (Prevezer, 2001), 
which were willing to carry the high failure risk inherent in new, disruptive 
technologies. In 1986, ten years after Genentech’s foundation, the US biotech sector 
already counted more than 800 firms and 40000 employees (Ernst & Young, 2001). 
Despite several periods of hostile financing environments such as in 1986 or during the 
economic downturn of the years 1993 – 1995, which constituted a major decrease in 
financing opportunities for young biotech firms, the number of bioentrepreneurial 
ventures as well as the number of industry employees grew steadily (Ernst & Young, 
2003b). 
Since the mid-1990s, the amount of firms in the US biotech industry has remained 
almost at a constant level (about 1400 firms). Today the sector is considered as a mature 
industry. A substantial number of firms is publicly traded at the stock markets (318 
companies in 2002, Ernst & Young, 2003b). Many firms possess a product pipeline 
containing candidates in all development stages including marketed products some of 
which generate hundreds of millions $US annual revenues. In 2002, the US industry as 
a whole had a market capitalisation of 190 billion $US and employed 195000 people. 
Amgen, the largest biotech firm in the world, had more than 10000 employees and 5.5 
billion $US revenues in 2003 (Amgen, 2004). Figure 1 summarises the development of 
the US biotechnology industry. 
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Figure 1: Development of the biotechnology industry in the USA 
The origin of the European biotech industry dates back to the inception of Celltech in 
the UK in 1980. As in the case of Genentech, Celltech’s foundation was only possible 
due to the established venture capital industry in the UK (Celltech, 2003; Sainsbury, 
2003). Although Celltech was founded only four years after Genentech and is profitable 
today, too, the biotech industry in the UK developed more slowly than its counterpart in 
the USA. In 2002, it had a lower portion of publicly trades firms (46 firms in total), a 
lower rate of employment increase, and fewer marketable products. The common view 
is that the development of the UK industry, which is by far the most developed one in 
Europe, is 10 years behind the US sector (Cooke, 2001). 
Since 1992 the number of biotech firms in Europe grew from about 450 to more than 
1800 in 2002. This number exceeds the US industry (1400 firms). However, European 
companies employ fewer people (about 82000) than the firms in the USA, and the 
number of publicly traded companies is only one third (102) of the US industry. In 
2001, the largest number of European biotech firms were located in Germany (360), 
followed by the UK (331), and France (239). Figure 2 shows the distribution of firms 
among the top ten biotech nations in Europe in 2000. As a whole the sector is not 
profitable yet, although its loss is decreasing continuously and was only 7 million € in 
2002 as compared to 13 million € in 1999. During this timeframe, the number of 
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profitable firms within the top ten group (in terms of market capitalisation) doubled 
from four to eight (Ernst & Young, 2003a). 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of biotechnology companies among European countries 
In Germany, the biotechnology industry did not emerge substantially before the 1990s. 
Besides the generally hostile attitude of the German society against the new, living 
organisms-manipulating technology, major sector development hurdles were the 
restrictive law regulating use and commercialisation of genetic material as well as the 
lack of a venture capital industry (Becker and Hellmann, 2000). This situation changed 
during the 1990s when the Germans recognised that biotechnology does not only have a 
huge economic potential, but also contributes to wealth of humankind by, e.g., 
developing new drugs for unmet clinical needs such as cancer and Alzheimer’s disease. 
In 1993, the German government reformed the regulatory and legal framework and, in 
order to facilitate foundation of new biotech ventures, in 1995 initiated the BioRegio 
Contest which led to a large number of bioventure inceptions in the following years 
(Dohse, 2000). In parallel, several venture capital funds were started in Germany, partly 
with governmental support (Giesecke, 2000). As a consequence, the number of German 
biotech firms rose from 95 in 1996 to 365 in 2001 (Ernst & Young, 2003c). During the 
downturn at the equity markets in 2002 – 2004, this number slightly dropped to 346. In 
2004, 13 German biotech firms were listed at the stock markets. The sector employed 
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about 10000 people (Ernst & Young, 2005). Cooke (2001) claims that the German 
biotech industry is about 10 years behind in development as compared to its counterpart 
in the UK, and 20 years behind the US industry. Although this number appears 
overestimated in view of the development the German sector experienced during the 
years 1999 – 2004, the above numbers illustrate that the differences are still substantial. 
Figure 3 illustrates the development of the German biotech sector. 
 
Figure 3: Development of the biotechnology industry in Germany 
1.2 Structure and scope of this thesis 
The above description of the biotech sector in the USA and Europe illustrates that, 
although still young, the industry has gained significant economic importance over the 
last two decades. However, it also shows that – particularly in Germany – the vast 
majority of firms are young start-ups far from profitability. Many of these ventures 
essentially depend on capital infusions from investors. How can these firms survive 
when the capital markets close as we experienced in Germany during the years 2002 – 
2004? Are mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and strategic alliances between firms an 
appropriate means for young biotech companies to acquire financial resources? How 
can a biotech venture survive and grow in a hostile financing environment if it looses its 
basic technology? And how do VC investors deal with the high failure risk of biotech 
start-ups by diversification of their investment portfolio? These questions constitute the 
research guideline for this thesis. 
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This thesis consists of five empirical studies which cover such diverse topics as 
financing strategies, M&As, strategic alliances, crisis management, and venture capital 
portfolio strategies. I will address these issues from both, a theoretical as well as a 
practitioner-oriented perspective. Moreover, I will include the perspectives of biotech 
company managers as well as biotech venture capital investors. Methodologically, I will 
include qualitative case studies as well as a large scale statistical analysis using an 
experimental design. In order to deal with this diversity in a way that is most convenient 
for the reader, I dedicate to each empirical study a separate chapter. Each of these 
chapters contains a general introduction placing the topic in the context of existing 
research, followed by theory, methodology, and results sections. I will then discuss the 
findings of each study and illustrate limitations which suggest avenues for future 
research. 
The following Chapter 2 introduces basic issues of biotechnology and 
bioentrepreneurship and is dedicated to readers who are new to the field. I will illustrate 
the business activities of new biotech firms as well as their business areas and business 
models. Moreover, I will describe how modern biotechnology reformed the classical 
drug development process leading to the foundation of many ventures developing 
biotherapeutics. I will also elaborate on the interdependencies of the pharmaceutical and 
the biotechnology sector. 
Chapter 3 contains the first empirical study and provides a detailed and theoretically 
founded analysis of the development of the German biotechnology industry in the 
hostile financing environment of 2002 – 2004. I will draw on the perspectives of 
population ecology and evolutionary economics in order to understand the sector 
development. I will analyse external as well as internal mechanisms of adaptation. I will 
employ a case study methodology to explore how firms can adjust their financing 
strategy to the new environmental conditions. The results of this study will have 
implications for scholars studying organisational evolution processes as well as for  
biotech practitioners. 
Chapter 4 copes with M&A activities of biotech start-up companies. Since there is no 
literature on M&As of entrepreneurial firms so far, which would provide any insights 
on important management issues related to this difficult task, the aim of this study is not 
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so much to develop theory, but it is rather addressed to bioentrepreneurs. I will draw on 
an exploratory case study approach to analyse six M&As from the German sector in 
detail. I will investigate motives, benefits, and problems which may arise when two 
entrepreneurial biotech firms decide to merge. 
The subsequent Chapter 5 constitutes the theoretical and empirical heart of this thesis.  
Its aim is to develop and test theory and add to the strategic management and 
entrepreneurship literature. From a decision-making perspective, I will analyse how the 
internal and environmental situation of a biotech start-up firm motivate its managers to 
seek partners for strategic alliances. I will introduce a theoretical decision model for the 
managers and subsequently test hypotheses using a conjoint experiment which I 
conducted with 51 top managers of biotech ventures. I will analyse how three factors – 
the level of internal firm capabilities, the governance over the venture’s intellectual 
assets, and the context in which the venture operates – impact the managers’ decision to 
seek alliance partners. I will also investigate the moderating role of the venture’s 
liquidity on the other factors. The findings extend the literature on strategic alliances 
and the capabilities view of the firm. Moreover, they help to understand previous 
empirical results from studies of other scholars analysing the alliance constellations of 
bioentrepreneurial ventures. Finally, I will discuss implications for biotech managers. 
In Chapter 6 I will introduce an exploratory case study of Curacyte, a German 
biopharmaceutical start-up company which successfully survived a technology 
breakdown crisis. This topic has been untouched in the entrepreneurship and crisis 
management literature so far. The study is addressed to practitioners and aims at 
demonstrating how major crises in bioentrepreneurial firms can be overcome. I will 
analyse Curacyte’s strategy to build up a new technological platform as well as 
Curacyte’s management of financial, organisational, human, and social resources during 
the crisis management process. The results of this study are helpful for bioentrepreneurs 
facing similar crisis situations. 
In Chapter 7 I will switch to the perspective of biotech investors and analyse portfolio 
strategies of life science venture capitalists. The scope of this study is to fill a gap in the 
VC literature and extend the concept of portfolio diversification to industry-specialised 
portfolios. I will illustrate how venture capitalists reduce their high investment risk 
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inherent in life science ventures by diversification within their specialised portfolios. I 
will introduce a framework for analysis of these portfolios and apply it to seven Central 
European venture capital firms with major investments in the German sector. This case 
study approach reveals two archetypical strategies venture capitalists in the chosen 
sample pursue. Additional interview data will unravel major determinants of portfolio 
diversification for life science VCs so far undescribed in the literature. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 I will briefly sum up the results of this thesis and the contributions 
I made. I will draw final conclusions and suggest new avenues which scholars in the 
field of bioentrepreneurship might follow in the future. 
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2 What do biotechnology firms do? 
This chapter is particularly addressed to readers who are new to the field of 
biotechnology and bioentrepreneurship. It will provide them with the background 
necessary to understand the empirical studies in the following chapters. I will first give 
a definition of modern biotechnology (Section 2.1) and introduce a categorisation for 
biotech firms (Section 2.2). I will then describe the different business sectors (Section 
2.3) and business models of bioventures (Section 2.4). Finally, I will elaborate on the 
impact of the biotechnology industry on the modern drug development process (Section 
2.5). 
2.1 Modern biotechnology 
There are various definitions for biotechnology in the literature. As a consequence, 
scholars have failed so far to agree on which companies are viewed as biotech firms and 
which ones are not. A commonly used source of information for biotech researchers are 
the industry reports published by the consulting company Ernst & Young (e.g., 
Giesecke, 2000; Dohse, 2000; Kaiser and Prange, 2004). Ernst & Young survey the 
sector annually or bi-annually and supplement these data with interview material and 
data from other biotech press such as BioCentury. Besides the German biotech report 
(since 1998), Ernst & Young also publish a report on the US-American (since 1986), 
European (since 1993), and global (since 2002) biotech industry. Therefore, in the 
context of this thesis, I will refer to Ernst & Young’s definition of biotechnology (Ernst 
& Young, 2000b: 7): 
“The term “modern biotechnology” refers to all innovative methods, processes, 
or products, which include the use of living organisms or their cellular 
compartments and draw on the results and knowledge generated from research in 
the fields of biochemistry, molecular biology, immunology, virology, 
microbiology, cell biology, or environmental and engineering sciences.“ 
The above definition demonstrates that biotech companies follow a broad range of 
different business activities. In the following sections, I will introduce these activities in 
more detail. 
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2.2 Categories of biotech firms 
Nowadays biotechnological products and processes are employed in many industries. 
Breweries, for example, use genetically engineered yeast to manufacture beer. Despite 
of the utilisation of an organism modified by modern biotechnological methods, 
however, it would hardly make sense to view breweries as biotech firms. Therefore, it is 
important to define more accurate criteria which allow the identification of firms 
belonging to the biotechnology sector. A scheme commonly used in the literature is the 
one by Ernst & Young (2000b), who distinguish the following three categories. 
Category I companies are called “Entrepreneurial Life Sciences Companies 
(ELISCOs)”. These firms constitute the prototype of biotech firms in the Anglo-
Saxonian sectors. They are “small and medium sized companies, the business objective 
of which is exclusively to commercialise modern biotechnology” (Ernst & Young, 
2000b: 6). Typically, these firms are financed by venture capital and are led by a 
management consisting of scientists and entrepreneurs. 
Category II firms are small and medium-sized companies (less than 500 employees) 
which do not exclusively commercialise biotechnology, but generate more than 50 % of 
their revenues using processes, products, or offering services belonging to the field of 
biotechnology. Ernst & Young (2000b) name these firms “Extended Core Companies”. 
Category III firms are large corporations with more than 500 employees which generate 
a “substantial part of their revenues from modern biotechnological products and 
products for biotechnological research and production, respectively” (Ernst & Young, 
2000b: 6). Examples are pharmaceutical corporations and firms such as plant und food 
manufacturers, which earn more than 10 million € annual revenues by employing  
biotechnological processes or products (Ernst & Young, 2000b).   
2.3 Business sectors of biotech firms 
Depending on the area of application of biotechnological products and services, Ernst & 
Young (1998) distinguish three business sectors of biotech firms. 
Firms that operate in the “red” biotechnology sector develop products for human 
healthcare. These products are therapeutics, molecular diagnostics, drug delivery 
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systems, or tissue engineering products. As Figure 4 demonstrates, by far most German 
red biotech firms are active in therapeutics development. Because red biotechnology has 
the highest economic potential of all sectors, in 1997 83 % of all German biotech 
companies were red biotech firms (Ernst & Young, 1998). This percentage dropped to 
about 50 % in 2004 because of the cost intensity of product development and the hostile 
financing markets during 2002 – 2004 (Ernst & Young, 2005). 
 
Figure 4: Products of red biotechnology firms in Germany 
In 1997, about 11 % of German biotech companies belonged to the sector of “green” 
biotechnology (Ernst & Young, 1998). Green biotech firms develop or produce 
agricultural products such as transgenic plants or food. In Germany, market potential as 
well as acceptance in the society are much lower than for red biotechnology firms, 
which explains that much fewer firms are active in this sector as compared to other 
countries such as the USA (Ernst & Young, 1998; Ernst & Young, 2005). Globally, the 
green biotechnology sector has been booming over the last years as judged by the 
enormous growth of agricultural areas used for trials with gene-manipulated plants 
(Figure 5). In 2004, it was seven times larger than the total agricultural area in 
Germany. The total value of genetically engineered plants was about 3.8 billion € (Ernst 
& Young, 2005). 
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Figure 5: Global agricultural area for growth of gene-manipulated plants 
The remaining 6 % of German biotech companies are distributed among the sectors of 
“white”, “grey”, and “blue” biotechnology. Firms active in the field of white 
biotechnology develop and commercialise biotechnological processes and products such 
as enzymes in the fields of speciality chemicals for the pharmaceutical, chemical, and 
food industries. Over the last years, the potential of the sector has grown substantially 
and more and more firms engage in this field (Ernst & Young, 2005). Table 1 shows 
examples of German firms active in white biotechnology. 
Company Location Products 
ASA Spezialenzyme Wolfenbüttel Enzymes and microbial cultures 
e.gene Feldafing Genome analysis of extremophile organisms 
Jülich Fine Chemicals Jülich Biotransformation and chirale synthesis 
Nadicom Wiesbaden Microorganism genetics and enzyme 
optimisation 
N-Zyme Biotech Darmstadt Transglutaminase technology for target-directed 
modification of proteins and peptides 
X-Zyme Düsseldorf Chirale molecules from enzyme production for 
use in the pharmaceutical industry 
Source: (Ernst & Young, 2005: 64) 
Table 1: Examples of firms and products in the white biotechnology sector 
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Companies in the grey biotechnology field develop products related to environmental 
protection and environmental diagnostics, whereas firms which operate in the field of 
blue biotechnology exploit marine organisms. The high potential of blue biotechnology 
has been recognised already years ago in the USA and Japan, but only very few firms 
are active in this sector in Germany. One example is BlueBioTech GmbH in Elmshorn, 
which uses biotechnological processes to produce micro algae as nutrition supplements 
(BlueBioTech, 2004). 
2.4 Business models of biotech firms 
According to Ernst & Young (2000b) and in agreement with many articles in the 
biotech press, biotech firms follow one of three possible business models. The choice of 
the business model depends on the strategy pursued by the firm. 
Product-oriented companies concentrate on development and commercialisation of 
biotechnological products such as therapeutics and diagnostics (red biotechnology), 
transgenic plants (green biotechnology), or enzymes (white biotechnology). As product 
development is capital and time intensive in particular in the field of red biotechnology, 
most product-oriented firms generate their first revenues not before several years after 
their inception. This business model is particularly risky since the success of product 
development is highly uncertain at the time of the venture foundation. However, if 
product companies succeed in bringing a product such as a blockbuster drug to market, 
they may earn several hundreds of millions of revenues each year. 
Service or platform companies draw on an innovative but yet established technology 
which they either developed by themselves or purchased from another firm. These firms 
offer the utilisation of the technology to other companies as a research service. Often 
service firms are profitable few years after foundation. However, they generate 
substantially lower revenues than successful product-oriented companies. Examples for 
services include DNA sequencing or the supply of laboratory material.  
Some biotech firms utilise their proprietary technology for their own product 
development besides commercialising it. These “hybrid companies” have the advantage 
to generate revenues soon after their inception. Those revenues are invested in in-house 
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product development. Thus, the firms are not profitable at an early development stage, 
but do not exclusively depend on external investors such as venture capitalists. 
The business models adopted by biotechnology firms in Germany varied substantially 
over the last years. Whereas in 2001, when capital was easily available at the VC 
market and the stock markets, half of all firms pursued a product-oriented business 
model, during the hostile financing environment of the years 2002 – 2004 a hybrid 
model became more popular since it allowed the firms to become at least partially 
independent of external financing opportunities. Figure 6 shows the development of 
business models during the timeframe 2001 – 2004. I will provide a more detailed 
analysis of this phenomenon in Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 6: Business models of biotech firms in Germany 
Figure 7 summarises the above introduced categorisations of biotechnology companies 
(Herstatt and Müller, 2002). In this thesis, I will mostly focus on product-oriented, 
hybrid, and service companies, which are ELISCOs and operate in the sector of red 
biotechnology. They represent about 70 % of all German biotech companies and are 
indicated by the grey areas in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Categorisation of biotechnology firms 
2.5 Biotechnology and drug development 
Most biotech ventures in the German industry operate in the field of red biotechnology 
and thus contribute to the pharmaceutical value chain. Traditionally, pharmaceutical 
companies developed therapeutics by screening a large number of chemical entities with 
regard to their potential to inhibit the progression and/or cause recession of diseases in 
animal models. There was no understanding of the molecular mechanisms of these 
diseases (Giesecke, 1999). The development of modern biotechnological methods and 
the knowledge gained by their application about the molecular causes of diseases 
introduced a more systematic R&D process into the development of therapeutics. 
The modern drug development process starts with the identification of a potential 
molecular target. A target is a gene or a protein the malfunction of which is responsible 
for the development of a disease. Target identification may be performed, e.g., by 
comparing gene patterns or protein profiles of ill and healthy individuals. 
Biotechnological techniques such as large-scale gene profiling and analysis of RNA and 
protein patterns in samples of diseased tissue by micro-arrays and two-dimensional gel 
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electrophoresis, respectively, are commonly applied within this first step of the 
pharmaceutical value chain. 
In the second step, the identified potential target needs to be validated. That is, the 
connection between a modification of the target in the sick body and the cause of the 
disease must be well established and understood. Research must demonstrate that 
attacking the target, e.g. by lowering its abnormally elevated levels or inhibiting its 
function, does lead to death or recovery of the pathogenic cells. Cell cultures and 
techniques such as RNAi to modify pathogenic tissue cells in the laboratory are 
fundamental for the target validation process. 
After completion of target validation, a potential drug candidate (so-called lead 
compound) which interacts with the validated target needs to be discovered. A lead 
compound is either a new chemical entity (“small molecule”) or a biomolecule such as 
an antibody, protein, or a piece of DNA or RNA. The latter four lead compound classes 
are often referred to as “biologics”. In the case of small molecules, which constitute the 
lead class traditionally used for drug development in the pharmaceutical industry, High 
Throughput Screening methods select the best 10 – 20 candidates from a pool of 10000s 
of possibilities. Antibodies and proteins may be gained from living organisms whereas 
DNA and RNA are rationally designed in silico as to interfere with the DNA or RNA 
underlying the pathogenic target of interest. 
As a final part of the four-step research process (the “R” in pharmaceutical “R&D”, 
often referred to as “drug discovery”), the lead molecules of either class are optimised 
in a way that the interaction with their target is as strong and as specific as possible. 
Chemical modifications of the lead may facilitate easy oral uptake of the drug. A further 
aim is to avoid interactions with other, non-disease related molecules in the body which 
may lead to undesired side effects for the patient. Besides traditional chemical synthesis 
for small molecules and DNA and RNA lead candidates, biotechnological genetic 
engineering methods are employed to generate optimised antibodies and proteins 
constituting lead candidates.  
After completion of the discovery process, the drug candidate enters the classical 
pharmaceutical development process (the “D” in “R&D”) starting with preclinical 
development. At this step, the drug candidate is analysed in animal models and may be 
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optimised again in parallel to circumvent discovered and undesired side effects. 
Subsequently, it is tested in a clinical Phase I trial within a small group of healthy 
volunteers (typically about 15-50 persons) in order to elucidate general safety dosages 
and gain insights into the drug’s metabolism, distribution within the body, excretion, 
and toxic effects. Phase II is the most critical step for the majority of drug candidates 
and constitutes the “proof-of-concept”. It consists of a placebo-controlled, large scale 
study with up to several hundred individuals who suffer the targeted disease. The aim of 
this phase is to gain evidence on drug safety and efficacy. The subsequent Phase III 
clinical trials are the last tests before market approval and are conducted double-blind 
and placebo-controlled with sometimes more than thousand patients in multiple clinical 
centres in different countries. In this phase, the efficacy of the new drug must be 
established on a statistical level and rare side-effects are investigated (DiMasi et al., 
2003). Figure 8 summarises the modern drug development process. 
 
Figure 8: Modern drug development process 
Besides the above described steps of the pharmaceutical value chain, Figure 8 displays 
the time each step takes as well as its estimated costs and success probability. The 
average total time an initial drug candidate requires for passing the R&D and approval 
process is more than 12 years. On average, the costs amount to 144 million $US. Taking 
into account the costs of capital in the pharmaceutical industry, this number even raises 
to 800 million $US (DiMasi et al., 2003). The probability that an initially selected lead 
candidate will enter the market is only about 6 %. In terms of initial candidates 
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screened, only one out of 5000 finally reaches market launch (Evans and Varaiya, 
2003).  
The numbers above demonstrate that biotechnology, particularly when it comes to 
development of biotherapeutics, is an extremely time and money consuming as well as 
risky business. Therefore, biopharmaceutical ventures essentially depend on capital 
infusions from VC investors. However, even when they succeed in acquisition of VC, it 
is impossible for most young firms to cover all steps of the pharmaceutical R&D 
process. Only established pharmaceutical companies (“big pharma”) are capable of 
financing all activities along the value chain. Therefore, biotech companies usually 
focus on the early steps and have their core competencies in initial screening and 
discovering of new drug candidates by employing their innovative technology. 
Typically, they develop drug candidates jointly with pharmaceutical companies after 
Phase I or II clinical testing in form of a strategic alliance. Since alliance agreement is 
often associated with upfront and milestone payments or equity investments by the 
incumbent, it allows the biotech venture to generate revenues although its products are 
still under development (DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999). Moreover, alliances also save 
costs through pooling of resources (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). I will provide 
a more detailed analysis of the formation of alliances of bioventures in Chapter 5. On 
the long term, a biotechnology firm may become fully integrated and cover the whole 
pharmaceutical value chain. So far only the oldest and most successful 
biopharmaceutical companies in the world such as Amgen and Genentech have realised 
this strategic goal. 
From the perspective of the pharmaceutical companies, there is a high need of filling up 
their R&D pipeline because many firms are about to loose patent protection for their 
best-selling products within the next years (Drews, 1998). Since modern 
biotechnological methods are most efficiently invented and developed in an academic 
and entrepreneurial atmosphere, it is difficult for pharma firms to build up these 
technologies internally. Therefore, they are dependent on the foundation and emergence 
of small bioventures from which they in-license promising drug candidates. In a number 
of cases, this leads to an equity participation of the pharmaceutical incumbent, or to 
total acquisition. However, in the latter case it is important that the biotech firm keeps 
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its independency in order to conserve the entrepreneurial spirit required for 
development of innovative technologies and products (Schweizer, 2005). 
Unfortunately for many young biotech firms, the sequencing of the human genome and 
the quick development of drug discovery technologies over the last years led to an 
oversupply and thus to a severe price decline for validated targets and drug candidates 
in early development stages. In 1998, for example, US biotech company Millennium 
and pharmaceutical firm Bayer entered into an alliance according to which Millennium 
received 456 million $US for validation of 225 potential drug targets for which Bayer 
aimed to develop drugs („Bayer-Millennium-Deal“). Five years later, the average 
market value of a validated target was only about 100000 € – twenty times less than for 
the Bayer-Millennium-deal (Knittel, 2003). Thus, biotech firms face a dilemma: they do 
possess validated targets but are, due to limited financial resources, not able to develop 
drug candidates for these targets to the clinic. On the other hand, pharma firms prefer 
in-licensing of candidates in Phase I/II. For many biotech ventures revenue generation 
by out-licensing early stage product candidates is impossible. Their only way out is to 
acquire sufficient capital from VC investors. Thus, they are highly dependent on the 
capital markets and a downturn means a serious threat for most of the firms. The 
following Chapter 3 will provide a detailed analysis of the effect the hostile financing 
environment of the years 2002 – 2004 had on the German biotech industry. 
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3 Biotechnology in hostile financing environments – an 
organisational evolution perspective on the German 
industry 
The preceding chapter has shown that biotechnology is an extremely money and time-
consuming business, and that the probability that product candidates such as drugs will 
fail to complete the development process is high. Therefore, bioventures essentially 
depend on VC investors which are willing to take the risk and invest large amounts of 
money in these potentially very profitable firms (Prevezer, 2001). A downturn of the 
VC market thus severely threatens young bioventures’ survival. 
In this chapter I will provide a detailed analysis of how a sudden decline in the 
munificence of the financing environment influences the development of the 
biotechnology industry. Specifically, I will investigate from an organisational evolution 
perspective how the German sector responded to the hostile financing environment for 
biotech ventures in the years 2002 – 2004, which followed the burst of the high-tech 
bubble at the stock markets at the beginning of 2001. In Section 3.1, I will first give an 
introduction to the topic before I elaborate on the theoretical lenses of population 
ecology and evolutionary economics, both of which I employ in order to derive the 
analytical framework of the study (Section 3.2). Subsequently, I will describe the 
research design (Section 3.3). I will then illustrate how the German biotech sector 
developed in the years 2000 – 2004 (Section 3.4) before I analyse how external (Section 
3.5) and internal adaptation mechanisms (Section 3.6) contributed to this development. I 
will discuss the findings in Section 3.7 before highlighting limitations of this study and 
suggesting opportunities for further research in Section 3.8.2
3.1 Introduction 
A specific characteristic for many biotechnology ventures is that they burn huge 
amounts of money before they generate revenues. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
biopharmaceuticals, for example, demand more than 100 million $US R&D expenditure 
and a 12-year development process before they enter the market (Kellog and Charnes, 
                                                 
2 I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Dodo zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, University of Bamberg, and Prof. Dr. David B. 
Audretsch, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, for critical comments and discussions on this study. 
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2000; DiMasi et al., 2003). Other biotechnological products such as genetically 
engineered plants or platform technologies also demand high R&D expenditures before 
they reach market launch. For most young bioventures, financing these expensive 
development processes essentially depends on the availability of capital from VC 
investors and the stock markets, which are the main financing sources of young 
bioventures (Ernst & Young, 2005). Therefore, the development of the biotechnology 
industry is substantially influenced by the munificence of the financing environment 
(Prevezer, 2001). In the context of this study, I understand as “development” the change 
in the total number of firms in the industry over time. 
In a munificent environment where capital is easily available and investors are risk-
taking, biotechnology ventures face optimal conditions. Bioentrepreneurs acquire 
capital for starting new firms and quickly expanding existing businesses. Their 
comfortable cash positions allow them to follow several R&D projects in parallel 
including time-consuming and risky ones. They can expand their R&D capabilities by 
enlarging laboratory facilities and hiring top scientific talents. Insolvencies are rare 
since money from investors is pouring in the firms. Thus, the industry will develop and 
grow substantially. In the context of this study, I understand as “development” the 
change in the total number of firms in the industry over time. 
However, a sudden drop in the munificence of the financing environment creates a 
misfit of the bioventures’ growth-oriented strategies with their environmental context. 
The firms are unable to attract further capital in order to finance their expensive and 
lengthy product development processes. Since many ventures were incepted in the 
munificent environment in the recent past, they are still too young to generate revenues. 
Due to their large R&D expenditures, they will quickly face severe financing constraints 
and run in danger of insolvency. Thus, a sudden hostility of the financing environment 
exerts a selective force on the young firms leading to survival of the most adapted ones 
and death of the unadapted. In this study I analyse this adaptation process from an 
organisational evolution perspective. I draw on the theoretical perspectives of 
population ecology and evolutionary economics, respectively, in order to investigate 
adaptation mechanisms at both, the industry and the firm level. The purpose of this 
work is not to provide a mathematical model or a large scale analysis, but rather to 
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qualitatively understand the effect a shortage of available capital has on the 
development of the biotech sector. 
The German biotechnology industry in the years 2000 – 2004 constitutes an excellent 
setting for this research. The sector, which is much younger than its counterparts in the 
USA and the UK (Cooke, 2001) and mainly consists of entrepreneurial, VC-backed 
companies far from profitability, has experienced two fundamentally different financing 
situations in this timeframe. During the high-technology hype in 2000 and the beginning 
of 2001, bioventures faced a financing environment as munificent as never before in 
Germany. In each year venture capitalists invested more than half a billion € in the 
young industry, and companies did not only close large VC financing rounds like, e.g., 
Ingenium (50 million €), Micromet (46 million €), and Cardion (42 million €), but also 
raised more money at the stock markets than ever before. Prominent examples of 
successful Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) include Lion Biosciences (228 million €), 
GPC (188 million €), and MediGene (120 million €). In contrast, when the high-tech 
bubble at the stock markets burst in late 2000 and firm valuations kept declining in 2002 
without recovering substantially in 2003 and 2004, young biotech firms were 
confronted with a completely different situation. The average annual VC investment in 
Germany during this timeframe was only 220 million €, and there was just one single 
IPO of a bioventure. By analysing the evolution of the sector in this time frame, I make 
the following contributions. 
Firstly, I provide an explanation for the unexpected response of the German 
biotechnology industry to the hostile financing environment in 2002 – 2004. Industry 
experts were, based on data on the firms’ cash reserves and R&D expenditures, 
expecting a large number of insolvencies and thus a severe consolidation of the sector. 
However, I show that the adaptive capacity of young biotechnology firms is substantial, 
leading to a much higher survival rate than assumed by the experts. 
Secondly, I find empirical support for recent theoretical work calling for an integrative 
rather than a competitive application of the population ecology and evolutionary 
economics perspectives in order to explain organisational evolution processes. Whereas 
existing studies mostly apply only one perspective or offer and test competing 
hypotheses derived from both, I demonstrate here that the development of the German 
 
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN HOSTILE FINANCING ENVIRONMENTS 24 
 
biotech industry is best understood through both theoretical lenses in parallel. This 
suggests that the more integrated organisational evolution approach is a valuable 
perspective for analysing industry development. 
Thirdly, I provide useful insights for bioentrepreneurs. By illustrating successful 
adaptation strategies of young biotechnology firms I show that cost reduction by 
downsizing, a change in the business model towards more service-orientation, and 
entering into strategic alliances and M&A activities are appropriate means to survive 
during times of low VC investments and closed stock markets. 
3.2 Theoretical background 
Organisational and management theories can be categorised according to two analytical 
dimensions. The first dimension is the level of analysis, which either focuses on 
populations of organisations or on individual organisational units. Moreover, 
organisational theories can be grouped into those which adopt a deterministic view, i.e., 
they consider the behaviour of organisations and the human beings which are part of 
these organisations as determined by environmental forces, and schools of thought 
which follow a voluntaristic perspective and assume that humans in organisations have 
a free will and choose and form their environment pro- or interactively (Astley and Van 
de Ven, 1983). The matrix in Figure 9 provides an overview. 
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Figure 9: Categorisation of organisational theories 
Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985) develop this concept further and treat determinism and 
voluntarism (strategic choice) as independent variables with the combinations high 
environmental determinism/low strategic choice and low determinism/high strategic 
choice representing the ends of the Astley/Van de Ven continuum (for a summary and 
continuative discussion see zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 1995: 427-430). The question 
arises which of these concepts fits most for selecting theoretical perspectives in order to 
analyse the development of an entrepreneurial biotech industry in a hostile financing 
environment. 
As I demonstrated above, bioventures demand huge amounts of money to finance their 
expensive and risky product development processes, and are usually not able to generate 
revenues for years after their inception. Therefore many bioentrepreneurs acquire 
financial resources via the VC market. The amounts raised usually provide them with 
enough liquidity for one to three years. However, when capital markets become hostile, 
they must quickly look for financing alternatives in order to maintain the cash flow 
necessary for further product development. In this case, bioentrepreneurs can not be 
choosers: the high cash burn and short financing horizon of their company demands that 
they acquire whatever financial resources available, otherwise their firm soon runs in 
danger of insolvency. Thus, with regard to the financing strategy, there is little choice 
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for a bioventure manager in a hostile environment. Therefore voluntaristic approaches 
like strategic management theory which stress the strategic choice and pro-activeness of 
managers (Child, 1972; for an overview of strategic management theories see zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2000) are less suited to describe the situation of bioentrepreneurs 
in times of tight equity markets than deterministic theories which at best assume a 
reactive role (Figure 9). Moreover, the argumentation suggests that these managers act 
under high environmental determinism/low strategic choice conditions as introduced in 
the Hrebiniak/Joyce (1985) model, which coincides with the deterministic end of the 
Astley/Van de Ven (1983) continuum. I will thus adopt a deterministic perspective 
below. 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the adaptation of an entrepreneurial biotech 
industry in a hostile financing environment from a process perspective. Therefore, 
evolutionary theory is an appropriate approach for the analysis. The basis assumption of 
this approach is that, as for biological systems, the evolution of organisations can be 
explained by a selective force the environment exerts on each member of the population 
(Alchian, 1986). Like living organisms die if they do not adapt to changes in their 
environment such as food limitations or atmospheric variations, organisations such as 
firms can only survive when their behaviour is in line with the context in which they 
operate. 
Figure 9 shows that population ecology serves as an evolutionary perspective for studies 
on the population level, whereas evolutionary economics is suited for analysis of 
evolutionary processes at the firm level.3 The choice of an evolutionary approach for 
firm level analysis has the further advantage that, in contrast to most strategic 
management theories, it allows for variation of strategies pursued by organisations 
rather than drawing on a fixed “strategic space” of variants (Barnett and Burgelman, 
1996). This is essential to identify so far undescribed financing strategies of bioventures 
in a hostile financing environment. I will below describe both evolutionary theories in 
more detail. I will then introduce a conceptual framework which is inspired by a recent 
                                                 
3 Some scholars also analyse evolutionary processes from a population ecology-inspired perspective at the 
firm level. In this case, a firm constitutes a population of business units, which are selected for survival 
depending on environmental forces. One example is Burgelman (1991), who provides a detailed case 
study on Intel’s strategic exit from its DRAM business. However, this approach is not suited for the 
analysis here because it is difficult to define the “population” of financing sources for small bioventures. 
Instead, identification of alternative financing strategies in a hostile environment is part of this study. 
 
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN HOSTILE FINANCING ENVIRONMENTS 27 
 
theoretical study by Valle (2002) and integrates both approaches. This framework 
serves as the basis for the subsequent analysis. 
3.2.1 Population ecology 
The basic assumption of traditional population ecology is that organisations are inert to 
change because “there are very strong inertial pressures on structure arising from both 
internal arrangements (for example, internal politics) and from the environment (for 
example, public legitimation of organisational activity). To claim otherwise is to ignore 
the most obvious feature of organisational life” (Hannan and Freeman, 1977: 957). As 
the genetic code of a living organism is fixed over its lifetime and limits its adaptability 
to environmental variations, fixed structures in organisations cause inertia leading to the 
inability to adapt to changing environments (Nelson, 1995). Evolution occurs 
“principally at the population level, with forms of organisations replacing each other as 
conditions change” (Hannan and Freeman, 1984: 149). 
Variety among organisations is essential for the population as a whole to survive 
(Campbell, 1969). Organisational diversity is based on differences between the 
competitive behaviour of organisations. Because organisations compete for resources, a 
selection process begins when resource limitations occur and the demand for resources 
exceeds the offer (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979). Only the organisations 
which compete most efficiently survive while all others disappear. 
An important implication of the population ecology approach is that managers and 
leaders of organisations have no impact on survival (Durand, 2001). Due to structural 
inertness, internal change does not take place and strategic adaptation is impossible. The 
evolutionary path of the organisation is exclusively determined by environmental forces 
and independent of its strategy. 
Empirical studies have provided support for the population ecology approach. 
Prominent examples are longitudinal studies by Carroll and co-workers (Delacroix and 
Carroll, 1983; Carroll and Huo, 1986) on the news article industries in Argentina, 
Ireland, and the USA, which showed that newpaper firms’ survival is mainly 
determined by the characteristics of the environment of their home country. Lomi 
(1995) used an ecological approach to explain the founding rates of rural cooperative 
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banks in different regions in Italy. By survival analysis, Nyhan, Ferrando, and Clare 
(2001) found support for the population ecology view on hospital closures in Florida. A 
unique longitudinal, interview and survey-based study among 100 young high tech 
firms in Silicon Valley, the so-called Stanford Project on Emerging Companies (SPEC), 
demonstrated that the conditions at company foundation such as founding team 
composition and the strategy chosen are major determinants of organisational inertia 
and change (Baron et al., 1996; Hannan et al., 1996; Baron et al., 1999). As an example 
for the entrepreneurial context, Shane and Kolvereid (1995) demonstrated that the 
performance of start-up firms in Great Britain, New Zealand, and Norway is best 
explained by environmental factors. 
It is important to note that population ecology is a long-term perspective. Existing 
studies of populations often cover several decades and sometimes even exceed one 
century (e.g., Carroll and Hannan, 1989). In contrast, in this study I only analyse a 
three-year time span (2002 – 2004). However, I argue that the population ecology 
approach is nevertheless suited for this analysis for two reasons. Firstly, the financing 
horizon for most bioventures is considerably less than three years. VC firms usually 
provide staged financing to ventures leaving them with liquidity for one to three years. 
Thus, many VC-backed bioventures will be in danger of becoming insolvent in the 
timeframe of interest (see also the analysis below). In other words, biotechnology can 
certainly be classified as a “high velocity environment” as it is the case for 
microcomputers (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Secondly and more importantly, 
please note that I do not argue on the basis of an economic equilibrium and/or provide a 
generalisable mathematical model. I rather employ the perspective to give a dynamic 
description and identify and explain general tendencies of the sector in the respective 
time span. Therefore equilibrium considerations such as the time horizon analysed do 
not interfere with the results presented here.4
3.2.2 Evolutionary economics 
In contrast to population ecology scholars, the lens provided by evolutionary economics 
assumes well-adaptable organisations (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In analogy to living 
                                                 
4 T. Brenner, personal communication 
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organisms, evolutionary economics scholars argue that organisations are capable of 
learning (Foss, 1994). This learning occurs through a change of their internal routines, 
which become manifest in “activity patterns” of an organisation (Becker, 2004) and 
reflect its knowledge (Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1991). Routines are inherited from the past 
and constitute the basis for future behaviour (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Variety among organisation is based on different sets of established routines (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). Upon environmental change, some of these routines may lead to 
unfavourable results and suboptimal organisational performance. Thus, the organisation 
tries to replace them with new ones which either emerge accidentally or by systematic 
search for alternatives (Winter, 1971). Only those routines which contribute most to 
survival and performance in the new environment will be kept and adopted by the 
organisation (Aldrich, 2000). Feldman and Pentland (2003) distinguish two aspects of 
routines. Firstly, there is the “ostensive” aspect, i.e., its representation, such as “hiring 
routine” or “inventory control”. Secondly, the “performative” aspect describes the 
concrete carrying out by specific people in specific organisations at specific points in 
time. In this study, I will emphasise the ostensive aspect and analyse the representation 
of “financing routines” in bioventures. 
The assumption that new routines may be acquired by a systematic search process 
implies that, in contrast to the population ecology approach, managers and leaders of 
organisations do indeed matter. They decide which strategy the organisation takes and 
which new routines it implements in order to facilitate adaptation to the changing 
environment (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). A change in 
organisational strategy thus always reflects a change of internal routines. Managerial 
choice is determined by various different variables including the managers’ mental 
models (e.g., Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Carpenter et al., 2004) and group processes 
(e.g., Hambrick et al., 1996; Pegels et al., 2000; Carpenter, 2002). 
Empirical evidence for the impact of a firm’s strategy and internal routines on survival 
and performance in different environments has been provided by various scholars. Early 
work by Miller and Friesen (1983) showed that firms which engaged more in strategy-
making activities such as analysis and innovation performed better in a rapidly changing 
environment than others. Others have used the PIMS database to establish that firms 
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with a good environment/strategy fit perform better than others (e.g., Zeithaml et al., 
1981). With regard to small and new ventures, results from a survey among 344 US-
American firms by Miles, Coven and Heeley (2000) suggested that an entrepreneurial 
strategic posture leads to higher performance in a dynamic environment than in a stable 
environment. Zahra and Bogner (2000) used a survey among 127 young US software 
ventures to demonstrate that the interaction of the firm’s technology strategy with its 
competitive environment impacts performance.  
3.2.3 Framework for analysis 
Population ecology and evolutionary economics emphasise two fundamentally different 
mechanisms of organisational adaptation to environmental forces. Whereas the first 
approach focuses on “external” adaptation, i.e., adaptation at the industry level outside 
the organisational sphere, evolutionary economics scholars stress “internal” adaptation 
processes, i.e., the change of organisational routines and organisational strategy. 
Because in reality, however, both mechanisms impact organisational evolution 
processes in parallel (Valle, 2002), both theories can be considered complementary 
(Singh, 1990). Since there is a “lack of studies which include a simultaneous study, 
from a more global point of view, of the processes of change and disappearance” (Valle, 
2002: 219), I will below try to overcome this limitation by analysing both mechanisms.  
Availability of capital is known as an environmental factor which influences survival of 
new firms (Cooper, 1970; Hannan and Freeman, 1984) , and financing constraints are a 
major hurdle for small firm growth (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). This is certainly 
true for biotechnology start-ups, which are capital-intensive and to a large extent 
dependent on the capital markets. Thus, a sudden drop in munificence of the financing 
environment constitutes the start of the adaptation process which simultaneously takes 
place outside and inside organisations (Valle, 2002). Internal adaptation at the firm level 
occurs when bioventures change their financing routines in order to become at least 
partially independent of capital markets. The extent and mode of internal adaptation 
depends on the reactions and strategic decisions of the bioentrepreneurs as a response to 
the environmental change. External adaptation occurs through replacement of firms 
which are unable to raise further capital and which are in addition too inert to change 
their financing routines. The relative amount of external versus internal adaptation 
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determines the observed consolidation of the sector in a hostile financing environment. 
In case of strong external and little internal adaptation, many firms will become 
insolvent and the industry will severely consolidate. In contrast, if many firms are able 
to adapt internally, only few of them will disappear and the overall observed 
consolidation will be rather weak. Figure 10 summarises the described framework. 
 
Figure 10: Framework for analysis of the evolution of the biotech industry in a 
hostile financing environment 
3.3 Methodology and data collection 
In this study I employ population ecology and evolutionary economics as theoretical 
perspectives to describe the development of the German biotech industry. Since both 
perspectives differ in their unit of analysis (industry versus individual firms), I use 
different methods and data sources for both analyses. 
Population ecology studies often derive and test a mathematical model describing the 
adaptation process of a population over a long period of time (for examples see Hannan 
and Freeman, 1989). These analyses draw on data on the founding and disappearance 
events of each member of the population. There is no database available containing 
these data for every biotechnology firm in Germany, and it is therefore impossible to 
describe its development on a mathematical basis. However, the aim of this study is not 
to provide an exact model for the German biotech industry, but rather to qualitatively 
understand its development in the hostile financing environment of the years 2002 – 
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2004. For this purpose, I rely on aggregated industry data which are available for the 
German industry. 
A clear definition of the population under study is critical for analysing its development 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Therefore, for choosing a source for industry level data, it 
is necessary to define which firms I classify as biotechnology firms and which not. 
Because scholars have not yet succeeded to agree on this topic, I rely on the definition 
of biotechnology by the consulting company Ernst & Young, the leading industry 
observer in Germany (see Section 2.1). All quantitative data I use are from Ernst & 
Young biotechnology reports on the German industry, specifically those of the years 
2002 (which covers 2000 and 2001), 2003, 2004, and 2005 (each reporting the 
development of the preceding year). These reports have often been used as data sources 
in the literature (e.g., Giesecke, 2000; Dohse, 2000; Kaiser and Prange, 2004). In order 
to access also qualitative data on industry development such as expert opinions, which I 
use for interpretation of the quantitative material, in addition to the industry reports I 
draw on biotech press, conference contributions, and published interviews. 
With regard to firm level analysis, no literature is yet available on adaptation strategies 
of bioventures in a hostile financing environment. Thus, a substantially detailed 
approach is necessary to analyse the phenomenon. Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest 
a qualitative research design when an in-depth understanding of the research object is 
desired. I therefore chose to apply a case study methodology. Yin (1994: 9) considers 
case studies as appropriate when a “a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being asked about a 
contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control”. As I 
will analyse “why” young biotech firms survived and “how” they adapted their strategy  
and financing routines to the changing environmental context, a case study 
methodology is most suited for analysing the research questions. Cases studies have 
often been used in process research on organisational evolution (e.g., Burgelman, 1983; 
Burgelman, 1991). 
Sampling of the cases is a critical issue because the results of the study depend on the 
choice of the cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994). As a starting point, I used a list of 
German biotechnology firms which Ernst & Young issued in combination with their 
2003 industry report. This list contains 212 German biotechnology firms which 
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participated in Ernst & Young’s 2002 industry survey. I then investigated which firms 
were financed by VC and survived in the years 2002 – 2004. Subsequently, I reviewed 
published case studies (e.g., in dissertations, books and journal articles), industry 
reports, biotech press, published biotech executive interviews, and press releases of 
firms and their respective VC investors in order to identify companies which adapted 
their strategies to the changing financing environment. Further case selection was 
mainly determined by availability of data on the firms. I chose to analyse the cases of 
Micromet, Ingenium, Curacyte and Epidauros, which are all typical entrepreneurial 
bioventures of the German industry. This sample size is consistent with 
recommendations for case studies in the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). Data from 
different sources on one case were triangulated in order to ensure construct validity and 
substantiate the findings and interpretations (Denzin, 1978). 
3.4 The development of the German biotechnology industry 
The German biotechnology industry did not emerge substantially until the 1990s. 
Before, potential bioentrepreneurs were facing unfavourable social, political, and 
financial conditions. This changed at the beginning of the 1990s, when the German 
population and politicians recognised that biotechnology does not only have an 
enormous economic potential, but also contributes to wealth of humankind by, e.g., 
facilitating the development of drugs for unmet clinical needs such as cancer, 
Alzheimer’s disease and diabetes. Hence, biotechnological practices, in particular when 
intended to treat human diseases, gained support in the German society. In 1993, the 
German government reformed the law for use and commercialisation of genetic material 
and techniques. Furthermore, government programs such as the BioRegio Contest in 
1995 financially supported biotech start-up companies and facilitated formation of local 
biotech clusters (Dohse, 2000; Cooke, 2002). Simultaneously, several VC funds were 
started in Germany. Their formation was aided by the introduction of the “Neuer 
Markt” in 1997. This stock market for technology-based firms offered investors an 
attractive opportunity to exit their biotech investments by an IPO (Cooke, 2001; Müller 
et al., 2004). 
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Figure 11 demonstrates the late but rapid development of the German biotechnology 
industry and the amounts of VC invested. The number of firms increased from 104 in 
1996 to 365 in 2001, the highest among all European countries. The VC investment rose 
from 21 million € in 1996 to 565 million € in 2000. However, due to their late 
incorporations, only 13 German biotech companies were listed at the stock markets in 
2004. Many of them were still financed by VC (Ernst & Young, 2003c; Ernst & Young, 
2004; Ernst & Young, 2005). 
 
Figure 11: Development and VC financing of the German biotechnology industry 
After the burst of the high-tech bubble in late 2000, the IPO window closed and did not 
open again for biotech firms until 2004. Because venture capitalists lacked their 
favoured exit option, investment in the sector dropped from 525 million € in 2001 to 
207 million € in 2002 without rising substantially again during the two years following. 
However, the number of biotechnology companies in this timespan decreased only 
slightly to 346 companies in 2004 (Ernst & Young, 2005). I will now analyse how this 
development is explained by external and/or internal adaptation mechanisms. 
3.5 External adaptation 
External adaptation and organisational death occurs either when firms become insolvent 
or when they are acquired by/merged with another company. Whereas insolvencies 
constitute the classical form of organisational death, in the case of an M&A parts of one 
organisation continue their existence as part of another organisation. Because, in 
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contrast to organisations, biological systems are not decomposable, there is no classical 
analogy in biological evolution which would make it easy to categorise M&As as 
survival or death of the partner firms (Aldrich, 1979). However, since in every M&A 
one firm looses its formal independency and the overall population decreases by one, I 
consider it as most appropriate to view M&As as organisational death of the target 
company (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Creation of new organisations is represented by 
new company foundations. Table 2 provides an overview of insolvencies, M&As, and 
foundations of biotech firms between 2000 – 2004 in the German biotech industry. 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Insolvencies n.a. 6 26 24 31 
M&As5 4 5 4 9 3 
Foundations total 59 44 25 23 26 
Foundations VC-backed 30 12 6 3 0 
Sources: (Ernst & Young, 2002b; Ernst & Young, 2003c; Ernst & Young, 2004; 
Ernst & Young, 2005) 
Table 2: Insolvencies, M&As, and foundations in the German biotech industry 
3.5.1 Insolvencies and M&As 
As Table 2 demonstrates, the number of insolvencies increased rapidly upon the drop in 
the munificence of the financing environment in 2002. Whereas only 6 companies ran 
out of money in 2001, 26 became insolvent in 2002. This number finally amounted to 
31 in 2004. These insolvencies include companies which, two years before, had been 
considered flagships of the young industry and had acquired significant amounts of VC, 
such as Axxima (64 million €), Munich Biotech (40 million €), Apovia (29 million €), 
and Xerion (26 million €). Obviously, these ventures were not able to adapt their 
strategy to the new situation and thus were subject to external adaptation. 
                                                 
5 Please note that this number does not include international M&As where the bidder firm is German. 
Moreover, I do not include firms which were acquired by strategic investors but continue to operate 
independently. These two kinds of M&As have no impact on the number of firms in the German industry 
and therefore do not contribute to industry development as I understand it in the context of this study. 
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With regard to M&A activities, the level stayed surprisingly low during 2002 – 2004. 
Although experts were awaiting a wave of M&As coming up as a means of 
consolidation during this timeframe, there was little activity. Thus young biotech firms 
appear to be particularly inert when it comes to M&As. The reasons for this observation 
lie in M&A hurdles specific for privately held and VC-backed entrepreneurial ventures, 
which constitute the major part of German firms. These hurdles include the egos of 
scientific founders who block negotiations in fear of their position and scientific 
reputation, valuation problems of the privately held companies, and missing experience 
with M&As of both, management and investors (Ernst & Young, 2004: 67). These 
hurdles and were observed for VC-backed biotech ventures before (zu Knyphausen-
Aufseß et al., 2005). As a consequence, a number of firms faced insolvency instead of a 
potentially beneficial M&A. One of the most prominent examples is Axxima, which 
was guaranteed a 10 million € financing round in 2004 by its investors if the firm 
succeeded to find an M&A partner. However, negotiations failed and Axxima filed for 
insolvency in late 2004. 
3.5.2 Foundations 
Table 2 shows that the number of new biotech firm foundations dropped substantially 
after the burst of the high-tech bubble in late 2000. In that year, almost 60 biotech 
ventures were incorporated due to easily available capital, and in 2001 Ernst & Young 
still counted 44 inceptions. However, during the hostile financing environment in 2002 
– 2004, the annual number of foundations was only 25 on average. In contrast to 2000, 
when 30 newly founded firms received VC, in 2002 and 2003 only 6 and 3, 
respectively, of the new bioventures were VC-backed. In 2004, none of the newly 
founded biotech start-ups was financed by VC. All these firms obviously succeeded in 
finding alternative sources of financing. Intriguingly, the number of 2004 is quite 
similar to the number of firms started without VC in 2000. Thus, it appears that there is 
a relatively constant amount of firms started without VC in different financing 
environments, whereas the number of VC-backed firms heavily depends on the 
financing situation. This observation is in line with the population ecologist perspective: 
biotech firms are selected already at the time of inception according to their fit with the 
financing environment. 
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Taken together, the population ecology perspective helps to explain the pattern of 
organisational birth and disappearance in the German biotechnology industry during the 
hostile financing environment. External adaptation took place through an increasing 
number of insolvencies and a reduced number of foundations of VC-backed companies.  
3.6 Internal adaptation 
This section describes how biotechnology firms successfully adapted internally to the 
hostile financing environment in Germany. I will introduce four case studies of 
bioventures which changed their strategy and adopted new financing routines as a 
response to the new context. I will then perform a cross case analysis and discuss 
whether the strategic changes I identified were more frequently applied in the industry. 
3.6.1 Micromet 
Micromet was spun-off the University of Munich in 1993 by a team of scientists. The 
company develops antibodies for treatment of various cancers and other indications. 
After financing its R&D by government support for three years, Micromet closed its 
first VC financing round in 1997. Until 2001, Micromet had acquired more than 60 
million € of equity investments, primarily as VC. Until the mid of 2005, Micromet had 
not closed another financing round.  
The key for Micromet to ensure a further inflow of cash during the times of tight equity 
markets was to establish development alliances for its product candidates. In 2000, the 
company granted a global exclusive license to manufacture, market, and distribute an 
antibody of its development pipeline for use in cancer diagnosis to ChromaVision 
Medical Systems. In 2001, Micromet entered into a strategic alliance with Curis 
covering target research and drug development. Micromet received a 14 million $US 
upfront payment and a share in profits and revenues. One year later, it formed an 
alliance with Enzon to jointly develop antibody-based therapeutics, resulting in an 8 
million $US equity investment by Enzon and the agreement to share costs and revenues. 
Another month later, Micromet partnered its clinical lead drug candidate MT201 with 
Novuspharma. The agreement provided Micromet with another 3.9 million $US upfront 
fee. Further milestone payments were planned. Moreover, the companies agreed to 
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share development costs and revenues. Micromet’s CEO commented the deals (Wess, 
2002b): 
“With this series of deals we have generated a good cash flow. We are financed 
through to the end of 2004, maybe until early 2005.” 
However, spanning a network of cash-providing alliances was not enough for Micromet 
to survive in the hostile financing environment. The company also had to restructure its 
operations. This reaction was partly forced by the acquisition of its alliance partner 
Novuspharma by Cell Therapeutics in 2004. Mircomet and Cell Therapeutics failed to 
agree on continuation of the alliance which would have secured Micromet further 
milestone payments. Therefore, Micromet had to reduce its staff from 135 to 90. The 
reduction was expected to provide Micromet with enough liquidity to carry out Phase II 
clinical trials of MT201 themselves (Maggos and Brown, 2004). However, by the end 
of 2004, Micromet again partnered MT201 with pharmaceutical company Serono. As 
part of the agreement, Micromet received another 10 million $US upfront fee and will 
get milestone payments of up to 138 million $US when the product is successfully 
developed and registered worldwide in three or more indications. 
3.6.2 Ingenium 
Ingenium is a Munich-based company which develops mouse and rat models for 
analysis of therapeutically relevant biological pathways. Founded in 1998 as a spin-off 
of the German Human Genome Project, Ingenium had acquired 60 million € in two VC 
financing rounds until the end of 2000. Originally, the company planned to compile a 
catalogue of clinically relevant mouse mutants and offer them to other firms. Besides, 
Ingenium develops its own portfolio of drug candidates. 
Because of its high R&D expenditures and rapid growth to up to 140 employees, 
Ingenium found itself in mid-2002 with financial resources for only about one more 
year. This situation was due to the fact that the company had not yet succeeded in 
finding enough customers for their animal models and had not been able to close a large 
alliance contract as it had planned. Therefore, in June 2002 Ingenium adopted a more 
service-oriented strategy. Instead of developing a catalogue with mouse models which 
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might not meet the requirements of potential customers, the company started to design 
its models according to the specific customer needs. This strategic change allowed for 
commercialisation in more flexible partnership structures including upfront funding, 
milestone payments, royalties, co-development of compounds, and direct fee-for-service 
agreements. Moreover, as a consequence of its strategic change, Ingenium also reduced 
its staff to 80 employees. According to the VP finance (Wess, 2002c): 
“The change of our business model has considerably slowed down our burn rate. 
We now have enough cash to take us through the signing of our first partnership 
before we will need to raise more money.” 
In the beginning of 2003, Ingenium entered into a collaboration with pharmaceutical 
company Elan comprising a potential worth of more than 50 million €. Moreover, 
investors confirmed Ingenium’s strategic change and committed another 13.8 million € 
financing to the company despite of the hostile financing environment at the end of 
2003 (Wess, 2002c; Liebl, 2003: 57). 
3.6.3 Curacyte 
Curacyte was founded in early 2000 in Munich and closed a first round of 7 million € 
VC financing in the autumn of the same year. The company’s initial business concept 
drew on a drug discovery technology from a Germany university institute. Half a year 
after Curacyte’s foundation it turned out that this technology was invalid and based on a 
scientific artefact. In the munificent financing environment during the high-tech hype, 
investors decided to continue the company instead of liquidating it. At that time, 
Curacyte had more than 5 million € in cash left from its initial investment. Curacyte’s 
management started a business development program based on in-house development 
and in-licensing of projects. Moreover, Curacyte actively looked for M&A activities. 
During the hostile financing environment in 2002, Curacyte faced the challenge to 
acquire further capital without a robust technology in hand. Therefore, the company 
decided to merge with another Munich-based firm from the portfolio of its lead 
investor. The merger partner had a drug candidate in Phase III clinical trials which it 
developed in its US subsidiary. As a precondition of the merger, Curacyte’s 
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management demanded that shareholders invest another 7 million € in the combined 
entity in order to facilitate post-merger development. As part of the merger, Curacyte 
consolidated its portfolio and stopped the less promising projects. Moreover, the 
company saved costs through release of personnel (Wess, 2002a; Giersiefen, 2003). 
By the end of 2004, Curacyte was again in need of financing. Although the company 
tried to raise funds through partnering of its clinical product candidate with a 
pharmaceutical firm, negotiations had been unsuccessful so far. Due to the ongoing 
difficult conditions for VC-backed biotech ventures in Germany, management again 
decided to merge with another firm in early 2005. On back of the merger, Curacyte 
secured a 16.5 million € investment. Curacyte’s merger partner was based in Leipzig in 
former Eastern Germany. Since salaries in this part of Germany are significantly below 
payments in the Munich area, management decided to close its Munich site and move 
the company’s headquarters to Leipzig. Moreover, Eastern Germany is eligible for 
special funding and other economic benefits for the German accession states. According 
to the CEO, Curacyte planned further cost reduction and partnering of product 
candidates which were, after reprioritisation of the combined project portfolio, no more 
in the focus of the company (Wess, 2005): 
“We may also lay off some people and seek to partner our oncology compounds, 
as we want to focus on cardiovascular diseases and inflammation.” 
3.6.4 Epidauros 
Epidauros is based in Bernried near Munich and was founded in 1997. In 1998, the 
company closed its first financing round. At that time, Epidauros planned to establish 
three businesses on the basis of its proprietary pharmacogenetic technology: internal 
drug development, out-licensing of pharmacogenetic markers for the development of 
diagnostics, and pharmacogenetic research services for other companies and research 
institutes. In 2001, Epidauros counted 59 employees and planned an IPO in the near 
future in order to attract further capital. 
However, by the end of 2001 Epidauros had not achieved its R&D goals and therefore 
was unable to raise further venture capital or go public in the hostile financing 
environment. The company found itself near insolvency in autumn of 2002. The only 
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alternative was to completely reorganise its business and become profitable the 
following year. In early 2003, Epidauros exchanged its complete management team. 
The company stopped its internal drug development programs and released 50 % of its 
staff. From that time on, Epidauros focused on its fee-for-service business and, using its 
proprietary pharmacogenetic technology, conducted genotyping analyses for drug 
development projects of other biotech and pharma companies. As a second major 
column of Epidauros’ business emerged co-operations with universities and other 
institutions for building up new Intellectual Property (IP) as well as generating revenues 
by out-licensing of existing IP. Moreover, Epidauros started to enhance its income by 
offering pharmacogenetic consulting to other companies and Clinical Research 
Organisations (CROs). In 2003, Epidauros reached its break even, and the company was 
also profitable in 2004. As the CEO stated (Zoltobrocki, 2005): 
“The history of the firm is an example for a turn-around and continuation of a 
company through fundamental reorganisation of its business.” 
3.6.5 Cross case analysis 
The case studies I introduced above reveal four major strategies and new routines by 
which biotechnology firms in the German sector adopted as a response to the hostile 
financing environment: downsizing of operations, entering into strategic alliances, 
changing the business model, and engaging in M&A activities. I will now discuss 
whether the case studies represent exceptions or whether these measures can be viewed 
as more common strategies in the industry. I will draw on the industry data described in 
Table 3. 
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Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Industry employees 10673 14408 13400 11535 10089 
Employees per company 32 39 37 33 29 
Strategic alliances n.a. n.a. 100 105 147 
Business models 
(Product/Hybrid/Service in %) n.a. 45/41/14 46/36/18 33/50/17 31/50/19
Sources: (Ernst & Young, 2002b; Ernst & Young, 2003c; Ernst & Young, 2004; 
Ernst & Young, 2005) 
Table 3: Employees, business models, and strategic alliances in the German 
biotech industry 
Downsizing. Downsizing is “an intentional, permanent, and systematic reduction of 
an organisation’s workforce” (Nixon et al., 2004: 1122). It is a measure of corporations 
to reduce expenditures and is often followed in times of economic downturns (Cascio, 
2002). All four case study companies in the sample downsized their operations in order 
to survive the scarce availability of capital. Micromet reduced its staff by 33 %, 
Ingenium by 43 %, and Epidauros by 50 %. Curacyte also laid off personnel after each 
of its two mergers. Other examples of downsizing measures (either without or in 
combination with M&A activities) in the German biotech industry include Graffinity, 
DeveloGen, Morphochem, Morphosys, Biobase, and others. For the industry level, 
Table 3 shows that not only the total number of employees in the industry dropped by 
almost 30 % from 2001 to 2004, but that the average number of employees per 
company also declined by 26 %. It thus appears that downsizing is a common strategy 
for biotech ventures to adapt to a hostile financing context. 
It is important to note that while downsizing allows for a quick cost reduction and thus 
has a positive effect on a company’s financial results on the short term, it always means 
a loss of human capital which might impact performance on the long run. Nixon et al. 
(2004), e.g., showed that downsizing measures of large corporations tend to have a 
negative impact of firm valuation at the stock markets. Market returns are only positive 
when the company follows a reallocation strategy which ensures that important human 
capital is kept within the firm. Downsizing may be particularly difficult for biotech 
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firms because employees carry most of a firm’s knowledge, which is one of the most 
important organisational resources in the biotech industry (Liebeskind, 1996; Zucker et 
al., 2002). Since existing literature focuses on downsizing of large corporations but 
provides little insights for small and entrepreneurial firms so far, I suggest that going 
forward researchers should analyse how bioventures downsize most efficiently, and 
which impact downsizing has on their long-term performance. 
Strategic alliances. Strategic alliances are “voluntary inter-firm agreements aimed at 
achieving competitive advantage for the partners” (Das and Teng, 2000b: 33). They 
include in- and out-licensing deals, joint R&D agreements, technology exchange, joint 
ventures, and minority equity partnerships (Gulati, 1995). Three of the case study firms 
reacted to the hostile financing environment with an enhanced engagement in strategic 
alliances with other biotech firms, pharmaceutical corporations, and universities. 
Micromet’s new corporate partners included ChromaVision, Curis, Enzon, 
Novuspharma, and Serono. These firms paid more than 20 million $US in upfront 
payments alone, thereby securing Micromet a considerable cash inflow independent of 
the financing environment. For Ingenium, establishing an alliance with Elan was a 
major milestone not only to generate revenues, but also to secure support of investors. 
Epidauros made alliances with universities and research institutions a major part of its 
business in order to develop new IP, which it then out-licensed to other organisations. 
Other German biotech companies such as Paion, Morphosys, and Trion Pharma also 
stressed the importance of strategic alliances to build up and maintain a product 
portfolio in times of tight equity markets (Ernst & Young, 2004). For the industry as a 
whole, the number of newly established alliances rose from 100 in 2002 to 147 in 2004 
(Table 3). I therefore conclude that strategic alliances are important financing routines 
for biotech firms in a hostile environment. 
This interpretation is further supported by existing literature on strategic alliances and 
inter-firm co-operations. Besides research that shows that the establishment of an 
alliance network has a positive effect on the performance of biotech firms in general 
(George et al., 2002; Baum et al., 2000), scholars also demonstrated that alliances are an 
appropriate means for bioventures to obtain various resources from a partner, including 
financing (Shan, 1990; Audretsch and Feldman, 2003). Moreover, Lerner and co-
workers (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner and Tsai, 1999) showed that bioventures in 
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poor cash positions and in hostile financing environments enter into alliances with 
pharmaceutical firms even when the majority of the alliance control rights is allocated 
to the incumbent partner. 
Change in business model. The term ‘business model’ refers to the specific 
information, service, or product that companies exchange and/or the parties that engage 
in the exchange (Amit and Zott, 2001; Hamel, 2000). In the context of the biotech 
industry, Ernst & Young distinguish three business models (Section 2.4). Product-
oriented companies concentrate on development and commercialisation of 
biotechnological products such as therapeutics and diagnostics. Service-oriented 
companies offer the utilisation of their proprietary technology to other companies as a 
research service. Finally, hybrid companies utilise their proprietary technology for 
internal product development besides commercialising it. One major difference between 
these business models is that service-oriented firms create an inflow of cash 
independent of the capital markets. On the other hand, they do not have the growth- and 
upside potential of product-oriented companies. 
Two of the case study companies in the sample adapted their business model to the 
hostile financing environment. At inception, Ingenium planned to offer its mouse 
models from a compiled product catalogue to customers. However, since the company 
was unable to find customers and got in danger of running out of cash in 2002, it 
adapted this model towards more service-orientation. Ingenium started to develop its 
products together with customers according to their specific needs. Similarly, Epidauros 
changed from a company focusing on the development of products such as drugs and 
biomarkers for diagnostics towards a service-oriented firm. Since Epidauros was unable 
to raise funds from investors in 2003, the company focused on its fee-for-service 
business and became profitable within 12 month. Another example of a company which 
had to change its business model towards more service-orientation as a response to the 
hostile capital markets is Cologne-based Amaxa (Ernst & Young, 2003c: 57). Analysis 
of industry level data reveals that these three firms were no exceptions in the German 
industry (Table 3). In 2003, 67 % of all companies were service or hybrid firms, 
whereas one year before these ventures accounted for only 54 % of the total industry. 
Please note that this increase corresponds to a total number of 28 firms, which is below 
the number of new firm foundations in 2003 (Table 2). Thus, even if all insolvent firms 
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in 2003 had been pursuing a product-oriented and all newly founded firms a service-
oriented business model, this number can not be fully explained. These findings suggest 
that bioventures are able to adapt to a hostile financing environment by changing their 
business model towards more service orientation.  
M&A activities. As a final strategy which enabled German biotech companies to 
adapt to a hostile financing environment emerged M&A activities. Curacyte succeed in 
closing two VC financing rounds although the company suffered a technology 
breakdown after its foundation in 2000. Both capital infusions were coupled to the 
merger with another company. Other examples of bioventures which acquired capital in 
combination with M&A activities included SiREEN (2004, 20 million €), DeveloGen 
(2004, 19 million €), Santhera (2004, 14 million €), and others. Obviously, VCs are 
more willing to support their investees in difficult times if these combine with another 
firm and create a larger and more robust company. However, due to the hurdles I 
described above, M&As were a rare strategy for bioventures to achieve financing in the 
years 2002 – 2004 (Table 2). This contrasts the tendency of large corporations to engage 
in M&As as a means of consolidation in times of low environmental munificence (e.g., 
Anand and Singh, 1997). Nevertheless, M&As appear to be a potentially successful 
strategy for bioentrepreneurial companies as well when it comes to securing support of 
investors in hostile financing environments. 
In summary, the above described case studies in combination with the industry data 
demonstrate that, despite their high capital intensity and resource constraints, young 
bioventures are surprisingly flexible organisations with regard to adjusting their 
financing routines to a hostile environment. A substantial number of firms in the 
German industry were able to survive during the years 2002 – 2004 through internal 
adaptation in terms of downsizing, entering into strategic alliances, changing their 
business models, and engaging in M&A activities. 
3.7 Discussion 
In this study I analysed how a drop in the munificence of the financing environment 
influences the development of firms in the biotechnology industry. I drew on the 
theoretical perspectives of population ecology and evolutionary economics in order to 
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illustrate both, external adaptation processes at the industry and internal adaptation 
processes at the firm level. Which contributions do both kinds of processes make to 
explain the overall industry development I described in Section 3.4? 
As Figure 11 shows, VC investment in the German biotechnology industry decreased by 
more than 50 % in 2002 and the two years following, as compared to the years 2000 and 
2001. Interestingly, however, the overall consolidation of the industry was quite 
moderate since the number of firms only dropped from 365 in 2001 to 346 in 2004, a 
decrease of just 6%. This number is much lower than predicted by industry experts such 
as VC managers, executives, and observers of the sector, who were expecting 
disappearance of up to half of all biotech companies in Germany (Table 4). Based on 
their knowledge of the firms’ cash reserves, revenues, and R&D expenditures, these 
experts substantially underestimated the potential of young bioventures to adapt 
internally to the hostile financing context.  
Person Statement Source 
Helmut Schuehsler, 
Techno Venture 
Management TVM 
“Only 200 – 250 of about 400 German biotech 
companies might survive the next two years.” 
(BioCentury, 2003)
Jörg Neermann, 
Deutsch Venture 
Capital DVC 
“Many of the about 400 companies in Germany 
will disappear. At the end of that process, I expect 
that we will reach a steady state of about 150 
biotech companies.” 
(Wess, 2002b) 
BioCentury staff 
report 
“European investors figure that at least a quarter – 
and maybe more than half – of European 
companies will not make it through the current 
selection process, especially those in Germany. 
Attrition will occur through M&A, trade sales, or 
simple liquidations.” 
(BioCentury, 2003)
Mathias Pietras, 
Zentaris GmbH 
“The biotechnology industry will strongly 
consolidate. Besides insolvencies there will be 
successful firms which are integrated in pharma 
companies or acquired by firms from the US.” 
(Ernst & Young, 
2003c: 59) 
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Peter Stadler, 
Artemis Pharma 
GmbH 
“Too much money has flown into too many 
companies while there was too little scrutiny. [...] 
We are now paying the price and have to digest the 
insolvency of many companies.” 
(Wess, 2002b) 
Thomas Köhler, 
Roboscreen GmbH 
“There will be a separation of wheat from the 
chaff. Only those companies will survive that offer 
a product with a demand based on a proprietary 
technology platform.” 
(Ernst & Young, 
2003c: 59) 
Table 4: Selected statements of experts on the expected development of the 
German biotechnology industry 
The significant role a change in financing routines played for survival of a substantial 
amount of firms in the sector is also underlined by the fact that, in 2003, 68 % of VC-
backed firms (corresponding to 105 companies) reported that they had cash for less than 
12 month (Ernst & Young, 2004: 67). However, there were only 34 insolvencies/M&As 
(Table 2) and 33 VC financing rounds in 2004 (Ernst & Young, 2005), leaving at least 
38 of the 105 firms which survived through a change in their financing routines. Thus I 
conclude that, while external adaptation processes qualitatively describe the patterns of 
insolvencies and new firm inceptions, internal adaptation and strategic changes of firms 
prevent a severe consolidation of the sector. A considerable number of bioventures is 
able to adapt to the hostile financing environment by downsizing, entering into 
alliances, changing their business model towards more service-orientation, and securing 
support of investors by entering into M&As. Figure 12 summarises these findings. 
 
Figure 12: Model for the organisational evolution of a young biotechnology 
industry in a hostile financing environment 
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The unit of analysis in this study was the German biotech industry in the timespan 2002 
– 2004. Thus, I draw on a single case study, which raises the question of generalisability 
of the results. Do biotech industries in other countries at other points in time react with a 
similarly moderate consolidation to a sudden hostility of the financing environment? 
There is indeed evidence suggesting that a young biotech sector is generally able to 
cope with a hostile environment for quite some time without severe consolidation. The 
biotech industry in the USA experienced a similar situation as the German sector twice: 
after the crash at the stock markets in 1986 and during the recession in 1993 – 1995. In 
particular the situation in 1986 reminds of the German industry as described in this 
study, because at that time the US sector was similarly young as the German industry in 
2002. Both consisted almost exclusively of entrepreneurial ventures, with many of them 
depending on capital infusions from VC investors and the stock markets. However, 
neither in 1986 nor in 1993 – 1995 the US industry consolidated as strongly as expected 
by industry experts (Ernst & Young, 2003c; zu Knyphausen-Aufseß et al., 2005), 
suggesting that bioventures are more flexible when it comes to financing than generally 
assumed. It appears that the findings presented here are at least partially relevant for 
explaining the development of a young biotech industry in hostile financing 
environments also in other countries. 
For scholars studying the evolution of organisations, the results of this study highlight 
the need to employ the theoretical perspectives of population ecology and evolutionary 
economics simultaneously. Whereas the first approach assumes organisational inertness 
and postulates that organisational evolution takes place through external adaptation 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979), the second perspective emphasises the 
flexibility of organisations and internal adaptation processes (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
So far, there are few studies which draw on both perspectives simultaneously (Valle, 
2002) despite their complementary character (Singh, 1990). Although only exploratory 
and qualitative in nature, the findings I present here contribute to the scarce empirical 
evidence on this argumentation. The assumption of external adaptation is necessary to 
explain the rising number of insolvencies and the decreasing number of new firm 
foundations in the hostile financing environment the German biotech industry 
experienced. However, it is not sufficient to understand why the consolidation of the 
sector was much weaker than data on liquidity and cash burn of ventures would have 
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suggested. This phenomenon can only be explained by assuming a substantial amount 
of internal adaptation processes and changes in the companies’ internal financing 
routines and strategies. New routines bioventures adopt in hostile financing 
environments include downsizing activities, new business models, and an enhanced 
engagement in strategic alliances and M&A activities. For the complete picture of the 
organisational evolution of the German biotech industry, both external and internal 
adaptation processes must be considered. This argumentation is in line with recent 
theoretical work by Valle (2002: 223) who claims that “organisational evolution can be 
explained on the basis of a combination of [the two] different adaptation mechanisms”. 
For biotech managers, the findings of this study have important implications. Even if 
their company was founded in times of a munificent financing environment and pursues 
a growth-oriented strategy, it appears to have a remarkable potential to adapt this 
strategy when equity markets become hostile. However, managerial flexibility is 
essential and drastic measures may be required. These possibly include a significant 
downsizing of operations, a change in the business model towards more service-
orientation, and an enhanced engagement in strategic alliances and M&A activities. 
Since alliances and M&As often have their origin in the personal networks and informal 
contacts of management and employees and establishing these networks is a lengthy 
process, bioventure managers are well advised to build up these contacts already in 
times of environmental munificence. This provides them with the strategic flexibility 
required once the equity markets close. 
3.8 Limitations and future research 
The limitations of this study may be overcome by going forward scholars. As a first 
avenue for future research I suggest that the alternative financing strategies of 
bioventures in a hostile financing environment, which I identified from the qualitative 
case studies in Section 3.6, call for a large scale analysis. It is necessary to corroborate 
on a statistical basis the impact and importance of downsizing measures, changes in 
business models, strategic alliances, and M&A activities on bioventure survival and 
performance under these circumstances. These studies could provide valuable insights 
for bioentrepreneurs. A particular challenge for researchers may be to build up a 
 
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN HOSTILE FINANCING ENVIRONMENTS 50 
 
database containing longitudinal data on the financing routines of biotech firms in 
different environments, which would be necessary for a systematic analysis. 
Secondly, it is important to note that the evolutionary path of the biotech sector in times 
of hostile financing environments may change when the industry becomes older and 
proceeds in its life cycle. The differences relate, e.g., to the role of M&A activities, as 
the development of the US biotech sector in the years 2002 – 2004 indicates. In contrast 
to Germany, the more developed US industry experienced a high M&A activity. One 
major reason for this difference is that about one quarter of the US biotech firms are 
mature and publicly traded companies. In case of M&As between these firms, there are 
little valuation problems because a market valuation is available. Moreover, large and 
highly profitable firms in the US sector such as Amgen and Genentech have significant 
cash reserves which enable them to purchase small firms at low valuations in times of 
closed equity markets. Therefore, at least with regard to M&A activities, the findings I 
presented here appear to be mainly applicable to biotech industries which are in early 
life cycle stages like the German sector. Further research is necessary to explore 
evolutionary adaptation mechanisms not only in relation to the munificence of the 
financing environment, but in parallel taking into account the effect of different industry 
life cycle stages. 
Finally, by providing some insights into the consequences of the German government 
policy which promoted the development of the biotech industry in the late 1990s, the 
results I present also raise important research questions to public policy scholars. Upon 
initiation of the BioRegio Contest in 1995, the development of the German biotech 
industry was facilitated in the four winner regions by interventionist policy measures 
such as providing seed funding for bioventures and building biotech clusters (Dohse, 
2000). Existing research suggests that the government “efforts of interventionism were 
not able to overcome blockages that exist in the German system of biotech innovation. 
On the contrary, those government strategies have enhanced to a large extend the 
structural inertia that made the German system inappropriate for biotech development 
needs” (Giesecke, 2000: 221). However, it is important to note that this study was 
performed the late 1990s and that, as I showed above, the industry has developed 
significantly since. Given the fact that the German sector is less than a decade old and 
that Germany does neither have an established VC industry nor an entrepreneurial 
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culture like, e.g., the USA, the high number of biotech firms in Germany today may 
lead one to believe that the interventionist policy was quite successful. This assumption 
is supported by the fact that, contrary to the expectations of industry experts (Table 4), 
the number of bioventures remained surprisingly high during the hostile financing 
environment in the years 2002 – 2004. However, the strategic adaptation of firms 
towards more service orientation limits their future growth potential and it appears 
unlikely that large and very successful firms such as Amgen and Genentech, which 
were all product-oriented firms from their beginning, will emerge in the German sector. 
Clearly, more research is needed to analyse the impact of policy measures on the 
development of the biotech industry systematically and over a longer period of time. 
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4 M&A activities of German biotechnology start-ups 
The findings I presented in the preceding chapter show that M&As between 
bioventures, although they are rare a phenomenon, can contribute to ensure survival of 
the firms in hostile financing environments. Moreover, these activities are potential 
measures for bioentrepreneurs to achieve company growth in times of environmental 
munificence and easily available capital (Ernst & Young, 2002b). However, M&As of 
small and privately held start-ups are a so far unexplored field in scientific literature. 
Therefore, in this chapter I will introduce a detailed empirical study on M&A activities 
of German biotechnology start-up firms. This study is explorative in nature since I do 
not aim to rigorously develop or test theory, but rather to provide valuable insights for 
managers. I will illustrate specific motives, benefits and problems that are associated 
with M&As of new biotech ventures from the start-up management’s point of view.6
I structure the remainder of this chapter as follows. In the next Section 4.1 I will give a 
general introduction to the topic and its scholarly relevance. I will then provide an 
overview of the development of start-up M&A activities in the German biotech industry 
(Section 4.2). After a brief description of the data sources and methodology (Section 
4.3), I will introduce six M&As between privately held biotech start-ups in more detail 
(Section 4.4). In Sections 4.5 and 4.6, I will discuss benefits and problems, respectively, 
which arose in the analysed cases. In Section 4.7, I will illustrate implications for 
biotech start-up managers and the future development of the M&A activities in the 
German biotechnology industry. I will close in Section 4.8 with pointing to limitations 
of the study and offering suggestions for more systematic future research. 
4.1 Introduction 
In research-intensive high-technology industries such as biotechnology, it is a 
challenging task for start-up company managers to build up a valuable resource 
platform of their firms in order to gain competitive advantage. The development of 
complex new technologies does not only require substantial financial resources, but also 
competencies in different scientific and technological fields (Jones et al., 2000). The 
                                                 
6 This study profited from discussions with Dr. Lars Schweizer and Prof. Dr. zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 
University of Bamberg. 
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increasing speed of new product development in global markets further complicates the 
entrepreneurial task (Chatterji and Manuel, 1993). In order to ensure a quick and 
efficient acquisition of resources, many biotech start-ups share resources with other 
firms and enter into strategic alliances or mergers and acquisitions. 
A substantial body of literature is dedicated to strategic alliances in the biotechnology 
industry (Audretsch and Feldman, 2003). For young biotech companies, in particular, 
alliances are essential (Oliver, 2001). The establishment and efficient organisation of an 
alliance network is linked to the innovative performance of biotech start-ups (Shan et 
al., 1994) and is a prerequisite to attract investors (Baum and Silverman, 2004). 
Furthermore, collaborations constitute an important source for learning and, therefore, 
broaden the biotech start-up’s knowledge base (McNamara, 1998; Fildes, 1990; 
Liebeskind et al., 1996; Powell, 1998). 
In contrast to literature on strategic alliances and inter-firm co-operation, work on 
M&As mainly focuses on large companies. In this context, the desire to obtain valuable 
resources, including know-how, technologies, and capabilities possessed by the target 
firms is a driver of M&A activities (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999; Schweizer, 2005). 
However, existing literature can not provide research devoted to the study of the 
acquisition of entrepreneurial firms (Chen and Reuer, 2004) or of the M&A activities 
between start-up companies. These M&As might differ from deals between large 
corporations in various aspects. In contrast to large firms, start-up companies follow 
resource-seeking rather than resource-exploiting strategies (Zaby, 1999), and I therefore 
would expect different M&A motives. Moreover, start-up companies may achieve other 
benefits through M&As, e.g., attracting new equity investors as a result of enhanced 
visibility. Finally, during the M&A process, specific problems for small start-up 
companies might arise due to missing management experience and the strong impact of 
investors, such as venture capitalists, on the start-up management (Gompers and Lerner, 
1999). Research on M&As between start-up companies is particularly important since 
an unsuccessful deal might threaten the life of a new venture because of its limited 
resource base. Therefore, I analyse M&As between start-up companies in the German 
biotechnology industry. 
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4.2 M&A activities in the German biotechnology industry 
After the burst of the high-tech bubble in the year 2000, many German biotech start-ups 
were facing serious financing problems (see Chapter 3). Because of the closed IPO 
window in the years 2002 – 2004, investors lacked their favoured exit option and VC 
investment in the sector dropped from 525 million € in 2001 to 207 million € in 2002 
and 216 million € in 2003, respectively. However, although in 2003 more than half of 
the German biotech start-ups had cash for less than twelve month, the awaited 
consolidation of the industry through M&A activities did not materialise. In their annual 
reports, Ernst & Young listed 38 M&A deals in the years 2000 – 2003, 18 of which took 
place between two privately held start-up companies (Ernst & Young, 2002b; Ernst & 
Young, 2003c; Ernst & Young, 2004). In the following, I analyse six of these 18 M&As 
in more detail. 
The development of the financing environment had implications for the M&A activities 
of biotech start-up companies. There were eight and seven deals between private start-
ups in 2000 and 2003, respectively, but only two and one in 2001 and 2002, 
respectively. In the high-tech hype of the year 2000, when the financing environment 
was excellent and valuations of biotech start-ups were high, German companies 
acquired or merged with mostly US-based start-ups in exchange for their expensive 
stock. In five of the eight M&As in 2000 the target company was from the USA. In 
2001, stock markets were declining and the IPO window closed. Thus, valuations of 
start-ups also dropped and stock-by-stock acquisitions became more expensive for 
German companies. Consequently, there were only two deals. In 2002, VC investment 
in the German biotech sector declined more than half as compared to the preceding 
year, and company valuations were also lower than in 2001. Because investors were not 
willing to sell or merge their portfolio companies cheaply, low valuations hindered an 
efficient consolidation of the German industry and there was only one merger of two 
privately held biotech start-ups. In 2003, the financing environment was still difficult 
for German bioventures and many of them were in danger of running out of cash. Thus, 
they were an attractive acquisition target for foreign companies. Of the seven M&As in 
2003, four had a foreign bidder, with three of them coming from the USA (Ernst & 
Young, 2003c; Ernst & Young, 2004). 
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Depending on the financing environment, motives and general conditions for the M&As 
mentioned above differed. For example, whereas the overall motif for an M&A in 2000 
was to grow and attract new investors in an excellent financing environment, the merger 
between Curacyte and VitaResc was aimed at consolidating the businesses in order to 
ensure survival and further growth of both companies in the difficult financing 
environment of 2002. In the following sections, I introduce examples of both, growth- 
and consolidation-oriented M&As (Bower, 2001), and benefits and problems associated 
therewith. 
4.3 Methodology and data collection 
As mentioned above, this research was not intended for rigorously building or testing 
theory, but for providing valuable insights for managers. With the aim of demonstrating 
motives, benefits and problems that are specific for M&A deals between new 
bioventures, I analyse six M&As within the German biotech industry. Four of these 
deals took place during the high-tech boom of 2000 and two in the hostile financing 
environment of the years 2002 and 2003. The cases cover national and international 
deals and drug development as well as diagnostics companies. Table 5 provides an 
overview of the analysed M&As. 
Case Year Countries Employees Business area 
GPC – Mitotix 2000 G/USA 90/40 drug development 
Morphochem – SMT 2000 G/USA 30/28 drug development 
DeveloGen – HepaVec 2000 G/G 30/30 drug development 
Epigenomics – ORCA  2000 G/USA 50/15 diagnostics 
Curacyte – VitaResc 2002 G/G 15/13 drug development 
Alnylam – Ribopharma 2003 USA/G 25/25 drug development 
Table 5: Overview of M&A cases 
A detailed case analysis turned out to be a more difficult task than initially expected. 
One major reason why there is so little research dealing with M&As of small, privately 
held companies may be that start-up managers as well as their investors tend to keep the 
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development of their risky businesses secret until they go public. Consequently, when 
approaching companies for interviews, I did not manage to talk to the CEOs and/or 
other executives or investors of all the case companies. Therefore, I also had to rely on 
secondary sources of information. In two cases, I had the chance to attend conference 
talks given by the CEOs and reporting on the M&A deals of their company. 
Furthermore, I talked to independent experts of the German biotech industry to validate 
the results. 
Given the qualitative nature of the data, triangulation was one of the important means of 
increasing construct validity and substantiating findings (Denzin, 1978). I used archival 
documents and interview case write-ups. Table 6 presents an overview of the data 
sources. 
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GPC – Mitotix X X   X   
Morphochem – SMT X X X X    
DeveloGen – HepaVec X X  X    
Epigenomics – ORCA  X X    X X 
Curacyte – VitaResc X X X X   X 
Alnylam – Ribopharma X X  X  X  
Table 6: Data sources used in the M&A case studies 
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4.4 Description of the M&A cases 
This section describes the above listed M&As. I will introduce the merging companies 
and the motives behind the deals. Table 7 shows an overview of M&A motives from the 
data. This table serves as the basis for the subsequent discussion of benefits and 
problems in the next sections. 
Case Motives 
GPC – Mitotix 
“The transatlantic combination of GPC AG and Mitotix will create 
a unique company which combines broad technological integration 
from target discovery to the clinic with global access to the world’s 
premier pharmaceutical customers, strategic biotech partners and 
financial markets.” (CEO in company press release in 2000) 
Morphochem – SMT 
“We are excited about the novel proprietary screening technologies 
and biology that have been established at SMT.” (CSO in company 
press release in 2000) 
“Besides an interesting technology, we were also attracted by 
SMT’s strategically favourable location in Princeton.” (CFO in 
biotech press in 2000) 
DeveloGen – HepaVec 
“We have combined the technological platforms of two individually 
strong companies to create an organisation poised for significant 
advancement in its R&D programs.” (CEO in company press 
release in 2000) 
Epigenomics – ORCA  
“Because ORCA is the only company in the world which is also an 
DNA methylation specialist, the transaction will create an 
outstanding force in this exciting market. [...] Through the merger 
we strengthen our leading position and establish a main pillar in the 
US.” (CEO in conference talk in 2003) 
Curacyte – VitaResc 
“The merger was part of our strategy to achieve critical mass.” 
(CEO in interview in 2004) 
“It was clear to us that the pearl of VitaResc was PHP, which was 
developed in the US.” (CFO in interview in 2004) 
Alnylam – Ribopharma 
“By combining our patent portfolio and scienitific skills we became 
the major RNAi company and the most attractive partner in the 
world for pharmaceutical companies aiming to develop RNAi 
therapeutics.” (CSO in interview in 2004) 
“A major motive for the merger was to get access to Alnylams 
professional management.” (CEO in interview in 2004) 
Table 7: M&A motives (examples from the data) 
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4.4.1 Genome Pharmaceutical Corporation – Mitotix 
Genome Pharmaceutical Corporation (GPC) was founded in 1997 in Munich with the 
aim of becoming a fully integrated drug discovery company. GPC was building up a 
proprietary technology platform including analysis of protein interaction and gene 
expression as well as bioinformatics for efficient identification and validation of 
therapeutically relevant target molecules. Until March 2000, GPC had raised more than 
30 million € financing, most of it as VC. At that time, it acquired Mitotix, a company 
focusing on the development of small molecules as lead drug candidates for cancer 
diseases. Being five years older than GPC, Boston-based Mitotix had also closed 
several rounds of VC financing. 
The integration of technologies with the potential to cover the whole drug discovery 
process was the major motif for both companies to combine operations. Mitotix’ 
excellent geographic location at One Kendall Square and the resulting opportunities to 
establish networks with US companies and universities was another motif for GPC’s 
acquisition. 
4.4.2 Morphochem – Small Molecule Therapeutics 
The scientists Alexander Dömling and Wolfgang Richter founded Morphochem in 1996 
in Munich. As basic technology, the company developed its proprietary “MORE-
System”, which combines chemical reactions with a bioinformatics platform, thereby 
allowing an efficient identification and optimisation of lead molecules for drugable 
targets. Before the acquisition of Princeton-based Small Molecule Therapeutics (SMT) 
in March 2000, Morphochem had raised about 22 million € in two VC financing rounds. 
SMT had raised 10 million $US financing but was in serious financial problems and 
thus an attractive acquisition target. SMT was developing tests for screening the 
interaction of lead molecules with specific target proteins. 
Executives from both companies and main shareholders mentioned the combination of 
both technologies in order to form a fully integrated drug discovery company as the 
main deal motif. Further motives for Morphochem’s acquisition included the 
installation of an international presence and the access to SMT’s business and scientific 
network in the USA and Japan. 
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4.4.3 DeveloGen – HepaVec 
A team of three scientists and the serial bioentrepreneur Herbert Stadler founded 
DeveloGen in 1997 in Goettingen. DeveloGen aimed at developing drugs for metabolic 
diseases such as obesity and diabetes and focused on the identification and validation of 
target genes. Until October 2000, when it merged with HepaVec in the first German-
German biotech merger, DeveloGen had raised about 10 million € VC financing. 
Berlin-based HepaVec, which was founded in 1996 also by Herbert Stadler, owned a 
vector technology for targeting specific genes to pathogenic cells. It already had a gene-
therapeutic drug candidate in Phase I/II clinical trial. HepaVec had raised more than 10 
million € in two VC financing rounds. 
According to Herbert Stadler, CEO of both companies at the time of the merger, growth 
and the achievement of critical mass was the main motif for the deal. The combination 
of DeveloGen’s and HepaVec’s technology should facilitate the targeting of 
therapeutically relevant genes to damaged cells within the human body. 
4.4.4 Epigenomics – ORCA Biosciences 
Epigenomics was incorporated in 1998 in Berlin. The company is specialised on DNA-
methylation technology, which it uses to develop a new generation of diagnostic 
products. Until December 2000, when Epigenomics merged with Seattle-based ORCA 
Biosciences, it had acquired about 7 million € VC. ORCA, founded in 1997, was also 
focusing on DNA-methylation technology. 
Epigenomics founder and CEO Alexander Olek stressed that the extension of a 
worldwide leading position in DNA-methylation technology and the establishment of a 
US presence were major motives for the merger with ORCA. He expected a US 
subsidiary to provide access to qualified senior management, a huge market for 
diagnostics, co-operations with universities and industry, and an easier listing on the 
NASDAQ in the future. 
4.4.5 Curacyte – VitaResc 
Curacyte was founded in 2000 by a team including Helmut Giersiefen (CEO) and 
Andreas Zaby (CFO) in Munich. Because of a technology breakdown ten month after 
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its incorporation, Curacyte had to build up a new technology platform by in-house 
development, in-licensing, and M&A activities. Therefore, the company, which still was 
in a good cash position from its 7 million € series A financing round, merged with 
Munich-based VitaResc in 2002. VitaResc, which was founded in 1999, had a wholly-
owned subsidiary in Durham, North Carolina. VitaResc was developing PHP, a drug 
against distributive shock, which was already in Phase III clinical trial. At the time of 
the merger, VitaResc had already closed two VC financing rounds worth more than 20 
million € capital. 
Through the merger with VitaResc, Curacyte became, although only two years old, one 
of the few German biotech companies with a product in Phase III clinical trial. 
VitaResc, which was a high-risk one-product company, on the other hand gained a 
proprietary technology with the potential for in-house development of drug candidates. 
According to Helmut Schuehsler of Techno Venture Management (TVM), the major 
shareholder of both companies, the merger was a clear win-win situation for all 
participants. 
4.4.6 Alnylam – Ribopharma 
Alnylam is a US company founded in 2002 in Boston by a team of reputable scientists 
and managers including Nobel laureate and Biogen founder Philip Sharp and CEO John 
Maraganore, previously manager and scientist at two leading US biotech companies. 
Alnylam develops a new class of pharmaceuticals based on the innovative and very 
promising RNAi technology. Already in 2002, Alnylam closed two VC financing 
rounds and acquired 17 million $US. One year later, Alnylam merged with Ribopharma, 
a company located in Kulmbach, Bavaria. Like Alnylam, Ribopharma were RNAi 
specialists. The company was headed by two scientists, Roland Kreutzer (CEO) and 
Stefan Limmer (CSO). 
Through combination of their strong IP portfolios, Alnylam and Ribopharma aimed at 
becoming one of the leading RNAi companies worldwide. For Ribopharma CEO 
Roland Kreutzer, access to the professional management and the reputable scientists at 
Alnylam was another main motif for the merger. 
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4.5 Benefits from the M&As 
M&As of biotech start-ups are difficult to evaluate with regard to their overall success. 
Because the companies are not listed at the stock markets, no market valuation is 
available. Furthermore, as biotech companies do not generate significant sales in their 
early development stage, no accounting data can be used to estimate success. Another 
problem is that some of the deals in this study were successful in the one context, e.g., 
gaining visibility for investors, and less successful in the other, e.g., integration of 
technologies. Thus, I could not draw any conclusions with regard to the overall success 
of the M&A deals analysed. 
However, based on the interviews and secondary data sources, I was able to identify 
specific benefits that arose from the M&As. Given the fact that there is no consensus on 
a common way of measuring M&A success (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999), I used the 
evaluation of managers involved and compared these statements with the evaluations 
given in other data sources (Datta and Grant, 1990). Table 8 provides examples of 
benefits from the data. During the analysis it turned out that the benefits can be 
differentiated according to four main categories: financial, technological, product-
oriented, and managerial. 
Case Benefits 
GPC – Mitotix “This [the acquisition of Mitotix] saved us two to three years of work.” (CEO in business press in 2004) 
Morphochem – SMT 
“The purchase may pay dividends after all, as an article in the 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences suggests that the 
subsidiary’s research has produced several early stage cancer 
compounds.” (Biotech press in 2002) 
DeveloGen – HepaVec 
“Half a year after the merger we closed one of the largest VC 
financing rounds ever in Germany, which was already planned at 
the time of the merger. In this sense, the merger was very 
successful.” (CFO in interview in 2004) 
Epigenomics – ORCA  
“ORCA brought to Epigenomics valuable co-operations and 
connections with academic institutions in the US.” (Biotech press in 
2001) 
“Epigenomics identified several hundred unique markers to allow 
early detection of colon cancer. [...] Research was carried out at 
Epigenomics’ high throughput discovery facility in Seattle.” 
(Company press release in 2001) 
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Curacyte – VitaResc 
“Despite the hostile financing environment, our shareholders 
decided on a bridge financing round on the back of the merger to 
provide ample time to implement the merger. [...] With an ongoing 
Phase III clinical trial, Curacyte is one of the most advanced biotech 
companies in Germany [in 2004].” (CFO in interview in 2004) 
Alnylam – Ribopharma 
“The excellent contacts of our professional management in the US 
with banks and investors were a prerequisite to go public in 2003, 
when the IPO window was closed in Germany.” (CSO in interview 
in 2004) 
Table 8: M&A benefits (examples from the data) 
4.5.1 Financial benefits 
All M&A deals cited above were accompanied by significant capital infusions for the 
biotech start-ups. By far the largest amount was raised by GPC two month after the 
acquisition of Mitotix. Due to enhanced visibility for investors through the international 
expansion and the excellent financing environment of the year 2000, GPC was able to 
acquire 188 million € through its IPO, one of the largest amounts ever raised by a 
German biotech company. 
Morphochem and DeveloGen both raised more than 40 million € VC financing in 
connection with their M&As. Those rounds were among the largest ever in Europe. 
Epigenomics raised 28 million € and Alnylam 25 million $US. The least money was 
raised by Curacyte (7 million €). However, given the technology breakdown one and a 
half years before and the harsh financing environment of the year 2002, without the 
merger further financing might have been very difficult for Curacyte. From VitaResc’s 
point of view, the merger with Curacyte did not only provide access to new capital, but 
also to Curacyte’s financial resources from its last financing round. Furthermore, 
Curacyte benefited financially from cost savings through release of personnel. 
Taken together, for the biotech start-ups in the case studies M&As were an option to 
acquire financial resources by attracting new equity investors, combining with a 
company which is in a good cash position, or by reducing costs in the combined entity. 
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4.5.2 Technological benefits 
In five of the six cases in this study combination of technologies was mentioned as one 
of the major deal motives. Four of these five companies retrospectively claim that this 
combination indeed paid off. GPC significantly speeded up its drug discovery process. 
Similarly, Morphochem reported the identification of small molecule inhibitors for 
therapeutically relevant cancer targets due to SMT’s screening technology. The CEOs 
of Epigenomics and Ribopharma mentioned benefits in technology development 
resulting from the scientific discussions with their respective M&A partners. 
4.5.3 Product-oriented benefits 
GPC and Morphochem both claim that their M&As have advanced their drug discovery 
process and led to identification of lead compounds. However, until the end of 2004, 
none of these drug candidates had advanced to the clinic, which makes it difficult to 
judge final benefits. Similarly, all projects at Alnylam were preclinical at that time. 
DeveloGen acquired one clinical product in Phase I/II, which failed to complete clinical 
development. The only company making a large step along the pharmaceutical value 
chain was Curacyte. VitaResc’s lead product PHP was already in Phase III clinical trials 
with indication distributive shock at the time of the merger with Curacyte. The study 
was ongoing by the end of 2004. Additionally, PHP entered Phase II studies for two 
further indications. 
4.5.4 Managerial benefits 
In three of the six M&As under study the combined company was obviously headed by 
a stronger management than the individual entities. Firstly, before the merger, Herbert 
Stadler had to spend his time on heading two companies, DeveloGen and HepaVec, as 
CEO and without any further top management support. After the merger, he could not 
only focus on one company, but was soon complemented by CFO Carsten Dehning. 
Secondly, Curacyte’s M&A partner VitaResc was headed by an interim CEO since the 
original CEO left the company one year before the merger. After the deal, the 
experienced Curacyte management took over the combined company and soon 
supplemented the top management team by a Chief Development Officer leading their 
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US-operations. Thirdly, Ribopharma, which was headed by two scientists, gained 
management experience by merging with Alnylam, the top management team of which 
consisted of well-known and previously successful bioentrepreneurs. 
4.6 Problems in the M&A process 
Although start-up managers as well as investors in the interviews and in the literature 
more stressed the benefits that arose from the described M&As, they also mentioned 
some problems associated therewith. Those occurred in the pre-merger negotiation 
phase or during post-merger integration. Table 9 illustrates examples from the data that 
form the basis for the following discussion. 
Case Problems 
GPC – Mitotix n.a. 
Morphochem – SMT 
“We added 35 people when we bought SMT. However, it took us 
until recently to understand what we did. [...] Cultures were 
different and there was no homogeneous growth. Looking from 
today’s perspective, it would have been necessary to have one 
board executive in the US all the time. [...] US companies are very 
difficult to integrate, and today, I would rather do it in Europe.” 
(CEO in biotech press in 2002) 
DeveloGen – HepaVec 
“[By using HepaVecs vectors to deliver the Pax-4 gene] we plan to 
take gene therapy into a new direction“ (COO in biotech press in 
2000); “We do not follow any gene-therapeutic projects anymore, 
but rather focus on small molecules.” (CFO in interview in 2004) 
Epigenomics – ORCA  
“We learned that there are real cultural differences between the US 
and Europe. [...] Financial controlling and planning issues differ a 
lot. So, it became necessary to keep tight control from Germany. 
[...] Frequent and direct interaction with the people in the US is 
essential.” (CEO in conference talk in 2003) 
Curacyte – VitaResc 
“Before entering into negotiations with VitaResc, we evaluated 
three other merger candidates. However, all were rejected on the 
basis of either scientific concerns or the problem that the 
candidates’ projects were even at earlier development stages than 
Curacyte’s new project portfolio and, thus, hardly qualified for 
creating a more robust company.” (CFO in interview in 2004) 
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Alnylam – Ribopharma 
“We had problems to ensure employment in Germany because 
Americans do not like long-term agreements [...] In the end, we had 
the largest problems with minority equity holders who tried to get 
the absolute maximum out of the deal.” (CSO in interview in 2004) 
Table 9: M&A problems (examples from the data) 
4.6.1 Pre-merger negotiation phase 
In many M&As, the pre-merger negotiation phase is an exhausting and time-consuming 
process which costs the participating managers a lot of energy. This became particularly 
obvious in the case of Curacyte. Since the company was missing a robust technology 
platform, it was actively looking for M&A opportunities. Before getting in contact with 
VitaResc, it had already entered into negotiations with three other companies. These 
negotiations failed for different reasons. In one case, Curacyte’s and the potential 
partner’s technologies were missing the desired compatibility, in the second case the 
cash-burn of the combined entity would have been too high, and in the third case, 
shortly before closing the deal, Curacyte’s candidate closed another VC financing round 
and decided to continue on its own. Therefore, the negotiations occupied significant 
managerial capacity, which was missing in daily business. 
Ribopharma only entered into negotiations with Alnylam and successfully completed 
them. In this case, the major problem arose during negotiations with shareholders. In 
particular the “stille Gesellschafter”, a special form of shareholders only incorporated in 
the German but not in the US-American law, were difficult to persuade and almost 
stopped the deal. Because Ribopharma is now part of the US-American Alnylam 
Holding, these shareholders could not continue their status after the merger and had to 
be paid out. Since they believed in a successful IPO of Ribopharma even without the 
merger, negotiations were difficult and, in the end, costly. In contrast, in the case of 
Curacyte, where both merger partners had a significantly overlapping shareholder base, 
full support of all shareholders facilitated pre-merger negotiations. 
Another difficult task reported by the interview partners at Alnylam and Curacyte were 
decisions about the future of employees. Ribopharma, which was in the comfortable 
position of having the opportunity to close another financing round with existing and 
new investors instead of merging with Alnylam, made it as a precondition of the deal to 
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guarantee maintenance of a German site of comparable size and staff for a certain time. 
Since US business philosophy does not like long-term agreements, it was difficult to 
achieve mutual consent. The Curacyte management, which was in a less comfortable 
situation than Ribopharma, had the opposite problem: they had to decide which people 
to lay off and which ones to keep. Since Curacyte’s management worked out a complete 
post-merger integration plan already in the pre-merger phase, these decisions had to be 
drawn already before the closing of the merger. In particular in a small company, where 
everybody knows everyone, this is a difficult task. As Andreas Zaby, Curacyte’s CFO, 
commented: “It was not easy on a personal level. We were not in the year 2000 when 
money was pouring in and positions could be double-staffed. Our situation was 
different. These decisions were no fun.” 
4.6.2 Post-merger integration phase 
It is a well-known fact that M&As, as good as the perspectives at the time of the merger 
may be, often fail (Sirower, 1997) because an efficient post-merger integration of the 
companies is not achieved (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). In the cases of this study, 
interviewees as well as literature articles reported several problems during this difficult 
task. 
In a conference talk, Epigenomics CEO Alexander Olek stressed that the overcoming of 
cultural differences between Germans and Americans was a serious challenge after the 
merger with ORCA. Staff at the Berlin site had to be trained to interact with personnel 
at the new US subsidiary and to get to know and respect the US social rules. 
Furthermore, it was important to keep all contacts as direct as possible and to use the 
phone for the tiniest issues instead of relying on e-mailing. Olek and his top 
management team members spent a lot time in the US and even built up a social life 
there including membership in fitness studios and participating at social events. On the 
other hand, the US management was invited as often as possible to come to Germany in 
order to ensure that they identify themselves with the whole company. 
The requirement for a steady and regular presence of top management team members at 
US operations was also reported by other companies. Four years after the acquisition of 
Mitotix, GPC’s CEO Bernd Seizinger still shuttled in a three-week period between 
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Munich and the USA. Curacyte instead, although not planned initially, shortly after the 
merger turned the head of their US operations into a top management team member and 
hence ensured better identification with the merged company. Furthermore, to support 
scientific exchange and communication between both sites, Curacyte organised the 
company by projects and, if possible, distributed project team members among the two 
sites. Morphochem also reported that permanent presence of a top management team 
member at their acquired US operations would have been necessary for efficient 
integration, but did not achieve it. In 2002, Morphochem laid off 27 of their 32 US 
employees and today would prefer acquiring a European company due to its integration 
problems. 
Moreover, financial planning and controlling were sources of post-merger integration 
problems. Epigenomics CEO Alexander Olek stressed that these practices differ 
significantly between Germany and the USA. Hence, Epigenomics introduced tight and 
central control from the German headquarters. 
Finally, combination of technologies may also cause difficulties post-merger. When 
merging with HepaVec, DeveloGen aimed to use HepaVec’s technology for 
development of a “regenerative gene therapy”. In the years after the merger, however, 
DeveloGen turned into a small molecule company and does not follow gene-therapeutic 
projects any more indicating that technological integration was not possible as initially 
planned. 
4.7 Implications and conclusions  
Table 10 summarises the main motives, benefits and problems associated with M&As 
between biotech start-up companies in the case studies. The findings have several 
implications for biotech start-up managers. Furthermore, they offer the opportunity to 
discuss some potential implications and development paths of the future M&A and 
consolidation activities within the German biotech industry. 
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Case Main motives Main benefits  Main problems 
GPC – Mitotix 
Integration of technologies 
Access to networks in US 
Visibility for investors at 
IPO 
Faster product development 
n.a. 
Morphochem – 
SMT 
Integration of technologies 
Access to networks in US 
Visibility for VC investors 
Identification of lead 
compounds 
Post-merger integration of 
US subsidiary 
DeveloGen – 
HepaVec 
Achieve critical mass 
Integration of technologies 
Visibility for VC investors  
Management capacity 
Integration of technologies 
Epigenomics – 
ORCA  
Leading position in 
technology 
Presence in US 
Visibility for VC investors 
Scientific knowledge 
Cultural differences 
Financial planning and 
controlling issues 
Curacyte – 
VitaResc 
Extend product pipeline 
Achieve critical mass 
VC financing in hostile 
environment 
Extension of product 
pipeline 
Find the right merger 
partner 
 
Alnylam – 
Ribopharma 
Leading position in 
technology 
Access to management 
skills 
Visibility for VC investors 
Professional management 
Escape hostile financing 
environment 
Negotiations with 
shareholders 
Ensure employment 
Table 10: Summary of main M&A case findings 
4.7.1 Implications for biotech start-up managers 
Managers of biotechnology start-up companies can learn a number of lessons from the 
case studies. Before deciding to look for an M&A opportunity of their company, they 
should be aware that not only the process of searching and negotiating with possible 
partners can be exhausting and time-consuming, but also the post-merger integration 
phase. Pre-merger, sources of frustration may be the vain attempts to find the right 
partner and lacking support of investors. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the Curacyte 
case, negotiations may fail at any time, even shortly before signing contracts. Painful 
decisions like the lay-off of personnel or the restructuring of the project portfolio might 
cause sleepless nights to some managers. Post-merger integration problems may arise 
particularly in trans-national deals and will demand a high level of personal effort of the 
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top management team members. Successful integration can only be achieved if the 
managers are willing to spend a significant amount of time at the new site of the 
company. Financial controlling issues and cultural differences should be considered as 
well. 
However, the energy invested in an M&A deal can yield several benefits which a 
biotechnology start-up company can hardly achieve on its own. Firstly, M&As provide 
an important opportunity for biotech start-ups to acquire financial resources. All of the 
analysed deals were accompanied by capital infusions. Other examples of successful 
VC financing rounds in combination with an M&A include the mergers of Cardion with 
the US company Cardiogene in 2000 (42 million €) and SiREEN with NADAG, both 
located in Munich, at the beginning of 2004 (20 million €). Particularly in a hostile 
financing environment, however, the M&A should be a clear signal to investors that the 
companies are willing to reduce costs and to restructure their project portfolio, as both 
done by the Curacyte management. If the participating companies are in serious 
financial trouble and not willing to cut operations, investors will likely not support the 
deal by further capital infusion. As one VC manager commented: “We do not bind 
together sinking stones, which afterwards sink even quicker”.  
A merger with a foreign company may be a possibility for biotech start-ups to escape 
the hostile financing environment of their home country. One year after its merger with 
Ribopharma, US-company Alnylam went public at the NASDAQ and acquired about 30 
million $US. With the closed IPO window of the years 2002 – 2004, it would have been 
impossible for Ribopharma to issue shares and raise capital at the German stock market 
at that time. Besides equity financing, start-ups can benefit financially from an M&A 
through cost savings or combination of complementary cash positions. 
Secondly, integration of technologies through M&A can save time and costs in 
comparison to building up the resources internally. However, it might also turn out post-
merger that technologies do not combine as initially thought, like in the case of 
DeveloGen and HepaVec. Ongoing co-operation of the potential merger partners before 
the deal in order to ensure technological compatibility might reduce the risk of 
technology integration failure. 
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M&As are an opportunity for biotech start-ups to expand their pipeline of clinical 
products. Through the merger with VitaResc, Curacyte gained a significant product 
pipeline including a product in Phase III clinical trials. In 2004, DeveloGen 
strengthened its product pipeline by merging with Peptor, an Israeli company, which 
has a product in Phase II clinical trial. However, as DeveloGen’s first merger with 
HepaVec demonstrates, there is still the risk of failure of the product during clinical 
development. Merging with a company just with the aim of getting access to a single, 
early-stage clinical product might therefore be a risky strategy. The product should 
either be advanced or approved for clinical trials in further indications. Ideally, not only 
the product pipelines of the companies but also their technologies are compatible and 
complementary. 
Finally, managerial benefits can be achieved through M&As, if one company is lacking 
management experience which the other company offers. A prerequisite for full 
exploitation of this potential synergy source is that the inexperienced management is 
aware of its shortcomings and willing to hand over the CEO position to the experienced 
management of the M&A partner. If this is the case, competition with a firm led by 
superior management can be avoided and, as shown by Alnylams successful IPO a few 
month after the merger with Ribopharma, both companies can profit in the long run. 
4.7.2 Implications for the development of the German biotech industry 
In their biotech report of the year 2004, Ernst & Young list a number of reasons why the 
awaited wave of M&A and consolidation activities in the German biotech industry did 
not happen in the years 2002 and 2003 (Ernst & Young, 2004: 67). I analysed two 
M&As (Curacyte – VitaResc and Alnylam – Ribopharma) in this timeframe. How do 
the M&A hurdles described by Ernst & Young compare to the case studies? 
According to Ernst & Young, hurdles of M&As have their roots in the attitudes of the 
investors and the management. With regard to investors, these are not willing to sell or 
merge their companies cheaply in hostile financing environments, when valuations of 
private companies are low. If two companies from portfolios of different investors 
merge, there will be a dilution of the shares one investor holds in his portfolio company. 
Furthermore, valuation of biotech companies is always a difficult task (Remer et al., 
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2001). Dilution and valuation problems did not arise in the Curacyte – VitaResc merger, 
because both companies were from the portfolio of the same lead investor. Alnylam and 
Ribopharma, however, had a different shareholder base. Negotiations between 
shareholders were indeed a problem and almost stopped the deal. The perspective to 
escape the difficult situation at the German stock markets and to exit their investment 
by an IPO at the NASDAQ might have contributed to convince the Ribopharma 
shareholders. However, the case findings illustrate that consolidation within one 
investor portfolio is achieved easier than between portfolios of different investors. 
There are only a few investors in Germany like TVM, Curacyte’s and VitaResc’s main 
shareholder, which hold a portfolio large enough that CEOs can look for a merger 
partner within. Therefore, I doubt that within-portfolio consolidation will be an option 
for the majority of biotech start-ups in Germany in the future. 
As a further M&A hurdle, Ernst & Young list a lack of experience of both, management 
and investors, with M&A deals. Inexperienced managers would like their investors to 
actively support M&As pre-merger as well as during post-merger integration. 
Abingworth, the lead investor of Ribopharma, indeed orchestrated the pre-merger 
negotiations with Alnylam. Abingworth is an experienced VC company with a great 
reputation within the life science industry, but it is located in the UK and only has a few 
investments in Germany. Of the German VC firms, only TVM has experience with a 
significant number of M&A deals within the biotech industry. TVM offers active 
support for M&A activities to their portfolio companies. However, they are an 
exception in Germany and, thus, missing experience of management and investors will 
probably remain a hurdle for M&As in the future. 
Finally, Ernst & Young mention egos of biotech CEOs as a major M&A hurdle in the 
German biotech industry. Two of the six cases analysed in this paper had a special 
constellation of top management teams of the M&A partners. DeveloGen and HepaVec 
were both headed by the same CEO, Herbert Stadler, and VitaResc had one of its board 
members as interim CEO when merging with Curacyte. Thus, CEO egos were no hurdle 
in these exceptional cases. The CEO and CSO of Ribopharma, Roland Kreutzer and 
Stefan Limmer, demonstrate that there are indeed some managers who rank the wealth 
of their company higher than their own egos. When they approached Alnylam for 
merger negotiations, they were aware that they had to step down from their leading 
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positions of the company and other, more experienced managers will take over. 
However, the Alnylam – Ribopharma merger was the only one of the case studies with 
a CEO consciously handing over the leading position in favour of the wealth of his 
company. Hence, I speculate that egos of many CEOs will continue to be a major M&A 
hurdle in the German biotechnology industry. 
In summary, the case studies of this study are largely in line with the hurdles for 
efficient consolidation through M&As in the German biotech industry as described by 
Ernst & Young. However, they demonstrate that these hurdles can be overcome given 
the willingness of both, managers and investors. 
4.8 Limitations and future research 
The exploratory work of this study has limitations which offer avenues for future 
systematic research. Firstly, the generalisability of the findings is limited by the number 
of cases analysed. Large scale studies are necessary to corroborate the findings. Since 
M&As of biotech start-ups are rare events, an international study might be necessary to 
achieve a sufficient sample size. 
Secondly, I did not analyse in detail how the resource endowment of a biotech start-up 
before an M&A determines its strategy of external resource acquisition. Money, 
organisational resources, patents, products in development, and scientific and 
managerial knowledge are crucial resources for a biotech start-up’s success (Deeds et 
al., 1997; Deeds et al., 1998; Zucker et al., 2002). The case studies in this research 
indicate that biotech managers do indeed seek to acquire these resources through 
M&As. But, which of these resources should biotech start-ups better acquire through 
M&A activities and which ones better through alternative strategies such as in-licensing 
and strategic alliances? More systematic research is necessary to link the resource base 
of a biotech start-up to its external resource acquisition strategy, and, finally, to its 
success. 
Finally, the findings indicate that post-merger integration is not only a challenging task 
for large corporations, but also for small start-ups. However, the sources of post-merger 
integration problems are not so much cultural differences as in the case of M&As 
between large corporations (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988; Cartwright and Cooper, 
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1993), but missing experience and capacity of the start-up management. The impact of 
investors such as VC firms, which actively support management of start-up companies 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999), in the integration process might be substantial. Further 
research could provide insights how these factors influence different tasks of post-
merger integration. 
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5 To ally or not ally that is the question – an analysis of 
biotech managers’ decision policies to seek a new alliance 
The study I introduced in the preceding chapter has demonstrated that M&As are an 
appropriate means for biotech start-ups to acquire important resources such as 
technologies, product candidates, and access to networks and management skills. 
However, the Chapters 3 and 4 also showed that in the biotechnology industry M&As 
are a rare phenomenon because specific hurdles for these kinds of transactions exist. 
Thus, young biotech firms much more often gain access to missing resources via 
entering into strategic alliances with other companies. Therefore, the study I will 
introduce below deals with resource acquisition of bioventures via strategic alliances. 
Specifically, I will investigate from a decision-making perspective how a biotech firm’s 
endowment of resources and capabilities motivates its managers to seek new strategic 
alliance partners. 
Conceptually, this study builds the theoretical and empirical heart of this thesis. I build 
on and extend a theoretical model by Gomes-Casseres (1996) and subsequently test it 
empirically employing an experimental design and conjoint analysis. The study makes 
several contributions to the management and entrepreneurship literature and has 
valuable implications for practitioners.7
I structure this chapter as follows. First, I will give a brief introduction which places the 
study in the context of existing literature and highlights its contributions (Section 5.1). 
In the following Section 5.2, I will formulate the theory and hypotheses. I will then 
describe the research method and sample frame (Section 5.3) before presenting and 
discussing the results (Sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively). Finally, I will point to 
limitations of the study and suggest avenues for further research in Section 5.6. 
5.1 Introduction 
This study seeks to assess whether the factors that the literature on strategic alliances 
proposes as motivating a bioventure to seek to enter an alliance are in fact considered in 
its managers’ decision policies. Are managers primarily driven by a need to find 
                                                 
7 I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Dean Shepherd, University of Indiana at Bloomington, and Prof. Dr. David 
Deeds, University of Texas at Dallas, for their help with this study. 
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complementary assets to leverage their firms’ capabilities? Are the primary 
considerations those of their environment, such as the competitive environment or the 
environment for financing technology ventures? How does their perceived ability to 
control and protect their key knowledge assets impact their decision to seek a new 
alliance?  
Gomes-Casseres (1996) postulated that these factors – capabilities, governance and 
context – determine when constellations of alliances arise and the shape of those 
constellations. This study builds on these ideas and tests whether capabilities, 
governance and context are considered in the decision policies of bioventure managers. 
Drawing on Gomes-Casseres’ (1996) work I define capabilities as the set of tangible 
and intangible assets that enable an organisation to develop, make, and market goods 
and services. It should be noted that this is a broad definition of capabilities and 
incorporates what has traditionally been termed ‘resources’ by the resource-based view 
of strategy (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Control is defined as the ability of a 
decision maker to maintain ownership of, and appropriate the value created from the 
deployment of, these capabilities. Finally, context refers to the environment that places 
demands and creates opportunities for the organisation (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). These 
factors are consistent with the work of Kogut (1988) and Teece (1988), which have 
been influential in the development of the strategic alliance literature. In fact, while 
these factors have been widely accepted in the literature on alliances, surprisingly, no 
one has directly assessed whether they are part of managers’ decision policies and how 
these factors interrelate in that decision policy. The current study is an attempt to 
remedy this by employing an experimental design to shed light on how capabilities, 
governance and context interact to influence the decision by managers of bioventures to 
seek out new alliance partners.  
Using conjoint analysis, I collect and analyse 1532 decisions, nested within 51 
managers of entrepreneurial biotech firms. Specifically, I investigate the impact of the 
level of five different internal firm capabilities, the ability of the firm’s managers to 
govern these capabilities, as well of the nature of the firm’s financing and competitive 
environment on managers’ assessments of the likelihood of seeking an alliance. I take 
the analysis a step further by examining how the financial resources of the firm 
moderate the relationship between the other variables and the likelihood of seeking a 
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new alliance. By directly assessing the impact of these factors on managers’ decision 
policies I make a number of contributions. 
Firstly, by examining the capabilities, governance and context of the firm as antecedents 
of the alliance formation process I am filling a gap in the existing literature on strategic 
alliances. Existing theoretical work suggests only how general properties of resources 
might trigger alliance formation (Das and Teng, 2000b) without taking the specific 
perspective of the alliance-seeker into account. Moreover, most empirical studies on 
motives for strategic alliance formation have distinct shortcomings due to their focus on 
established alliances. That is, to a certain extent, these studies are sampling on their 
dependent variable since they are examining the motives of those firms that have been 
successful in their quest for an alliance while ignoring all those who are seeking but 
have not yet acquired an alliance partner. The examination of existing alliances also 
does not consider the resource heterogeneities of firms before an alliance is formed 
which might influence the decision of managers (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991) to seek a 
partner.  
Secondly, this study will add to the understanding of previous findings on alliances that 
indicate that some biotechnology ventures enter too many alliances (Deeds and Hill, 
1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Specifically, the results suggest that the 
differences in alliance formation activities between firms are partially due to managers’ 
reactions to heterogeneous endowments of resources, particularly liquidity. Thus, I 
provide an explanation for why many young firms form either too few or too many 
alliances in order to achieve an optimal rate of product development. 
Thirdly, the findings also extend the literature on resources and capabilities. I not only 
add to the so far scarce empirical evidence that a firm’s capabilities are fundamental for 
managerial decision-making (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991), but, more importantly, 
show that managers’ decision policies are complex and take into account interactions 
between different types of capabilities. I therefore address a recent critique of scholars 
which claim that most resources or capabilities-based studies treat these factors 
independently without investigating possible contingency relationships (Priem and 
Butler, 2001; Heirman and Clarysse, 2004). 
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5.2 A capabilities view of strategic alliances 
Strategic alliances have become an essential part of business for young biotechnology 
ventures over the last few decades. Since these firms develop complex products and 
face a highly dynamic and hypercompetitive environment, alliances are an important 
strategy to share risks (Hamel et al., 1989), gain market power (Hagedoorn, 1993), and 
enhance legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 1991). In the European biotechnology industry, 
for example, the number of strategic alliances between firms rose from 179 in 1997 to 
538 in 2001 (Ernst & Young, 2002a). Fisher (1996) reports that 20,000 alliances were 
formed in the US biotech sector between 1988 and 1996. Given these numbers, it is not 
surprising that strategic alliances have attracted considerable scholarly attention. 
Research has, for example, investigated the effect of alliances on firm performance 
(George et al., 2002; Baum et al., 2000), the choice of governance structures (e.g., Chen 
and Chen, 2003), the role of trust and commitment of parties (Cullen et al., 2000), and 
opportunistic behaviour (Deeds and Hill, 1998).  
Acquiring resources or capabilities has been one of the primary theoretical motivations 
for alliance formation. The existing literature provides insights into the type of 
capabilities firms may acquire through alliances. Knowledge resources (Chi, 1994; 
Leonard-Barton, 1995; Zahra and Bogner, 2000), access to customer networks 
(Beamish, 1994; Kauser and Shaw, 2004), financial capital (DeCarolis and Deeds, 
1999), and manufacturing and marketing capabilities (Hagedoorn, 1993; Audretsch and 
Feldman, 2003) have all been shown as capabilities which can be acquired through 
strategic alliance formation. However, while there has been significant study of the 
capabilities that are accessed via alliances, little empirical evidence is available about 
how the internal resource endowment of a firm before alliance formation influences the 
decision of its managers to seek out an alliance. Such an investigation is, however, of 
utmost importance since it represents a primary and fundamental step of the alliance 
formation process. Technology ventures are characterised by high resource needs and 
minimal resource endowments (Katz and Gartner, 1988), and because they are often 
new and/or small they lack an established customer base, distribution channels, 
reputation, and often have insufficient resource slack for further product development 
(Shepherd et al., 2000; Thornhill and Amit, 2003). Acquisition of these resources is one 
of the primary tasks of managers in entrepreneurial firms (Brush et al., 2001). These 
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tasks are particularly challenging in research-intensive biotechnology ventures, because 
product development is an expensive and time consuming process. To obtain the 
resources that they need, some biotech ventures seek alliance partners (Deeds and Hill, 
1996; Deeds et al., 1998; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), while others do not. What 
makes an alliance attractive to the managers of some ventures but not for others? It 
appears that the managerial decision to seek strategic alliance partners at least partially 
depends on the firm’s endowment of resources and capabilities. 
5.2.1 Capabilities and strategic alliances 
Strategic alliances are “voluntary inter-firm agreements aimed at achieving competitive 
advantage for the partners” (Das and Teng, 2000b: 33). They cover a wide variety of 
contractual arrangements including licensing, joint R&D agreements, technology 
exchange, joint ventures, and minority equity partnerships (Gulati, 1995). All forms of 
alliances have in common that firms pool some of their resources and capabilities and 
therefore generate new combinations with the aim of achieving sustained competitive 
advantage (Hamel et al., 1989). By application of the RBV framework to formation of 
strategic alliances, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996: 137) argue that alliances are 
driven by “a logic of strategic resource needs and social resource opportunities” in order 
to gain competitive advantage.  
Das and Teng (2000b) state that two distinct capabilities-based rationales may trigger 
strategic alliance formation: obtaining and retaining valuable resources. Retaining 
resources becomes particularly important for those firms that currently have excess 
resources (resources not being fully used) but want to maintain them for future 
utilisation (Kogut, 1988). Strategic alliances allow a temporary usage of these resources 
in combination with the resources of another firm (Das and Teng, 2000b). In contrast, 
obtaining resources from a strategic alliance represents an extension of a firm’s resource 
base with the aim of filling gaps in its resource endowment (Das and Teng, 2000b). In 
technology-based industries, firms may lack technological know-how and scientific 
knowledge for further product development and therefore decide to access these 
capabilities from an alliance partner (Hagedoorn, 1993; Chi, 1994; Leonard-Barton, 
1995). Even after completion of the development process, firms may lack the necessary 
resources and capabilities to efficiently and effectively manufacture and market their 
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new products and therefore enter into alliances with established incumbent firms to 
access these resources (Hagedoorn, 1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 2003). In any case, a 
lack of valuable resources and capabilities, which cannot be purchased efficiently at the 
factor markets, triggers the decisions of managers to seek an alliance partner in order to 
obtain the missing resources and gain competitive advantage. 
Existing literature identified a number of different resources and capabilities which 
contribute to success of biotech ventures and can be acquired by strategic alliance 
formation. Firstly, financial resources are particularly valuable for new firms because 
these resources are fungible and excess liquidity may allow the venture to purchase 
required other resources and capabilities through factor markets (Dollinger, 1995). 
Particularly in the biotechnology industry, where product development is accompanied 
by high uncertainty and long development cycles, firms need to spend large sums of 
money before they generate revenues. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
biopharmaceuticals, for example, require more than 100 million $US of R&D 
expenditure before they enter the market (DiMasi et al., 2003). Sufficient liquidity is 
thus a necessary condition for the continued existence of the biotechnology venture. 
Since alliances with corporate partners frequently include research funding, equity 
investments or other types of direct cash payments to the venture by the partner 
(DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999), these alliances are a favoured means to enhance the 
firm’s liquidity.  
Secondly, as many young biotech firms do not yet have a product on the market, their 
valuation is substantially based on the product candidates they have under development, 
often referred to as their “pipeline” (Kellog and Charnes, 2000; Deeds et al., 1997; 
Deeds et al., 1998). As noted by Rothaermel and Deeds (2004), these products in 
development are the embodied capabilities of the venture. The development of 
biopharmaceuticals, for example, is a 12-year multi-step process and drug candidates 
can fail at any stage of development with only about 6 % of initial candidates reaching 
the market (see Chapter 2). The value of a product candidate thus significantly increases 
with its development stage since the probability to achieve market launch becomes 
higher and the company needs to spend less time and money on further development. 
Managers of biotech firms must seek to build up a risk-adjusted pipeline which contains 
products in late development stages, and a sufficient number of early stage follow-ups 
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in order to compensate for late stage failures. A deficiency in either will likely 
encourage managers to seek alternatives to enhance product development such as 
strategic alliances (Deeds and Hill, 1996; Gulati, 1998). 
Thirdly, scholars have also stressed the importance of human resources in terms of 
excellent scientists and research team capabilities for the success of biotechnology firms 
(Zucker et al., 1998; Deeds et al., 1999). Scientists create and conserve over time 
knowledge, expertise, and skills, which are essential intangible resources (Liebeskind et 
al., 1996; DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999). Deeds et al. (1997) found that the publication 
record of a biotech firm’s scientific team is related to the money they raise at IPO.  
Moreover, since new product development in high tech industries essentially depends 
on basic scientific research (Dasgupta and David, 1994), highly reputable scientists 
provide the firm with links to universities and research institutes, which contribute to 
firm performance (Liebeskind et al., 1996). If a biotech venture does not possess a high 
quality scientific team, managers are likely to draw on the experience, skills, and 
knowledge of other organisations through alliance formation (Liebeskind et al., 1996; 
Das and Teng, 2000b; Zucker et al., 2002).  
Finally, the existing network of a biotechnology firm is an important and valuable 
resource (Estades and Ramani, 1998). Consistent with previous literature, I understand a 
biotech venture’s network as the sum of alliances and non-formal contacts with other 
firms, universities, research institutions, and investors (Estades and Ramani, 1998; 
Powell et al., 1996). Networks are tightly linked to the firm and highly immobile (Das 
and Teng, 2000b). For biotech ventures, they are a crucial source of learning, flexibility 
and technological competence (Estades and Ramani, 1998; Zucker et al., 2002). 
University linkages provide a firm with contacts to top scientists that possess valuable 
scientific knowledge (Liebeskind et al., 1996) which enhances innovative output 
(George et al., 2002). Entering into a strategic alliance with another firm does not only 
extend the network of a firm by one new contact, rather there appears to be a 
multiplying effect since the access to potential network partners depends on the number 
of previously established alliances (Gulati, 1995). 
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H1: The level of internal capabilities available to the biotechnology venture 
(liquidity, early products, late products, scientific team, and/or contact network) 
will be negatively related to the likelihood of the venture’s manager seeking an 
alliance partner. 
5.2.2 Governance and strategic alliances  
As Teece (1988) notes, the benefits to innovation are distributed among innovators, 
imitators, suppliers and customers based on the ability of the innovator to protect and 
appropriate the value of the innovation. Biotechnology ventures’ primary function and 
means of creating wealth is to bring innovative new products or services to market. In 
these conditions the key determinant of their ability to benefit and their choice of the 
mode of bringing the innovation to market is the strength of their property rights 
protection (governance) for their key intellectual property. As we know from the cases 
of EMI and Bowmar, being the innovator is clearly not in itself sufficient to assure 
success (Teece, 1988). The ability to appropriate the value of the innovation is 
substantially determined by whether the innovator has strong or weak protections on its 
intellectual property. If the innovator has a strong intellectual property position, this 
buys the innovator time and competitive space needed to continue to develop the 
innovation, which places little pressure on the innovator to immediately seek an alliance 
partner to expedite the development process. Thus, a high patenting activity is often 
seen as an indicator of a high tech venture’s innovative activity (Acs and Audretsch, 
1989), and has an important signalling effect for investors (Shan and Song, 1997). In 
contrast, if the innovator is operating with weak intellectual property protection he or 
she is in a race to capture the value from the innovation before it can be imitated by 
competitors. The race to market places a premium on rapid access to complementary 
assets and will therefore focus managers of these innovating ventures on seeking a new 
alliance. Granted, the risks of opportunistic action by the partner are also higher with 
weak intellectual property protection. However, the drive to be first to market to gain 
any benefit from the innovation will take priority in the managers’ decision policies, 
since the alliance contract will at least provide some level of protection and recourse to 
opportunistic action by the partner. 
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H2: The strength of the biotechnology venture’s governance over its intellectual 
assets will be negatively related to the likelihood of the venture’s manager seeking 
an alliance partner. 
5.2.3 Context and strategic alliances   
The environmental context in which a biotechnology venture operates will play a 
significant role in the decision of the venture’s manager to seek a new alliance. In this 
particular study I focus on two critical elements of a bioventure’s context – the 
munificence of the competitive and financing environment. I have chosen to limit the 
research to these two elements, since they are both critical determinants in the success 
and failure of new biotech ventures (Fildes, 1990; Zahra and Bogner, 2000).  
The competitive context likely plays a critical role in the decision policies of high 
technology venture’s managers, since being first to market with an innovative product 
or service is crucial to the success or failure of the venture (Schoonhoven et al., 1990; 
Stalk et al., 1992). Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) argued that the more vulnerable 
the strategic position of a firm, the more it will seek to enter into strategic alliances. The 
strategic position of a firm is particularly vulnerable when its environment is highly 
competitive, as it is the case for many biotech ventures (Fildes, 1990; Zucker et al., 
2002). Therefore the strength of the venture’s competitors will influence the managers’ 
view of the need to access complementary assets in order to speed the venture’s 
products towards the market. In contrast, in situations in which the venture does not feel 
substantial competitive pressure, its managers will not feel as compelled to immediately 
seek an alliance partner to bring the product to market as quickly as possible. Instead, 
they will seek to advance their internal development efforts in order to both move the 
product towards market and enhance their negotiating position in the event they decide 
to enter an alliance in the future.  
Since most biotechnology ventures do not earn significant revenues yet, they essentially 
depend on the infusion of capital from investors. Raising money at the capital markets is 
thus one of the main tasks of biotech managers (Fildes, 1990). However, the availability 
of money at capital markets changes over time. In particular the market for venture 
capital, the main financing source for young technology ventures, is highly cyclical 
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(Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Similarly, the possibility to acquire capital from equity 
markets through an IPO changes in simultaneous cycles (Lerner, 1994). As 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, young biotech firms in the German industry faced a highly 
munificent financing environment during the high tech hype in 2000 and acquired 565 
million € capital in VC financing and 655 million € through IPOs (Ernst & Young, 
2002b). In contrast, when stock markets were declining in 2002, the financing 
environment became considerably less munificent for biotech start-ups. The total 
amount of VC invested was only 207 million €, and no firm went public during that 
time (Ernst & Young, 2003c). Consequently, firms will face a higher need to employ 
strategic alliances as an alternative to the capital markets in a less munificent financing 
environment since alliances “can replace financing because they enable the firm to meet 
its goals without additional investment by piggy-backing on the investment of another 
firm” (Dollinger, 1995: 36). Moreover, acquiring an alliance partner serves as a 
powerful signal to the financial markets, which enhances a firm’s access to both the 
private and public financial markets (Stuart, 1998), particularly in times of a less 
munificent environment (Lerner and Tsai, 1999).   
Given the benefits in terms of both speed to market and access to capital I expect 
biotech managers to be more interested in seeking an alliance when their venture is 
operating in a context with low munificence. Alliances become in many ways an 
attractive alternative or substitute to the challenges being created for the firm by the 
context in which it operates.    
H3: The munificence of the context (competitive and/or financing) in which the 
biotechnology venture operates will be negatively related to the likelihood of the 
venture’s manager seeking an alliance partner. 
5.2.4 The moderating impact of firm liquidity 
Success in a high technology environment requires creating access to a complex bundle 
of complementary capabilities. Some of these capabilities will be developed internally, 
some acquired via the markets, and some accessed through alliances. As I hypothesised 
earlier, low levels of internal capabilities will focus management on seeking new 
alliances to compensate for these weaknesses and access capabilities from an alliance 
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partner. However, a firm’s liquidity might moderate the impact of the firm’s other 
internal capabilities on this decision. Specifically, I propose that managers believe that a 
firm needs to be sufficiently liquid to efficiently exploit existing capabilities on its own 
without an alliance partner. 
As stated above, the development of biotech products such as biopharmaceuticals is a 
long and complex process which demands large sums of money. Thus, product 
candidates can only be considered as valuable resources if the firms developing these 
candidates have sufficient liquidity to fund the whole development process. Imagine, for 
example, a biopharmaceutical venture with a product pipeline containing products in 
early preclinical development. Further advancement of these products is only possible 
when the firm is sufficiently liquid to finance the expensive subsequent clinical trials 
(DiMasi et al., 2003), otherwise it will need to form alliances with other corporations. 
Similarly, if a venture has products in late Phase III clinical trials, it needs access to 
production and marketing facilities which it can only build up internally if it is 
sufficiently liquid. Otherwise, it must enter into strategic alliances with large 
pharmaceutical firms to access these required capabilities (Rothaermel, 2001b; 
Audretsch and Feldman, 2003). Moreover, consider a biotechnology venture whose 
team consists of top scientists. These scientists are only able to fully exploit their 
knowledge and skills if they have access to modern devices and research facilities. In 
addition, a high salary may be necessary to motivate these people and keep them with 
the firm (Pfeffer, 1998). If the firm is insufficiently liquid to equip and pay its high 
quality scientific team, managers need to seek strategic alliances to acquire these 
resources. Finally, I expect that liquidity will also moderate the effect of a biotech 
venture’s network capabilities on the propensity of its managers to seek an alliance. In 
order to efficiently source capabilities via its network, a firm needs to monitor its 
network partners and establish contractual control mechanisms in order to protect itself 
from opportunistic behaviour of the partners (Williamson, 1985). These monitoring and 
contracting costs can be substantial (Gulati et al., 2000). Moreover, since in networks 
resources and capabilities are acquired from multiple partners, coordination costs arise 
(Gulati et al., 2000). Thus, efficient exploitation of network contacts is only possible if 
the firm has sufficient liquidity at hand. In the case of low liquidity, sourcing of 
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resources and capabilities becomes inefficient and entering into new alliances is a more 
attractive means for the firm to acquire the desired resources and capabilities. 
In summary, liquidity is essential for a biotech venture to efficiently exploit its existing 
capabilities by acquisition of complementary assets. If firms are insufficiently liquid, 
managers face a high need to acquire these complementary assets via alliance 
formation. Therefore, the liquidity of a biotechnology venture will moderate the 
negative relationship between the firm’s capabilities and the likelihood that its managers 
will seek an alliance particularly for ventures with high levels of existing capabilities.  
H4: The liquidity of a biotechnology venture will moderate the negative 
relationship between a venture’s capabilities (early products, late products, 
scientific team, and/or contact network) and the likelihood of its manager seeking 
an alliance partner such that the relationship is more negative for managers of 
firms with high liquidity than for managers of firms with low liquidity. 
In situations in which the governance over the biotech venture’s intellectual property is 
weak I expect those with lower liquidity to be more likely to seek out an alliance partner 
than those more liquid ventures. The cost and complexity of defending a patent, 
particularly one that is of questionable strength, will be daunting to a venture with little 
cash on hand (Lerner, 1995a). Also the costs of defending poorly protected intellectual 
property against infringement are likely higher than intellectual property protected by a 
strong appropriability regime increasing the need for venture liquidity. The costs and 
complexity of defending intellectual property and the benefits of deep pockets is 
evidenced by Amgen’s 17 year legal battle with pharmaceutical company Johnson & 
Johnson. Hence, the combination of these two forces is likely to increase the desire of 
managers of biotechnology ventures with weak cash positions to seek an alliance in 
circumstances in which they perceive the firm has weak governance over its intellectual 
assets. 
H5: The liquidity of a biotechnology venture will moderate the negative 
relationship between a venture’s governance over its intellectual assets and the 
likelihood of its manager seeking an alliance partner such that the relationship is 
more negative for managers of firms with low liquidity than for managers of firms 
with high liquidity. 
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In a highly competitive context a biotechnology venture will need to increase its speed 
to market to gain the benefits of being a first mover and avoid being locked out of the 
market (Lieberman, 1989). The venture will therefore need to reach out and access 
additional resources to compete and win via the strategic factor or labour markets. 
Under these circumstances a firm with high levels of liquidity will be able to leverage 
its capital to gain access to the resources they need to respond to the competition, since 
financial resources are fungible and allow the firm to access the strategic factor market 
or the labour market to enhance low levels of a specific capability. In contrast, when the 
firm’s liquidity is low, it will not have the opportunity to supplement its capabilities via 
the market in order to respond to competitive challenges, nor will it be able to increase 
its rate of internal development, since it will not have additional resources to commit to 
the project. Thus, low liquidity biotech ventures likely turn to an alliance to help 
competitive challenges.  
In some ways alliances and accessing the capital markets can be viewed as substitutes 
for one another. Recent research by Lerner and Tsai (1999) supports this contention by 
finding that in a less munificent financing environment young biotech companies seek 
alliances with large incumbent firms even if the bulk of alliance control rights are 
allocated to the incumbent. In other words, the price of an alliance goes up when 
financial markets become more difficult. A firm’s dependence on the capital markets is 
low when it is still sufficiently liquid from its last financing event (Wasserman, 2003). 
In this case, there is no need for short-term financing, and the firm may be able to ‘wait 
out’ a less munificent financing environment without entering into an alliance. 
However, managers of low liquidity biotech ventures will likely turn to alliances as a 
substitute for the capital markets. In addition, existing literature indicates that a low 
munificent funding environment is less onerous for firms with high liquidity since a 
strong financial position enhances the possibility of attracting investors under any 
circumstances (Audretsch and Lehmann, 2004). 
H6: The liquidity of a biotechnology venture will moderate the negative 
relationship between the munificence of a venture’s context (competitive and/or 
financing) and the likelihood of its manager seeking an alliance partner such that 
the relationship is more negative for managers of firms with low liquidity than for 
managers of firms with high liquidity. 
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Figure 13 illustrates the decision model for managers of biotechnology ventures to seek 
strategic alliances, i.e., the impact of the firm’s capabilities, governance and context on 
managers’ decisions and the moderating role of a firm’s liquidity on these relationships. 
 
 
Figure 13: Model for biotech managers’ decision to seek a new strategic alliance 
5.3 Methodology and data collection 
5.3.1 Sample characteristics 
The sample frame is managers of entrepreneurial firms in the German biotechnology 
industry. In combination with their biotechnology industry report 2003, Ernst & Young  
released a list of their 212 industry survey participants. However, since biotechnology is 
a heterogeneous field ranging from development of biopharmaceuticals to 
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manufacturing of enzymes and the supply of laboratory material, the firms in 
Germany’s biotechnology industry vary substantially in their financing, business 
strategies, and revenue perspectives. I therefore followed previous studies (Deeds and 
Hill, 1996; Deeds et al., 1998; George et al., 2001) and included in the sample only 
firms developing biotherapeutics and biodiagnostics. These firms are known to be 
engaged widely in alliance formations. This left 99 biopharmaceutical firms, of which 
twelve had gone out of business since the publication of the Ernst & Young list. 
I contacted all 87 firms by telephone and asked for at least one top management team 
member to participate in the study. I defined a top management team member as any 
person at the top executive and vice president level (Deeds et al., 1999). Moreover, I 
included leading business development managers because they were responsible for 
seeking and negotiating strategic alliances in the sample firms. From the telephone 
contacts, individuals in 68 firms agreed to participate.  
Except for the first six firms, which conducted the experiment in my presence (see 
below), a survey booklet and a cover letter was mailed to these firms. The mailing also 
contained a self-addressed, postage paid envelope for returning the experiment to me. If 
I did not receive the experiment within four weeks, I again called the firms asking 
whether they had received the letter and reminding them to participate. I finally 
received usable experiments from 51 managers of entrepreneurial biotechnology firms.8 
This response rate (51% in terms of firms contacted) is relatively high. Moreover, the 
number of participants is consistent with other conjoint studies.  Shepherd (1999a) 
analysed decision policies of 66 venture capitalists within 47 venture capital firms and 
Hitt and Tyler (1991) had a sample of 65 managers. Although for survey-based research 
this sample size looks small, there are 32 decisions nested within each of these 
individuals and therefore the sample consists of a total of 1632 decisions (I account for 
the nested nature of the data using hierarchical linear modelling HLM, described 
below). 
Table 11 summarises the characteristics of participating managers and their respective 
entrepreneurial biotech firms. On average, participants were 41.6 years old (standard 
                                                 
8 These 51 managers came from 44 firms. In the analyses that follow I found that results did not differ 
substantially when only one representative from each firm was used. Therefore, I report only the analysis 
of the full sample. 
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deviation 6.9 years), had 8.0 years experience in the biotech industry (std. dev. 6.4 
years), 3.7 years experience in the pharmaceutical industry (std. dev. 5.1 years), and 5.7 
years experience in top management team (TMT) positions (std. dev. 4.1 years). 
Moreover, they had worked on average in 1.6 firms before their current firm (std. dev. 
1.2 firms), had a tenure in their current firm of 4.3 years (std. dev. 3.2 years), and were 
involved in the top management of their present firm for 3.7 years (std. dev. 3.1 years). 
Sixty-seven percent of participants held positions at the CEO/CFO/CSO level, 82% had 
an education in natural sciences (biology, chemistry, medicine, the remaining 18% had 
educations in management), and 37% were founders of their current firms (all were 
managers). These firms were on average 6.7 years old (std. dev. 2.8 years) and 
employed 50 people (std. dev. 46). 
Demographic Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 41.6 6.9 
Total biotech experience 8.0 6.4 
Total pharma experience 3.7 5.1 
Total TMT experience 5.7 4.1 
Number of previous firms 1.6 1.2 
Firm tenure 4.3 3.2 
Firm tenure TMT 3.7 3.1 
Percentage CEO/CFO/CSO 67 n.d. 
Percentage nat. sci. education 82 n.d. 
Percentage founders 37 n.d. 
Firm age 6.7 2.8 
Firm employees 50 46 
Table 11: Characteristics of experiment participants 
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5.3.2 Conjoint analysis 
I used a conjoint experiment to collect data on the decisions of managers of 
entrepreneurial biotech firms in their assessments of the likelihood of entering into a 
strategic alliance. Conjoint analysis is a technique that allows researchers to decompose 
an individual’s decisions into its underlying structure (Green, 2001). It has been applied 
in marketing research, psychology research, strategic management research, and other 
disciplines (Green and Srinivasan, 1990; Wittink and Cattin, 1989). Conjoint analysis 
has also been used in research on strategic alliances, specifically on evaluation of 
desired partner properties (Tyler and Steensma, 1995; Dollinger et al., 1997). The 
particular strength of conjoint analysis is that it enables researchers to obtain real time 
data about the decision maker’s decisions. In contrast to retrospective methods such as 
questionnaires, interviews or surveys, this method is not biased due to the mistaken or 
missing introspection of decision makers (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1997). This bias 
can be substantial (Fischhoff, 1988; Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998). Moreover, conjoint 
analysis enables the researcher to analyse contingent relationships (two-way 
interactions) between variables (Hitt and Barr, 1989). Since the theory above suggests 
several interactions between research variables and thus a contingent decision policy of 
managers, conjoint analysis is the appropriate method for this research. 
5.3.3 Research instrument 
Conjoint experiments require decision makers to make assessments based on a number 
of attributes. These attributes are described by different levels (e.g., high and low). 
Several different attributes with predetermined levels constitute a profile to which the 
decision maker assigns her/his judgement.  
 Dependent variable. The dependent variable of this study is the manager’s 
likelihood of seeking a strategic alliance partner. I defined strategic alliance as any type 
of “corporate relationship between firms to develop new products”, consistent with 
previous studies (George et al., 2001; Deeds and Hill, 1996). I asked managers to assess 
the attractiveness of seeking an alliance partner on a seven-point Likert-type scale 
anchored by the end points “very unattractive” and “very attractive”. 
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 Independent variables. The scenarios in the experiment are described by eight 
attributes, each of which is described by two levels. These attributes are split among 
five that describe the internal capabilities of the venture (Liquidity, Early, Late, Team 
and Network), one that describes the ability of the venture to govern its intellectual 
property assets (Governance) and two that describe the context in which the firm 
operates (Financial Environment and Competitive Environment). Liquidity of the firm 
ranges from high (considerable liquidity which guarantees growth of the firm for the 
next years) to low (limited liquidity which will ensure survival for less than one year). 
Early means the number of products in early development stages and ranges from high 
(considerable number of early products in the firm’s pipeline) to low (few early 
products in the firm’s pipeline). Late stands for the number of products in late 
development stages and ranges from high (considerable number of late products in the 
firm’s pipeline) to low (few late products in the firm’s pipeline). Team means the 
quality of the firm’s scientific team and ranges from high (team consists of well-known 
and reputable specialists) to low (team consists of only average scientists). Network is 
the size of the firm’s existing network and ranges from extended (many contacts to 
universities, research institutes, and other firms) to limited (few contacts to universities, 
research institutes, and other firms). Governance ranges from high (broad portfolio of 
secure patents) to low (few patents, insecure due to pending law suits). Finance stands 
for the description of the firm’s financial environment and ranges from attractive (good 
possibilities to acquire venture capital or file for IPO) to unattractive (only limited 
possibilities to acquire venture capital, closed IPO window). Competition, which 
describes the competitive environment of the firm, ranges from high (very competitive 
projects and direct competition with other firms) to low (little competitive projects and 
no direct competitors). 
5.3.4 Experimental design, reliability and external validity 
Profiles of the experimental design consist of the eight attributes, each of which is 
represented by two levels, yielding 28=256 possible combinations. Since evaluation of 
256 profiles is not an easily manageable task for participants in this study, I applied an 
orthogonal factorial design to reduce the number of attribute combinations to 16 (Hahn 
and Shapiro, 1966). In an orthogonal design inter-correlations between attributes are 
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zero, which eliminates issues of multicolinearity and increases the robustness of 
experimental results (Huber, 1987). I chose a fractional factorial design which 
confounded main effects and all two-way interactions of most interest (involving the 
liquidity of the firm) with other two-way and higher order interactions (which are of 
least interest). It is therefore unlikely that the latter will bias the results of this study 
(Louviere, 1988; Green and Srinivasan, 1990). 
Reliability is a necessary condition for the validity of measures in general (Carmines 
and Zeller, 1979). In conjoint experiments, reliability of decision makers’ judgements is 
tested by replicating profiles and performing test-retest checks (Karren and Barringer, 
2002; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1997). Full replication of all 16 attribute combinations 
of the experimental design resulted in 32 profiles. In order to control for effects 
resulting from the specific order of the profiles and/or the specific order of attributes 
within each profile, I randomly assigned the 32 profiles as well as the attributes in two 
ways each resulting in four versions of the experiment. I distributed the versions 
randomly among participants. Since I found no significant difference across versions, I 
conclude that order effects had little impact on the results. Moreover, I included a 
‘practice’ profile as a first evaluation task, which I excluded from the statistical 
analysis, in order to make participants familiar with the decision situation before 
entering into the experiment. Thus, the final experimental design consisted of 33 
profiles.  
One possible criticism conjoint analysis faces is that these kind of ‘paper and pencil’ 
experiments do not represent real decision situations and therefore lack external 
validity. However, scholars have shown that conjoint analyses significantly reflect 
decision policies employed by individuals (Brown, 1972; Hammond and Adelman, 
1976). External validity can be enhanced by not only deriving judgement attributes from 
theory, but by in addition interviewing or surveying potential study participants with 
regard to relevance of the decision attributes (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1997; Karren 
and Barringer, 2002). I therefore conducted four in-depth interviews with managers of 
entrepreneurial biotech firms before I approached possible participants. In addition, the 
first six of the experiments were performed in my presence in order to obtain feedback 
on the design of the experiment. All interviewees and participants confirmed that the 
decision attributes are relevant and that the decision profiles are realistic.  
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5.3.5 Post-experiment questionnaire 
The research instrument also contained a post-experiment questionnaire where I asked 
participants to provide demographic information including the variables described in 
Table 11. I applied HLM to test whether these variables explained variance in decision 
policies across managers. I did not find any statistically significant associations. 
Moreover, I asked participants to self-report the importance of the decision criteria 
when evaluating the likelihood of seeking a strategic alliance partner on a seven-point 
Likert-type scale anchored by the end points “very unimportant” and “very important”. 
Participants reported the following average values: liquidity 6.3, early 4.4, late 5.8, team 
4.3, network 3.1, governance 4.4, finance 5.8 and competition 4.4. All criteria had some 
self-reported importance with emphasis on financial resources (liquidity) and access to 
them (financing environment). 
5.4 Results 
Eighty percent of the individual decision policies were statistically significant (p<0.05), 
consistent with previous research (Shepherd, 1999a). The mean R2 of these models was 
0.79 (Choi and Shepherd, 2004: 0.72; Shepherd, 1999a: 0.78). Seventy-eight percent of 
managers were significantly reliable (p<0.05), which is slightly below the 92% value 
found by Shepherd (1999a). However, the mean test-retest correlation was 0.66, again 
in line with previous studies (Shepherd, 1999a: 0.69). This indicates that the managers 
in the sample of entrepreneurial biotech firms consistently performed the conjoint 
experiment. For the sample as a whole, 91 % of the variance in decisions is within 
individual variance, that is, only 9 % of the variance in decisions is from individual 
differences.  68.3 % of the true within individual variance is accounted for by the 
variables of this study. 
The statistical analysis draws on 32 decisions from 51 individuals, thus yielding a total 
of 1632 data points. However, these data points are not independent since each set of 32 
observations is nested within an individual manager. I therefore applied HLM, which 
takes into account nested decisions within individuals. I did not use hierarchical linear 
regression analysis as earlier policy capturing studies had done (Hitt and Tyler, 1991) 
and report only full model results since orthogonal fractional design assures zero 
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correlation between independent variables (Priem and Rosenstein, 2000). Table 12 
presents the results. I report for each decision criterion the standardised coefficient, the 
corresponding standard error, the t-ratio as well as the level of significance, indicated by 
the asterisks. 
Evaluation criteria Coefficient Standard error t-ratio 
Intercept 4.647 0.089 52.424*** 
Capabilities 
Liquidity -1.377 0.187 -7.382*** 
Early -0.387 0.092 -4.217*** 
Late -0.522 0.140 -3.725*** 
Team -0.140 0.056 -2.495* 
Network 0.039 0.055 0.720 
Governance 
Patents -0.277 0.069 -4.023*** 
Context 
Finance -1.000 0.114 -8.770*** 
Competition 0.213 0.064 3.321** 
Interactions 
Liquidity x Early -0.078 0.130 -0.602 
Liquidity x Late -0.358 0.120 -2.975** 
Liquidity x Team -0.279 0.150 -1.857 
Liquidity x Network -0.324 0.120 -2.703** 
Liquidity x Patents -0.162 0.121 -1.340 
Liquidity x Finance 0.422 0.119 3.554** 
Liquidity x Competition -0.162 0.117 -1.374 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; n=1632 decisions nested within 51 managers 
Table 12: Results of the conjoint analysis 
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Results show that all main effects except for network are significantly used by 
bioventure managers in assessing the likelihood of entering into a strategic alliance. 
Specifically, managers’ likelihood of seeking strategic alliance partners increases with 
(a) lower liquidity, (b) a lower number of early stage products in the firm’s pipeline, (c) 
a lower number of late stage products in the firm’s pipeline, (d) a lower quality 
scientific team, (e) weaker governance over intellectual property, (f) a less attractive 
financing environment, and (g) a more competitive environment. In terms of the first 
three Hypotheses #2 and #3 receive strong support. In testing Hypothesis #1, which 
links capabilities to the propensity to enter an alliance, I find a strong relationship in the 
hypothesised direction for liquidity, early stage products, late stage products and the 
quality of the team, but no independent relationship between the venture’s network and 
the propensity to ally. However, the interaction between network and liquidity is 
significant. Thus, I conclude that there is strong overall support for the hypothesised 
link between capabilities and the likelihood that managers will seek strategic alliances 
(Hypothesis #1).  
However, managers’ decision policy was more complex than analysis of only the main 
effects would lead one to believe. Table 12 shows that three out of seven interactions of 
liquidity with other attributes are significant. Specifically two interactions between 
liquidity and capabilities measures – late stage products and network – are significant 
and the interaction between one of the context measures, the financing environment, 
and liquidity is significant. Since I find no significance for the interaction between 
liquidity and governance I conclude that Hypothesis #5 is not supported. 
In order to understand the significant interaction effects in more detail, I plot each 
research variable (x-axis) which interacts with liquidity against the managers’ 
evaluation of the likelihood of seeking alliance partners (y-axis). I plot separate lines for 
low and high liquidity (Figure 14, Figure 15, Figure 16).  
Figure 14 demonstrates that, based on their decision policy, biotechnology venture 
managers are more likely to seek a strategic alliance when there are fewer late stage 
products in the venture’s pipeline and this negative relationship is more negative for 
those whose firms have higher liquidity. The nature of this significant interaction 
provides support for Hypothesis #4. 
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Figure 14: Interaction effect between the firm’s liquidity and the number of late 
stage products. 
Figure 15 demonstrates that, based on their decision policy, biotechnology venture 
managers are more likely to seek a strategic alliance when their venture has a smaller 
network and this negative relationship is more negative for those whose firms have 
higher liquidity. The nature of this significant interaction provides support for 
Hypothesis #4. 
 
Figure 15: Interaction effect between the firm’s liquidity and the size of the firm’s 
network. 
Figure 16 illustrates that, based on their decision policy, biotechnology venture 
managers are more likely to seek a strategic alliance when the funding environment is 
less munificent and this negative relationship is more negative for those whose firms 
have lower liquidity. The nature of this significant interaction provides support for 
Hypothesis #6. 
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Figure 16: Interaction effect between the firm’s liquidity and the attractiveness of 
the financing environment. 
In summary, I find strong support for the hypothesised direct effects. Moreover, I find 
that liquidity moderates the impact of two capabilities (late products, network) on the 
likelihood of biotechnology venture managers to seek an alliance. I find partial support 
for the hypothesised moderating effect of liquidity on the relationship between the 
munificence of the context and the propensity to ally. The findings for the munificence 
of the funding environment are strong and in the expected direction, but there is no 
moderation of the competitive context. Further, I do not find support for any moderation 
of the governance relationship.     
5.5 Discussion 
In this study I introduced a model for biotechnology venture managers’ decision to seek 
strategic alliance partners. The model is based on the framework developed by Gomes-
Casseres (1996) and is consistent with the resourced-based theory and the work of 
Kogut (1988) and Teece (1988). The model describes how the capabilities, governance 
over knowledge assets, and the context in which the venture operates influence the 
managers’ decision to seek a new alliance. By testing this model via an experimental 
design and conjoint analysis I was able to compare the decision policy of bioventure 
managers with the theoretical models developed by management scholars.  
The findings of this research suggest that the internal resource position of biotech 
ventures influences the decision of managers to engage in strategic alliances. If their 
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venture lacks important resources and capabilities such as cash, products in early or late 
development stages, a high quality scientific team, or an extended contact network with 
other firms, they will aim to complement this deficit by seeking alliance partners. 
Managers also take into account the environmental situation of their firm with regard to 
the competitive situation and financing opportunities. Moreover, managers consider the 
strength of their governance of the intellectual property in deciding whether to seek an 
alliance. All these findings are in line with the resource-based rationale of strategic 
alliance formation to obtain resources from alliance partners (Das and Teng, 2000b) and 
gaining competitive advantage in strategic vulnerable resource positions (Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven, 1996).  
Whereas previous literature offered insights into which capabilities of potential target 
firms might trigger alliance formation (Kauser and Shaw, 2004; Chi, 1994), this 
analysis provides empirical evidence that internal capabilities are an important 
antecedent which determines if a firm will likely engage in alliance formation. If the 
necessary capabilities are present in the firm, managers will not be as likely to seek an 
alliance partner (Kogut, 1988). This does, of course, not exclude the possibility that they 
might enter into an alliance if they come across an attractive opportunity. They will, 
however, not actively seek to attract alliance partners by themselves. 
First and foremost the results highlight that the decision to seek an alliance appears to 
be viewed in light of the financial needs of the firm and the environment in which it 
operates before anything else. I find that the most powerful driver in the managers’ 
decision model is the firm’s liquidity and the financing environment. In examining the 
coefficients in Table 12, the paramount importance of firm finances in their decision 
becomes obvious, with firm liquidity having a coefficient (-1.377) twice as large as any 
other variables except munificence of the funding context (-1.000). The importance of 
cash is further highlighted by the contingent nature of the relationship between liquidity 
and the munificence of the financial markets which highlights the preference of 
managers of bioventures for using internal funds first, followed by equity capital and 
finally alliances.  
The results of this study indicate that managers of bioventures are much more likely to 
seek an alliance when their firm has lots of late stage products but low liquidity than 
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when their firm has lots of late stage products and high liquidity. In fact, the slope of the 
lines in Figure 14 indicates that managers prefer to use internal resources when 
available to further develop the products. The tendency to substitute internal resources 
for external ones is supported by the theoretical predictions of the optimal capital 
structure model (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The strength of the preference 
for internal resources is based on the costs associated with information asymmetries 
between the firm and external resource providers (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999) and the risks of expropriation of knowledge due to 
opportunistic actions on the part of partners (Williamson, 1985). Taken together the 
results for the moderating role of liquidity in bioventure managers’ decision models 
help explain earlier findings by Lerner and Merges (1998) and Rothaermel and Deeds 
(2004). It appears that managers are responding to the critical need to maintain their 
venture’s liquidity and are willing to over commit to alliances when necessary to 
maintain cash flows.  
An interesting result of the analysis is how the liquidity of an entrepreneurial biotech 
firm moderates the effect of the firm’s network size on the motivation of managers to 
seek alliance partners. As I expected, if the firm has already an extended network, 
managers are less likely to further expand it if the firm also possesses financial 
resources. In this case, managers will focus on internal processes in order to advance 
product development rather than acquiring additional resources by further expanding 
the network. At low liquidity, however, firms are more likely to acquire resources 
through further expansion of their already extended network, maybe partially with the 
aim of accessing new investors. Unexpectedly, the results are opposite when the firm 
does not yet have an extended network. In this case, managers are more likely to seek 
alliance partners when the firm has a high amount of cash available. One possible 
explanation might be that when their firms are highly liquid, managers are in a more 
comfortable position to engage in network extension activities than when the firm is 
short of money. Whereas in the latter case managers might employ alliances as a pure 
means to save costs for further product development (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 
1996), in case that their firm possesses high liquidity they may even invest money in 
growing their network with the aim of building up visibility, reputation, and legitimacy, 
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which contribute to performance in the long run (Baum et al., 2000; Zimmerman and 
Zeitz, 2002). 
This study also contributes to the understanding of previous empirical research on 
strategic alliance formation in the biotechnology industry. Specifically, Deeds and Hill 
(1996) and Rothaermel (2001a) found that there is an optimal number of alliances for 
biotechnology ventures with regard to their rate of product development. However, 
many biotech firms in their samples had too few or too many alliances. The authors 
speculated that “like all human decision makers, managers may be intendedly rational, 
but because of the constraints imposed by cognitive limits, uncertainty, complexity, and 
ambiguity, their rationality is bounded” (Deeds and Hill, 1996: 54). The results above 
provide evidence that biotech managers’ decision policies are, even if they were purely 
rational, complex and take into account more than just the firm’s current rate of product 
development. Instead, they depend on the firm’s endowment of a variety of different 
resources and interactions between them. Given the death sentence that a cash crisis 
represents to many biotech ventures, over committing to alliances at the expense of 
productivity may be rational if the alternative is dissolution of the firm due to a cash 
shortage. 
The results of this work may also shed some light on the current debate about the 
benefits of alliances for new ventures offered by Alvarez and Barney (2001). The short 
term decision making forced on venture managers by a low liquidity position may lead 
them to negotiate an alliance from a position of weakness and give away much of the 
firm’s future. Under these circumstances entering into alliances could quite conceivably 
have detrimental impacts on the venture’s future rents and survival. However, when 
alliances are entered into from positions of strength such as high liquidity, venture 
managers are in a position to negotiate stronger alliances and be selective in the 
alliances in which they engage the firm (Lerner and Merges, 1998). In high liquidity 
conditions venture managers will choose those alliances which have the greatest 
potential benefit to the firm in the long run and be in a position to negotiate better terms 
making it much more likely that these alliances will enhance the venture’s productivity 
and odds of survival. It appears that the old adage that the rich get richer applies to 
alliances. Understanding the biotechnology venture managers’ decision policies and the 
circumstances under which they are likely to enter alliances which are beneficial, in 
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contrast to seeking any alliance including those which are likely to be detrimental, may 
help to resolve the debate about the value of alliances to biotech ventures. 
Finally, this study contributes to existing literature on the RBV framework. Although 
several scholars have suggested that managers’ decision policies are central to resource-
based strategies (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001), empirical 
support for this hypothesis has been scarce. In the context of one specific strategy – 
formation of strategic alliances – I provide evidence that managers’ decisions do indeed 
depend on their firm’s endowment of resources that are valuable, rare, and difficult to 
imitate and substitute. Moreover, I show that their decision policies and thus the firm’s 
strategy does depend on contingent relationships between resources rather than their 
additive effect, as many previous studies applying the RBV framework suggest. In line 
with other scholars (Priem and Butler, 2001; Heirman and Clarysse, 2004) I therefore 
call for a more sophisticated application of the RBV in future research which views the 
firm as a complex “bundle of resources” (Penrose, 1959) and explicitly takes into 
account possible resource interactions (Black and Boal, 1994). 
The findings have value for practitioners. From the perspective of the alliance-seeking 
firm, understanding their decision policies might help venture managers to make better 
and more accurate decisions. Since alliances are long-term agreements between firms 
which bind resources of each of them for a significant amount of time (Das and Teng, 
2000b), managers should think deeply about the decision to seek an alliance partner. 
The results above suggest that in situations where their firm has low liquidity and the 
financing environment is less munificent, biotech managers have a strong motivation to 
seek alliances with other firms. However, employing alliances only as a means of short-
term financing might be a dangerous strategy since alliance success crucially depends 
on the commitment both parties bring to the agreement over the long-run (Cullen et al., 
2000), and unsuccessful alliances have been shown to be potentially devastating to a 
venture’s future (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). Indeed, many alliances fail (Das and 
Teng, 2000a; Dyer et al., 2001), and inappropriate motivations such as short-term 
financing might be one such reason. Consistently, managers in this study reported that 
on average only 56% of the alliances they negotiated turned out to be successful in the 
end. From the perspective of the alliance target firm, it is also important to understand 
the motives why they are approached for alliance formation. In line with previous 
 
TO ALLY OR NOT ALLY THAT IS THE QUESTION 102 
 
research by Lerner and colleagues (Lerner and Tsai, 1999; Lerner and Merges, 1998), 
this study suggests that, when the approaching firm has little cash and the financing 
environment is less munificent and thus the need for seeking an alliance is high, the 
target firm is in a strong position for negotiating the alliance conditions in their interest. 
There is, however, the danger that the approaching partner will act opportunistically by 
not living up to commitments or failing to bring enough resources to the table to make 
the alliance successful, or (perhaps most threatening) seeking only to learn and 
appropriate the knowledge base of the venture through the alliance. 
5.6 Limitations and future research 
As all studies, this one has limitations which I have attempted to minimise in the design 
of the study. Firstly, in this article I focus on the decision of biotechnology venture 
managers to seek any type of product development alliance with another company 
based on the resource endowment of their firm. In order to understand the fundamental 
motivation for formation of strategic alliances, I followed existing literature (e.g., Deeds 
and Hill, 1996) and did not distinguish between different contractual types of alliances 
(e.g., licensing deals, joint ventures, minority equity participations). This choice might 
also depend on the firm’s resource endowment (Das and Teng, 2000b). I suggest it as a 
fruitful avenue for further research to investigate this effect. An experimental design as 
I employ here might serve as an appropriate method. 
Secondly, the theoretical justification of the decision model I develop and its subsequent 
empirical test is focused on one specific context, entrepreneurial biotechnology firms. 
Strategic alliances are, however, a ubiquitous phenomenon in many industries 
(Hagedoorn, 1993), which are characterised by specific resource needs. The application 
of the model is thus limited and future research might well shed light on how a firm’s 
endowment of resources in other sectors and in established firms influences the 
managers’ decision policies to seek a strategic alliance partner. 
Finally, as a unit of analysis I draw on decisions made by individuals. In entrepreneurial 
high technology firms, however, decisions are often made by the top management team 
and might differ from individuals’ decision policies (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). I 
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suggest that future research might analyse decision policies of complete teams, possibly 
by employing a similar experimental design as this study. 
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6 Crisis management in entrepreneurial biotechnology 
companies 
The preceding Chapters 4 and 5 investigated two important strategies for bioventures to 
build up a competitive resource base: M&A activities and strategic alliances with other 
firms. I showed that biotech start-ups use both strategies to get, among other resources, 
access to patented technologies. These technologies constitute the economics basis of 
every bioventure. Thus, a breakdown of their proprietary technology means a major 
crisis for these firms and severely threatens their survival. How can bioentrepreneurs 
manage such a crisis successfully? Are M&As and/or strategic alliances an appropriate 
way to escape this difficult situation? The study I present in this chapter seeks to answer 
these questions.9
I will introduce an explorative case study of Curacyte, a biopharmaceutical start-up 
firms which escaped a major technological breakdown crisis. The work is practitioner-
oriented and aimed to provide valuable insights for start-up managers in similar crisis 
situations. After the following introduction (Section 6.1), I will describe a framework 
for analysis of the crisis management process (Section 6.2). I will then introduce the 
methodology and data collection process (Section 6.3), followed by the results (Section 
6.4). In the subsequent discussion (Section 6.5) I will highlight implications for 
practitioners. Finally, in Section 6.6 I will describe the limitations of the study and 
suggest how they might be overcome by scholars in future research. 
6.1 Introduction 
The discovery of a new and exciting technology is often the starting point for formation 
of a biotechnology venture. Genentech, for example, one of the first and most 
successful biotech companies in the world, was founded upon the discovery of rDNA 
technology in the late 1970s. Genentech utilised this technology for production of 
human somatotropin and human insulin, two therapeutic proteins which formed the 
basis of its later economic success. In the years following the discovery of rDNA 
                                                 
9 I would like to thank Dr. Andreas Zaby, CFO of Curacyte, for his support, and Prof. Dr. Dodo zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß, University of Bamberg, for providing me with archival interview material. 
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technology, many other biotechnological techniques and methods emerged and often led 
to foundation of a new biotech venture.  
Given the importance of an exciting technology for new biotech ventures, a sudden 
breakdown of the technology means a severe crisis for the firm. In contrast to large and 
established corporations, which usually have a broad technological basis and can thus 
overcome the loss of one technology, for entrepreneurial firms this situation is always 
life-threatening. Antisense and gene therapy are examples for promising technologies, 
which did often not fulfil the expectations of biotech investors at foundation. Several 
biotech start-ups building on these technologies were discontinued due to missing 
economic perspectives. 
Yet, a few biotech start-ups escape a technology breakdown crisis. To date, existing 
literature can not provide any insight on the successful crisis management strategies of 
these firms. One reason for lack of research in this area might be that managers and 
investors are not willing to release information on the crises of their firms to the public, 
a research hurdle described in crisis management literature (Pearson and Clair, 1998). 
However, I consider research on technology breakdown crisis management in 
entrepreneurial biotech ventures as particularly important since, as discussed above, 
these crises lead to organisational death for the majority of the firms. 
In order to fill this research gap, I introduce an exploratory case study of Curacyte, a 
biopharmaceutical start-up company. Curacyte is one of the rare examples of a new 
biotech venture escaping a technology breakdown crisis six month after its foundation. I 
demonstrate Curacyte’s successful crisis management strategy enabling them to build 
up a new technological platform. 
6.2 Framework of analysis 
Scholars have not yet succeeded to find an unifying definition of organisational crisis 
(King, 2002). In this study, I follow Weick (1988: 305) and define crisis as “low 
probability/high consequence event that threatens the most fundamental goals of an 
organisation”. In this sense, the unexpected breakdown of a biotech start-up’s 
technology, which constitutes its economic basis, doubtlessly means a major crisis for 
the new venture. Consequently, I consider the crisis as ongoing as long as the firm has, 
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in the eyes of the management, not yet succeeded in building up a new technological 
basis. My aim is to illustrate managerial challenges within this timeframe in order to 
gain useful insights for bioentrepreneurs in similar crisis situations. 
As a framework for the analysis I draw on the resource-based view of the firm. Since all 
new ventures have a limited resource base, acquisition of resources is the main task of 
entrepreneurs (Brush et al., 2001; Zaby, 1999). Many studies in the entrepreneurship 
literature therefore draw on the resource-based view as the theoretical perspective for 
analysis (e.g., Bruton and Rubanik, 2002; Choi and Shepherd, 2004). According to this 
perspective, firms are bundles of resources (Penrose, 1959), and the accumulation of a 
unique resource base is a prerequisite for firms to gain competitive advantage 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Resources must be valuable (contribute to value 
creation of the firm), rare (not available to competitors), non-imitable (difficult to copy), 
and non-substitutable by other resources which can easily be acquired (Barney, 1991). 
Several studies describe categories of resources essential for entrepreneurial firms  (e.g., 
Greene et al., 1997; Dollinger, 1995). I distinguish financial, organisational, human, 
social, and technological resources. Efficient management of these resources turned out 
to be crucial for a new biotech venture suffering technological breakdown during the 
course of the analysis. 
Financial resources are the funds to start, operate and grow a business and central for 
the development of every firm (Bygrave, 1992; Dollinger, 1995). In particular in the 
field of biotechnology, which is by its nature a research-intensive industry, development 
of products is an expensive and risky process. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
biotherapeutics, e.g., demand more than 100 million $US R&D expenditure and only 
few initial product candidates reach market launch. Therefore, financial resources are of 
utmost importance for successful development of new biotech ventures. 
Organisational resources include organisational relationships, structures, routines, 
culture, and knowledge (Greene et al., 1997). Whereas in very young biotech firms 
internal relationships, structures, routines and organisational culture might not yet have 
evolved in a way that they are different from competitors and thus a source of 
competitive advantage, the continual accumulation of organisational knowledge is a 
prerequisite for biotechnology firms to succeed (Liebeskind et al., 1996; DeCarolis and 
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Deeds, 1999). Scientific knowledge is the basis for a biotech start-up’s research 
capabilities, which are the precondition to develop new products (DeCarolis and Deeds, 
1999; McNamara, 1998). Since knowledge is particularly hard to imitate and substitute, 
it constitutes one of the most important resources of a biotech company. 
Scholars have also noted the central role of human resources for development of biotech 
ventures. Two types of human resources are of particular importance. Firstly, 
managerial resources are often missing in start-ups where scientific founders are 
heading the company (Ernst & Young, 2003c). These managers have former careers as, 
e.g., university professors, positions in which they are free to focus on science rather 
than financial issues and acquisition of capital. Consequently, start-ups led by 
inexperienced managers have a much harder time to get funding (Zacharakis and 
Meyer, 2000) and are more likely to fail. Secondly, scientists in biotech start-ups 
represent an important human resource. Zucker et al. (1998) show that the founding of 
new biotech ventures is tightly connected to the presence of “star scientists”. A highly 
motivated and qualified scientific team is an essential resource for biotech start-ups 
(Baum and Silverman, 2004). 
Social resources of a company refer to its relationships and networks (Bourdieu, 1983). 
They are tightly linked to the firm and thus immobile and a source of competitive 
advantage. For a biotech start-up company, an extended contact network is crucial for 
performance (Estades and Ramani, 1998; Baum et al., 2000). Networks cover contacts 
to other companies, universities and investors, and are a source of learning, flexibility 
and technological competence (Estades and Ramani, 1998; Powell, 1998; Zucker et al., 
2002). They lower R&D costs and enhance innovative output (Zucker et al., 2002; 
George et al., 2002). Investors such as VCs also provide access to their network, which 
is often widely spread (Fried and Hisrich, 1995; Bygrave, 1988). Social resources are 
thus crucial for young biotech ventures. 
Finally, technological resources are of central importance. In general, technological 
resources of a firm “are made up of processes, systems, or physical transformations” 
(Dollinger, 1995: 37) and include laboratories, R&D facilities, and other technologies 
valuable for the company. As demonstrated in the introduction, an exciting, cutting-
edge technology with either a great commercialisation potential itself, or the potential to 
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contribute to the development of revenue-promising products in the future, is often the 
starting-point for foundation of new biotechnology ventures. It is important that 
extensive patent rights secure an exclusive use of the technology to the start-up 
company for a certain amount of time (Dollinger, 1995). Otherwise, competitors will 
imitate the technology and it is no longer a source of competitive advantage. For 
potential investors, the patent position of a biotech start-up firm is an important factor 
influencing their investment decision (Stuart et al., 1999; Baum and Silverman, 2004). 
In summary, a strong patented technology is essential for successful development of 
biotechnology firms (Lerner, 1995a; Powell et al., 1996; Deeds et al., 1998). 
Given the importance of technological resources for new biotech ventures and the fact 
that these ventures are often built on one single technology, a breakdown of the 
technology will lead to a severe and life-threatening crisis for the new firm. A 
breakdown may, e.g., occur because (i) patent protection is not as complete as initially 
assumed, (ii) it turns out that the technology is not easily commercialisable, or (iii) the 
technology is based on a scientific artefact which was discovered after foundation of the 
firm. In the latter case, patents covering the technology are useless for economic 
purposes and the firm looses its economic basis. Thus, the fast build-up or acquisition of 
a new technology must be the primary goal of a crisis management strategy in a new 
biotech venture suffering technological breakdown. 
However, crisis management also requires secondary strategic actions of biotech 
managers since other resources of the company are affected in this situation, too. With 
respect to financial resources, e.g., managers must reallocate R&D expenditures and 
may even face the challenge to acquire new capital without a robust technology in hand. 
Organisational and human resources are affected when scientists leave the company due 
to its uncertain future and take scientific knowledge with them. Furthermore, future 
uncertainty may influence the overall motivation of staff and management. With regard 
to social resources, leaving personnel might take contacts to stakeholders like university 
scientists with them. A particular challenge may be to keep support of investors after a 
technology breakdown. 
The discussion above suggests the framework depicted in Figure 17 for this study. I will 
demonstrate a biotech start-up’s technology acquisition strategy as a primary crisis 
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management reaction in response to the technology breakdown. I also analyse the effect 
of the technology breakdown on management of financial, organisational, human and 
social resources of the company. 
 
Figure 17: Framework of analysis 
6.3 Methodology and data collection 
The main objective of this research is to conduct an examination of the crisis 
management process of an entrepreneurial biotechnology firm following a technology 
breakdown. In order to achieve this, I use an exploratory case study research approach 
(Yin, 1994). Yin suggests a case study methodology when “a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is 
being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or 
no control” (Yin, 1994: 9). Because I aim to investigate the crisis management process 
from a management perspective, I need to identify ‘how’ managers reacted in the given 
situation and ‘why’ they did so. Therefore, a case study approach is most useful for this 
purpose. Moreover, since crises are very diverse in nature and by definition rare 
(Weick, 1988; Pearson and Clair, 1998), case studies are the method of choice in most 
research on crisis management (e.g., Ulmer, 2001; Simon and Pauchant, 2000). 
One major hurdle for crisis management research is to obtain data about organisational 
crises since firms are often not willing to make the circumstances of a crisis public 
(Pearson and Clair, 1998). For small entrepreneurial companies it is particularly 
dangerous to release information on a crisis because investors may be warned off and 
not willing to participate in further financing rounds. The missing readiness of 
entrepreneurs to report about crises in their companies may thus be the major obstacle 
for crisis management research on entrepreneurial firms. In this study, I circumvent the 
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problem of limited data access by exploiting personal relationships to a manager of a 
bioventure which escaped a major crisis. Specifically, the CFO of Curacyte, the case 
study company, besides serving as an interview partner, provided me with information 
from business plans, proposals, press releases and other internal documents. In order to 
validate and extend the data, I also interviewed Curacyte’s CEO. Moreover, I draw on 
archival data containing interviews with managers of two shareholder VC firms. All 
interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, were semi-structured, and recorded and 
transcribed. Data from different sources were triangulated (Denzin, 1978), coded and 
analysed according to the framework presented in Section 6.2. 
6.4 Case study findings 
In this section I will first describe Curacyte’s history before it suffered the technology 
breakdown crisis (Section 6.4.1). I will then illustrate Curacyte’s technology acquisition 
strategy (Section 6.4.2) and its management of financial (Section 6.4.3), organisational 
(Section 6.4.4), human (Section 6.4.5), and social resources (Section 6.4.6) during the 
crisis management process. 
6.4.1 Curacyte’s history before the technology breakdown 
Curacyte is a German company and was founded in March 2000 in Munich. In June of 
the same year the company closed its first financing round. A consortium of European 
venture capital firms lead by Techno Venture Management TVM committed itself to 
invest 7 million € under the condition that the founders agree to the hiring of an 
executive management team to take the positions of the CEO and CFO rather than 
holding these positions themselves. Curacyte’s lead investor identified two individuals 
who had worked together for a management consulting firm, primarily for 
pharmaceutical clients – the designated CEO being a chemist with significant 
experience in the pharmaceutical industry and a track record of founding and managing 
a successful biotechnology company in the USA, the designated CFO with a 
background in management consulting and incubation of start-up companies. The two 
individuals acquired Curacyte shares prior to the closing of the financing round and 
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joined the company as executive managers and non-scientific founders subsequent to 
the closing. 
Two key technologies which originated from an university institute led by Curacyte’s 
scientific founder, a professor of medicine, formed the basis of Curacyte’s business 
plan. These technologies were promising early-stage targets in the fields of oncology 
and immunology, respectively. In preparation of the planned target validation and drug 
discovery work, Curacyte’s management recruited a team of scientists and technicians 
and set up the laboratory infrastructure immediately after the closing. Curacyte became 
fully operational in fall of 2000 with a staff of ten people.  
Curacyte’s scientists began the technology transfer process from the university institute 
by replicating key experiments. However, after a six month transfer period marked by 
numerous replication failures, it had become evident that the key technologies were 
seriously flawed and lacked commercial viability. The university research team had 
been misled by intricate scientific artefacts, which were impossible to be discovered in a 
pre-investment due diligence. 
Curacyte’s executive management team presented the bad news of the technology 
breakdown to the board of directors on a board meeting in January 2001, six months 
after begin of the technology transfer. As a consequence, Curacyte’s scientific founder, 
who was a shareholder and served as a non-executive member on the board of directors, 
but was not involved in daily business, as well as the head of research, immediately left 
the company. Intensive discussions ensued between management, board of directors, 
and shareholders about the strategic implications for the young company, which 
counted 15 employees at that time. The obvious alternatives were that Curacyte would 
have to receive a new technological basis or be liquidated. Based on the value of the 
experienced management team, the human resources and the available infrastructure, 
shareholders decided against liquidation. Management and Curacyte’s lead investor 
convinced the other shareholders that under a joint business development effort it would 
be feasible to escape the technology breakdown crisis and acquire the necessary critical 
mass of projects. 
Curacyte’s CFO summed up the situation of his company after the technology 
breakdown as follows: 
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“We had an experienced management team, a team of scientists and technicians, 
state-of-the-art laboratories, more than five million € in cash, but – apart from a 
minor project – no technology.”  
I now discuss how Curacyte managed to establish a new technological basis and coped 
with the management of other critical resources during the crisis management process. 
6.4.2 Technology acquisition strategy 
Curacyte’s primary crisis management effort aimed at acquisition of a new technology. 
The strategy consisted of three approaches. Firstly, Curacyte’s scientists would generate 
project proposals from in-house know-how. Secondly, Curacyte would scout, evaluate, 
and eventually acquire attractive technologies from German academia, and thirdly, with 
the support of its main shareholders, Curacyte would source technologies from other 
biotechnology companies under potential deal structures ranging from in-licensing of 
selected intellectual property to M&A activity. 
Within few months after the technology breakdown, Curacyte’s scientists came forward 
with several proposals for new project opportunities, two of which were eventually 
pursued. Building on the only remaining project, a ‘hit to lead’ project for an 
oncological target (project P1), the company’s scientists developed a broader program 
encompassing novel approaches in computational chemistry. In addition, the in-house 
team proposed a new project with the aim of discovering inhibitors of a target enzyme 
with cardiovascular indication (P2), thus leveraging the computational chemistry 
resources. After board approval, laboratory staff was fully allocated on these projects 
for several months until the second approach of the business development effort, i.e., 
the acquisition of new technologies from academia yielded further opportunities. 
Based on the personal network of its management, Curacyte reviewed numerous 
technologies from German universities and research institutes. Moreover, the company 
hired a scientist particularly for screening yearly reports from German academia in 
order to discover interesting technology candidates. Opportunities were evaluated along 
the parameters of fit with the company’s core competencies, scientific and economic 
feasibility, and intellectual property protection. Also, the willingness of the respective 
research group to out-license their technology while co-operating in some form of 
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continued support had to be assessed. Because of their previous experience with invalid 
technology, Curacyte’s scientists were extremely critical about all the project 
candidates. In order to get external validation, Curacyte employed university professors 
as consultants for project evaluations. As the management states: 
“It may sound sad, but our philosophy is to try to scientifically destroy any new 
project. It is better to ask the critical questions, which stop the projects, at the 
beginning, rather than messing around with them.” (CEO) 
“An incredibly high portion of what you get offered from academia is 
economically useless. Mostly this refers to the intellectual property protection of 
the projects, which professors often do not know. You must evaluate it yourself the 
hard way and give it back to them with the bad news.” (CFO) 
Although Curacyte rejected a number of project candidates – sometimes after evaluating 
them in their own laboratories for several month – the strategy was successful in two 
cases. The company acquired patents from a renowned research group at the university 
of Jena in two transactions. These patents were related to novel small molecule 
inhibitors of two target proteins with oncological and cardiovascular indication (P3 and 
P4), respectively. During negotiations, Curacyte particularly emphasised that they were 
interested in a long-term relationship with the research groups. 
“The key to success of these transactions was – apart from the necessary level of 
personal trust and the administrative support by the university’s patent office – 
that they contractually coupled the purchase of the intellectual property to a long-
term commitment by our company and the research groups to contribute to the 
progress of the projects.” (CFO) 
Following project budgeting and board approval, Curacyte’s work on the two projects 
began in summer of 2001. At that time, the board conceded that Curacyte had regained 
a technology base that at least matched the position of many of its peers. Yet, 
management was convinced that the company still lacked a robust and sustainable 
technological basis that would adequately address the risk of inevitable future project 
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failures. Therefore, the company also screened project opportunities from other biotech 
firms. 
While attempts to in-license projects failed due to the fact that none of the very few 
opportunities offered measured up to scientific and economic scrutiny, with the support 
from key shareholders Curacyte identified four merger candidates on the basis of their 
fit with the newly positioned company. One of the main aspects in defining ‘fit’ was 
that 
“... the merger candidates were focused on either up- or downstream activities in 
the drug development process and would potentially benefit from Curacyte’s 
expertise in hit identification and lead optimisation and vice-versa.” (CFO) 
By late 2001, Curacyte’s management had evaluated three of the four merger 
candidates. In one case evaluation had advanced to the stage of joint budgeting and the 
calculation of post-merger financing needs. However, all three deals were eventually 
rejected on the basis of either scientific concerns or the problem that the merger 
candidates’ projects were even at earlier development stages than Curacyte’s new 
project portfolio and thus, in the eyes of the management, hardly qualified for creating a 
more robust company. In November of 2001 Curacyte started discussions with 
VitaResc, another German portfolio company of Curacyte’s lead investor, about a 
potential fit of the two firms. Being one year older than Curacyte, VitaResc had 
acquired a US biotech venture which was developing a therapeutic compound with a 
cardiovascular indication in clinical Phase III, the final phase prior to filing for 
regulatory marketing approval (P5). The compound had also received authorisation to 
enter into clinical trials in another oncological indication. So while Curacyte had several 
early stage projects with about two years to go until the first one might reach clinical 
development, VitaResc had one late stage project with no significant early stage follow-
ups. Thus Curacyte was not going to generate revenues for many years, and VitaResc 
was a high-risk one-product company. Moreover, VitaResc was headed by an interim 
CEO who did not want to continue after the merger, which avoided conflicts about the 
composition of management in the combined company. Curacyte’s CEO described the 
motives behind the merger as follows: 
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“The merger was part of our strategy to re-gain critical mass. We still needed an 
attractive main project. Here we had the chance to get something clinical. We 
were particularly attracted by the main product, which was developed in the USA. 
This demonstrated to us the quality of the work that was done there over years.” 
Within a period of six months the management teams designed an integration plan as 
well as an outline of the business plan of the combined entity. As part of post-merger 
integration all projects of the combined company were reprioritised and a number of 
them were stopped. After shareholders had agreed to these plans and the issues of 
valuation were settled, the two companies were merged in late May of 2002 under the 
name of Curacyte. 
In summary, during the 16 month from the technology breakdown in January 2001 to 
the closing of the merger with VitaResc in May 2002, Curacyte had built up a project 
pipeline containing one clinical product with two indications, as well as four projects in 
the R&D stage. Figure 18 summarises the project acquisition process and shows 
Curacyte’s project pipeline by May 2002 as described in the business plan of the 
merged company. 
 
Figure 18: Curacyte’s technology acquisition process and project portfolio  
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6.4.3 Financial resources 
Efficient and careful management of financial resources before and after the technology 
breakdown was essential for Curacyte to survive the crisis. As the basis for continuation 
of the company, Curacyte had about 5 million € in liquidity when presenting the 
breakdown to the board of directors in January 2001. This comfortable cash position 
resulted from the management’s quick decision to concentrate all resources on 
corroborating the invalidity of the technology. After shareholders decided to continue 
the company, Curacyte’s management could focus on acquisition of technologies after 
the breakdown rather than finding new investors, which might have been impossible in 
view of the missing technological basis. However, despite of Curacyte’s considerable 
liquidity, management tried to minimise costs and acquire new capital during the entire 
crisis management process. 
Whereas the technologies Curacyte purchased from university were “attractive projects 
for which we did not pay much” (CEO), financial issues became more critical during 
Curacyte’s evaluation of merger candidates. One of the candidates, which showed a 
good fit with Curacyte in terms of scientific projects and human resources, was rejected 
because the cash-burn of the combined entity would have been too high. When merging 
with VitaResc, Curacyte saved costs through release of personnel. Additionally, the 
management made it as a precondition to shareholders that they would provide Curacyte 
further financing for development of the enlarged project portfolio. Shareholders 
decided on a bridge financing round of 7 million € on the back of the merger to 
guarantee ample time for implementing the merger and finalising the new business in 
preparation for a large financing round that would enable the company to advance its 
projects. According to the management, the fact that Curacyte and VitaResc had an 
overlapping shareholder base facilitated negotiations. Given the hostile financing 
environment for biotech start-ups in Germany in 2002 and the early development stage 
of Curacyte’s project portfolio before the merger, it would have been very difficult for 
the company to raise money without the deal. 
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6.4.4 Organisational resources 
As discussed above, in the context of new biotech firms organisational resources mostly 
refer to scientific knowledge present within the firm. Since Curacyte acquired new 
technologies in response to its technological breakdown, management had to guarantee 
that knowledge necessary for further development of these projects was also built up. 
Knowledge acquisition was no major problem for the two projects Curacyte developed 
in-house since they emerged from the firm’s scientific core competencies. These core 
competencies were based on computational chemistry, biochemistry, and molecular and 
cell biology. Thus, the knowledge required for development of early stage drug 
candidates was present within the firm. Missing parts were built up internally by the 
respective project teams as part of the R&D process. No specific managerial actions 
were necessary in these cases to ensure knowledge acquisition and integration. 
When merging with VitaResc, Curacyte expanded its knowledge base significantly and 
gained core competencies related to clinical development of products. P5 was already in 
Phase III clinical trial and developed at VitaResc’s site in the US from the beginning. 
Besides acquisition of a clinical product, the chance to get access to clinical expertise as 
a new core competency was a major driver for the merger. 
“Before the merger we did not have any clinical expertise. Thus VitaResc’s site in 
the USA supplemented well our core competencies. The people there are very 
experienced clinical developers. Their expertise at this part of the pharmaceutical 
value chain particularly attracted us.” (CFO) 
In order to ensure that the knowledge necessary for further clinical development of P5 
was kept within the company, Curacyte’s management decided to continue operations 
in the USA and keep key personnel there after the merger. As a long-term strategy, 
Curacyte planned to conduct clinical development of all drug candidates in the USA.  
The main challenge in building up and acquiring knowledge was related to the projects 
Curacyte acquired from the university of Jena. Simply purchasing the intellectual 
property associated with the projects would have left Curacyte without the necessary 
knowledge base for further project development. Thus, as a short-term strategy, 
Curacyte’s management made it as a precondition for the technology purchase that 
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contractual long-term relationships with the respective research groups would guarantee 
Curacyte the opportunity to draw on the knowledge of the scientists which originally 
developed the technologies. Frequent interactions of Curacyte’s management with the 
university researchers ensured commitment of both sides to project development. On 
the long run, Curacyte planned to fully integrate the knowledge into the operations of 
the company. In order to achieve this, Curacyte aimed to employ the three key 
technology developers. Since not all of them wanted to move to Curacyte’s 
headquarters in Munich, the management decided to open a new subsidiary (Curacyte 
Chemistry) near the university in Jena. This decision was aided by the fact that the new 
subsidiary would be located in Eastern Germany facilitating acquisition of public 
financial support such as research grants and government financing for regional 
development. The knowledge Curacyte incorporated in its new site again led to an 
extension of core competencies. Specifically, it was related to efficiently perform 
optimisation of early lead drug candidates by chemical modifications. 
“We were suddenly a company doing chemistry. We did not make it before and 
did not want to. But we then also started employing people bringing in knowledge 
in fields we did not intend to enter when we started the company.” (CEO) 
A main challenge for Curacyte’s management was to efficiently integrate and 
coordinate the acquired knowledge since it was located at three different sites. 
Curacyte’s computational chemistry and biology resources were located at its 
headquarters in Munich, its chemistry facilities at the new site in Jena, and its clinical 
expertise in the USA. However, management felt that for an efficient R&D process it 
was necessary to encourage cross-site communication and ensure, e.g., that the clinical 
developers located in the USA also contribute their expertise to preclinical projects 
because they were expected to take over these projects for clinical development in the 
future. Thus, in order to achieve this efficient knowledge integration, after its merger 
with VitaResc Curacyte’s management structured the entire company by 
interdisciplinary project teams and selected the team members in a way that they were 
distributed among different sites. Depending on the development stage, projects were 
headed from Germany (if at the R&D or preclinical stage) or from Curacyte’s newly 
acquired subsidiary in the USA (clinical projects). Through this interdisciplinary cross-
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site project organisation Curacyte did not only realise scientific synergies, but also 
ensured post-merger integration of its US subsidiary. 
In summary, Curacyte significantly expanded its knowledge base and core 
competencies during the crisis management process as a result of its external 
technology acquisition strategy. The loss of scientific knowledge due to leaving 
personnel turned out to be no major problem for the company, since this knowledge was 
mostly related to the invalid and discontinued technology. 
6.4.5 Human resources 
Human resource management was a major challenge for Curacyte’s management after 
the technology breakdown. In order to gain support for their decisions during the crisis 
management process, communication with employees was as open as possible. 
“We always had employee meetings, in which we told the people how the 
company developed. I think, we were very open, although I am not sure now 
whether it was always the best.” (CEO) 
Despite open communication, however, Curacyte’s management did not gain support 
from all employees and a turnover of staff, including scientists and technicians, was 
unavoidable. The failure of the company’s main project due to scientific invalidity led 
to suspension of the head of research. Staff loyal to him did not understand this 
management decision. Others had problems with the management style of the CEO, 
who temporary took over the position. Uncertainty about future development of the 
company and job security led to anxiety and interpersonal conflicts. 
“We had a turnover resulting from dissatisfaction, wrong expectations, and 
maybe missing confidence in the drastic management decisions. It did not help the 
climate within the company. We had real problems in tightening the team 
together. [...] I was really distressed and often swamped with the situation, 
although we tried everything.” (CEO) 
However, management understood that it would not help and make sense to keep all the 
people. 
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“Sometimes we had to say to someone: now it is a different job, and if you do not 
accept, leave the company!” (CEO) 
“We did not do everything to keep the people. Some were so agitated that you 
realised after a few conversations that it would not change and that it was best for 
them to leave. And so it happened.” (CFO) 
Instead of convincing all staff to stay, Curacyte soon started recruiting new people. The 
management did not pay particular attention on “crisis experience” or “stress resistance” 
of the candidates, but on their scientific qualification. As mentioned above, one strategy 
was to employ the people who developed Curacyte’s newly purchased projects at 
university. Others were acquired by advertisements in journals and newspapers. 
As a result of the dissatisfaction of employees, Curacyte’s management introduced 
periodical surveys among staff about job satisfaction, career advancement, and 
suggestions of improvement. These surveys were taken very seriously and still done 
four years after the breakdown. Several employee suggestions were implemented. These 
measures in combination with integration of new people and the leave of the most 
dissatisfied finally led to an “acceptable climate in the company” (CEO). 
With regard to managerial resources of Curacyte, it is obvious that the past experience 
of the CEO and the CFO as consultants and managers of pharmaceutical projects was 
crucial for successful crisis management. In contrast to many young biotech firms, 
which are spun-off universities and headed by former professors and scientists, both 
managers did not have any emotional relationships to Curacyte’s projects but instead 
viewed failure as intrinsic to drug development. They accepted the breakdown and 
quickly looked out for new opportunities. 
“I learned in pharmaceutical industry that it is the art of drug development to 
early enough identify projects with prospect of success. All others must be 
eliminated as soon as possible. Ninety percent of funds in the pharmaceutical 
industry are invested in drug candidates which never reach the market. This is the 
nature of drug development, although many believe that they can change it by 
messing around with projects.” (CEO) 
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6.4.6 Social resources 
Two kinds of social resources were particularly affected during Curacyte’s crisis 
management process: investor relations and Curacyte’s contact network to universities 
and research institutions. 
Support of investors was a prerequisite for Curacyte’s successful crisis management. 
Particularly their main VC shareholder TVM, who selected the CEO and CFO at 
foundation of the company, encouraged management to continue the firm despite of the 
breakdown. 
“I remember a business dinner I had with the chairwoman of our board shortly 
before the board meeting. I gave her some hints about our situation and asked 
what if we found out that our technology is invalid? She answered that this would 
be no catastrophe and we would have to find something new.” (CEO) 
It is important to note that the personal relationship between the CEO of Curacyte and 
TVM extends until before the company was founded. VC managers at TVM and the 
CEO knew each other from common years they spent at a major pharmaceutical 
company. The shareholder was thus aware of the managerial skills and personal 
integrity of the CEO which certainly facilitated their decision to continue Curacyte 
instead of liquidating it after the technology breakdown. 
As in the context of employees, open communication was essential for building up an 
atmosphere of trust, in particular with other shareholders than TVM which had no 
personal relationship to the management before company formation. Management was 
commended by shareholders for the rapid and unbiased recommendation to discontinue 
work on the main technology, although, in the eyes of the management, the opposite 
would have secured the future of the company for the short term. 
“We could easily have continued with the project for two more years and showed 
the board fishy results which can be interpreted in one way or another. Many do it 
like this. [...] But in the end, we would have reached no milestone to raise money 
again.” (CEO) 
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As a result of their openness, Curacyte’s management received a mandate from the 
board of directors to initiate the business development program with the goal of 
establishing a new technological basis. Shareholder support continued during the entire 
technology acquisition process. According to the management, it was a precondition for 
quick technology acquisition that the shareholders backed all major management 
decisions. 
Shareholder support for Curacyte was also crucial during its merger with VitaResc. 
Although the deal was initiated by the management and not, as it is often the case with 
underperforming VC portfolio firms, forced by the main shareholders, the lead investor 
TVM played a crucial role. First, they suggested to the Curacyte management to 
evaluate VitaResc as a potential merger candidate. Since TVM was also the main 
shareholder of VitaResc, they were aware that VitaResc lacked a senior management as 
well as valuable potential follow-up projects for its main clinical product thus providing 
a good fit with Curacyte’s project portfolio (see above). Moreover, the fact that both 
firms had the same lead investor facilitated valuation negotiations, a major problem for 
private biotech ventures and a hurdle for many biotech-biotech M&As (Ernst & Young, 
2004). Finally, although shareholders played no active role in the post-merger 
integration process, they contributed valuable practical suggestions during this phase 
ranging from how to sell free office space to how to efficiently cancel unnecessary 
contracts which had no value for Curacyte after the merger. 
The external project acquisition strategy provided Curacyte with additional contacts to 
universities and research institutes. Particularly the contact to the university research 
group in Jena where Curacyte purchased two projects from turned out to be valuable. 
The contact had its roots in the personal network of Curacyte’s management. 
Specifically, when looking for new project opportunities, the management contacted a 
scientist with whom they used to work at the consulting company before founding 
Curacyte. This scientist contacted his PhD supervisor, a professor at the Max-Planck-
Institute for Biochemistry in Munich, who in turn recommended the research group at 
the university of Jena as potential source of attractive projects. After the management 
visited the professor who led the research group in Jena and both parties got to know 
each other, he offered Curacyte to purchase the projects. In 2004, Curacyte was still in 
close contact with this professor. Besides ongoing scientific collaboration, he served as 
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an external scientific consultant for Curacyte during evaluation of new project 
opportunities. By the merger with VitaResc, Curacyte acquired a subsidiary in the USA, 
where experienced scientists with contacts to universities, research institutes, and CROs 
were working on the development of P5. As the CFO summed up: 
 “We are still in close collaboration with the university institute and recruited a 
number of people from there. [...] It is a big advantage to have the excellent 
universities around in the USA, and also the biotech companies and CROs. 
Because of these structures the USA are a much better place for clinical studies 
than Germany. We are also doing animal models in the USA together with a 
university research group which our scientists there know.” (CFO) 
6.5 Discussion 
In this article, I demonstrated how an entrepreneurial biotechnology firm escaped a 
technology breakdown crisis. Table 13 summarises the results. 
Resources Main challenges Important management reactions 
Technological Acquisition of new technology Three-way strategy: in-house development, 
in-licensing from academia, M&A 
Expansion of core competencies 
Financial Financing for continuation of 
company 
Remaining cash through concentration on 
quick corroboration of technology 
breakdown 
 Financing in times of tight 
equity markets 
Bridge financing round as precondition of 
M&A deal 
Organisational Acquisition of new knowledge Contractual long-term relationships to 
research groups, employment of scientists 
from purchased and acquired projects 
 Integration of new US 
subsidiary 
Organisation of company by cross-site 
projects 
Human Motivate and keep people 
Acquisition of new personnel 
Accept staff turnover, employee surveys 
Employ people from purchased projects 
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Social Keep investor relations Open and honest communication before and 
after the technology breakdown 
Table 13: Crisis management case study results 
The main aim of this study was to gain valuable insights for bioentrepreneurs. Results 
show that the breakdown of a bioventure’s technology does not necessarily lead to 
failure of the company. I illustrated that a loss of technological resources has important 
implications for the management of other resources as well. The following discussion 
may help bioentrepreneurs with this difficult task. 
Firstly, bioentrepreneurs should be aware that, although a new technology might look 
very promising at foundation of a company, there is still the possibility of technological 
breakdown for whatever reason. Scientific invalidity, as in the case of Curacyte, is only 
one example. Others may include incomplete intellectual property protection or missing 
commercialisability. The limited resource base of a new venture will probably not allow 
for extensive proactive crisis preparation, e.g., by developing scenarios of alternative 
strategies in case of a crisis, as done by some large corporations (Mitroff et al., 1987). 
The only proactive strategy bioentrepreneurs may follow is to be highly critical about 
the technology and sensible with regard to a possible breakdown. A critical attitude of 
management and scientists is a prerequisite for early signal detection, which is essential 
for successful management of every crisis (D'Aveni and MacMillan, 1990; Pearson and 
Mitroff, 1993; Pearson and Clair, 1998). Particularly scientific founders of a company 
should ask themselves whether they are critical enough about the technology they 
developed, or whether their emotional link to the technology perturbs their objectivity. 
Supplementation of the management team by external managers or non-scientific 
founders like the CEO and CFO of Curacyte might be a way to enhance sensibility of 
the management with regard to technological invalidity. 
In case of any indication of a technology breakdown, bioentrepreneurs are well advised 
to concentrate resources on corroborating these results instead of spending further 
money on the project despite of uncertain validity. This strategy limits financial damage 
to the new venture. It ensured Curacyte a maximum of financial resources for 
acquisition of a new technological basis after the breakdown was presented to the board 
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of directors. The findings are in line with existing crisis management literature, where 
general damage limitation in case of an upcoming crisis is seen as a crucial step in an 
efficient crisis management process (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993). 
Already during the process of detection and corroboration of a possible technological 
breakdown, investor relations are an important social resource bioentrepreneurs should 
pay attention on. Shareholder communication should be open and honest in order to 
create an atmosphere of trust and enhance the probability that they will decide on 
continuation of the company after technological failure instead of liquidation. This view 
is supported by Ulmer (2001), who finds that strong communication channels and 
positive value positions with stakeholders well before organisational crises erupt are 
important preconditions for successful crisis management. Excellent investor relations 
will also be valuable during the build-up of a new technological basis after the 
breakdown event. Curacyte, e.g., was supported by its shareholders not only in terms of 
access to investor networks and suggestions of potential deals, but also with regard to 
freedom and support for managerial decisions. The latter is a prerequisite for the 
management to react with the necessary speed and flexibility required during all crisis 
management processes (Pearson and Clair, 1998). 
Once technological breakdown is corroborated and board approval for continuation of 
the company is achieved, management needs to follow an aggressive project acquisition 
strategy. This strategy may consist, as in the case of Curacyte, of three approaches in 
parallel: in-house development, purchase or licensing of patents from academia, and 
deals with other biotech companies including in-licensing, joint ventures, or M&A 
activities. During project acquisition, which corresponds to the “recovery” phase 
described by crisis management researchers (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993), 
bioentrepreneurs should again be very critical with project opportunities with a focus on 
scientific and economic feasibility, and, equally important, intellectual property 
protection. As in the case of Curacyte, external consultants may assist in evaluation of 
project candidates. Furthermore, managers should pay particular attention on 
organisational resources, i.e., the attraction of knowledge related to the acquired 
technologies, since, in the best case, newly acquired projects should not only fit the core 
competencies of the firm but expand them. Curacyte, e.g., built up a chemistry facility 
and clinical expertise and acquired the corresponding knowledge by employing the 
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technology developers. Moreover, an aggressive strategy of external technology 
acquisition may provide a new biotech venture with additional contacts to universities 
and research institutions, an important social resource for these firms (Powell, 1998; 
Zucker et al., 2002). 
Lastly, bioentrepreneurs should be aware that, as during most crisis management 
processes (Pearson and Clair, 1998), a major challenge after a technology breakdown is 
the management of human resources. For Curacyte, turnover of staff was unavoidable. 
The overall climate in the company suffered and social structures eroded, consistent 
with observations of other crisis management scholars (Pearson and Clair, 1998). I 
suggest that bioentrepreneurs should follow Curacyte’s strategy to let go people willing 
to leave the firm instead of keeping them for any price. Acquisition of new staff should 
start as soon as possible. Moreover, human resource management practices like staff 
surveys can contribute to uncover sources of dissatisfaction and may, as in the case of 
Curacyte, help entrepreneurs to reintroduce an acceptable climate in the company. 
In summary, this research demonstrates that many aspects described as critical for 
successful crisis management in large organisations are also important in the context of 
a technology breakdown within a bioentrepreneurial firm. However, there are major 
differences due to the limited resource base of the venture. In contrast to large 
corporations, where often specialised crisis management teams deal with certain aspects 
of organisational crises (Podolak, 2002), in case of a new firm it is the entrepreneurial 
team themselves who must manage all kinds of resources during the crisis management 
process. They can neither establish a formalised signal detection process before the 
crisis occurs nor a specialised crisis management team afterwards. Moreover, in contrast 
to large corporations, lack of financial resources does not enable entrepreneurial firms 
to engage crisis management specialists from outside as consultants for certain aspects 
of the crisis. Instead, the whole organisation is affected by the crisis and it is the 
entrepreneurial team who must find a way out. 
Although one might consider Curacyte’s case as quite unique, it shows interesting 
similarities with a case study on the corporate renewal process of Celltech, one of the 
largest biotech firms in Europe (McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 1999). Founded in 1980, 
Celltech suffered a severe corporate crisis and found itself near bankruptcy in 1990. At 
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that time, a new, external top management team entered the company and initiated its 
transformation from a contract R&D firm and manufacturer of biologics to a modern 
biopharmaceutical company. As in the case of Curacyte, the fact that the new 
management was not emotionally attached to previous and ongoing projects facilitated 
this transformation. Furthermore, Celltech’s management experienced strong support by 
shareholders, again reminding of the relationship between the Curacyte management 
and TVM. The analogies also extend into management of financial, human, and 
organisational resources. As Curacyte, Celltech followed a strict cost reduction strategy 
and experienced a staff turnover. Since Celltech had to build up new knowledge related 
to development of therapeutics, management decided to hire thirty medicinal chemists 
to extend its knowledge base, a strategy similar to Curacyte’s hiring of scientists from 
the university research group it purchased projects from. Intriguingly, although Celltech 
was 10 years older and had considerably more employees than Curacyte, in both cases 
management decided to restructure the company by interdisciplinary project teams. 
Finally, collaborations with other organisations played a key role in Celltech’s as well 
as Curacyte’s strategy of new technology and knowledge acquisition. These similarities 
do not only suggest that many of the findings presented here are generalisable to other, 
even more established biotech companies in similar crisis situations as Curacyte, but 
they suggest that the literature of corporate renewal might provide an appropriate 
theoretical lens for future researchers studying crisis management in entrepreneurial 
firms. 
6.6 Limitations and future research 
This research is a first step to understand how entrepreneurial firms can survive life-
threatening crises. The specific focus on the technological breakdown of a new biotech 
venture allowed me to derive helpful insights for bioentrepreneurs. I would like to 
motivate researchers to extend this stream of research in several directions. 
Firstly, this work draws on a single case study and may thus, as all case studies, be of 
limited generalisability. Due to the similarities with the Celltech case described above, I 
consider it as likely that some of the findings might well be applicable to other cases. 
However, some biotech start-ups may escape a technology breakdown by a different 
 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT OF ENTREPRENEURIAL BIOTECH COMPANIES 128 
 
strategy, e.g., exclusive in-house development or acquisition of a new technology which 
has nothing to do with the core competencies of the firm. I speculate that management 
of other resources would be different in these cases. Moreover, it would also be 
interesting to analyse cases of non-successful crisis management in situations similar to 
the one of Curacyte. A comparison might reveal critical issues during the process more 
systematically. 
Finally, I would like to encourage managers as well as investors of biotechnology start-
ups to try to overcome organisational crises in a joint effort instead of quickly 
liquidating the company. Crises also offer chances to a firm (Hurst, 1995; Nathan, 
1998). Young ventures can, e.g., build up a “history” in quite a short time, which can tie 
the team together and enhance identification with the company, an experience made by 
the case study company Curacyte. Therefore, although conceding that the crisis 
management process was exhausting and often frustrating, in an interview Curacyte’s 
CFO referred to it as “good old times”. 
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7 How do venture capitalists spread risk by diversification 
within specialised life science portfolios? 
Bioventures are risky businesses. In Chapter 3 I illustrated that a downturn at the capital 
markets often leads to insolvencies because the firms fail to acquire the capital 
necessary to finance their expensive product development processes. Moreover, as the 
case study I introduced in the previous Chapter 6 demonstrates, the technological 
uncertainty of bioventures is high and there is always the danger that the firms will 
loose their economic basis because of a technological breakdown. From the perspective 
of biotech investors such as VCs, which often invest tens of millions of Euros in these 
risky firms, insolvencies usually mean a complete loss of their investments. How do 
these investors deal with the considerable risk inherent in their investees? 
The purpose of the study in this chapter is to analyse portfolio and risk reduction 
strategies of specialised life science VC firms. It is important to note that the term “life 
sciences”, which I will use below, refers to what I described as “biotechnology” in 
Chapter 2, but also covers “medical technology”, which I will introduce in more detail 
in the following sections. Since VCs often include both technologies in their portfolio of 
investees, this extension turned out to be necessary during the course of the analysis.10
This study contributes to VC literature by extending the concept of VC portfolio 
diversification to industry specialised portfolios. In the introduction in Section 7.1, I 
will illustrate how the study relates to existing literature on diversification of non-
industry specialised portfolios. In Section 7.2, I will introduce a theoretical framework 
for analysis of life science portfolios. I will then describe the methodology chosen and 
the data sources (Section 7.3). In Section 7.4, I will apply the framework to the 
portfolios of seven VC firms and describe the results. In the following Section 7.5 I will 
discuss the results and compare and extend them with rich interview data. Finally, in 
Section 7.6, I will point to limitations of this work which might be overcome by going 
forward scholars. 
                                                 
10 I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Dodo zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, University of Bamberg, for providing me 
with archival interview material and critical comments and discussions. I am indebted to Ilona Arnoldt, 
University of Bamberg, for her help with data collection. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Venture capitalists invest large amounts of money in a portfolio of start-up companies. 
Due to their liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), many of these start-ups fail 
during the first years of their lifetime. They therefore comprise a high risk for their 
investors. Investment risk in the VC market is particularly high since portfolio firms are 
not traded at public stock markets and therefore do neither have to publish detailed 
financial reports and inform their investors about company development, nor are they 
subject to monitoring by qualified analysts of institutional investors (Sanders and 
Biovie, 2004). Moreover, VC portfolio ventures often operate in new industries such as 
life sciences and employ new business models, where only scarce knowledge and 
experience is available to investors (Sanders and Biovie, 2004). Since many start-up 
managers tend to keep the use of their limited financial resources and operational 
problems secret (Mitchell et al., 1995), significant informational asymmetries arise 
between VC firms and their investees. Finally, in contrast to investors of public firms, 
VCs can not exit their investments at any point in time because valuation of early stage, 
non-public companies, which do often not yet have a product on the market, is difficult 
and VCs might not succeed in finding a buyer willing to pay their charged price. 
Therefore, in order to reduce future uncertainty and facilitate valuation and exit from 
their investments, VCs need to grow their portfolio firms to a certain size, which 
typically demands several rounds of capital infusion and takes about 5 years (Sahlman, 
1990).  
VCs can reduce their investment risk on the level of individual portfolio companies 
(“micro risk”) and on the level of the overall portfolio (“macro risk”) (Norton and 
Tenenbaum, 1993). It is well studied in the literature how VCs minimise their micro 
risk. Firstly, VCs carefully select their portfolio companies according to criteria such as 
quality and experience of the management, product differentiation, market potential and 
financial perspectives (Wright et al., 1997; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 
1985; Shepherd, 1999b). Moreover, during the time of investment, VCs thoroughly 
monitor and control the management of their portfolio start-ups through participation in 
the board of directors (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Lerner, 1995b). Sophisticated 
contracting constructs ensure the VC firm substantial rights to achieve their interests in 
case of agency conflicts with their portfolio start-up management (Kaplan and 
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Strömberg, 2001). VCs also provide not only financial support but add value to their 
portfolio companies by assisting the management in daily business, personnel 
management, selection of executives, strategic analysis, and financial issues 
(MacMillan et al., 1988; Sapienza, 1992; Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Fried and Hisrich, 
1995). Finally, VCs syndicate in financing rounds with other VC firms which allows 
them to draw on the experience of their syndication partners when selecting investees 
and supporting them in management (Bygrave, 1987; Lockett and Wright, 2001). 
In contrast to micro risk reduction strategies, much less attention has been paid in the 
literature on how VCs reduce their risk by diversifying their portfolio among markets 
and industries (macro risk). Whereas the systematic component of the macro risk, which 
arises from market-wide effects, remains unaffected, diversification of a portfolio can 
well reduce the unsystematic risk component arising from firm and industry-specific 
variations. According to financial theory, VCs should thus invest in a well-diversified 
portfolio of start-up companies (Markowitz, 1967). However, diversification of a 
portfolio of private firms is more difficult than diversification in public stock markets 
for two reasons. Firstly, VC investments usually demand a relatively high percentage of 
the total fund the VC firms have under management (Robinson, 1987), which limits 
diversification opportunities and drives syndication of investments (Lockett and Wright, 
2001). Secondly, the information asymmetries associated with their investments make it 
difficult for VCs to obtain sufficient information required for efficient diversification 
(Sahlman, 1990). Previous research has shown that these high information costs lead to 
specialisation rather than diversification of VC portfolios across industries. 
Accumulation of industry-specific knowledge, networks, and reputation enhances the 
probability that VCs will select successful portfolio companies which finally yield high 
returns (Bygrave, 1987; Sahlman, 1990; Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993). 
The development of the VC industry in the last decade provided further support for the 
industry specialisation hypothesis. An increasing number of VC firms raised funds 
dedicated to one promising high technology industry such as information technology or 
life sciences. Many VC companies even exclusively focus on one industry. According 
to previous studies, portfolios of these VC firms would be classified as undiversified 
(Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993). Industry-specialised VCs would not have the chance 
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and necessity to build up a risk-adjusted portfolio with regard to diversification of their 
portfolio firms among technologies and product markets.  
In this study, I argue that diversification of their portfolio is an important strategy also 
for industry-specialised VC firms to reduce their macro risk. I illustrate within-industry 
portfolio diversification in the context of the life science industry, one of the most 
promising sectors of the 21st century. Modern biotechnological methods like genetic 
engineering and large-scale production of biomolecules such as proteins and antibodies 
facilitate the development of drugs and diagnostics for unmet clinical needs (e.g., 
cancer, Alzheimer’s disease) and have a huge economic potential. However, the 
development of biotechnological products is research-intensive and risky and requires 
large amounts of capital before the firms generate revenues. Therefore, most life science 
start-up companies essentially depend on VC financing (Prevezer, 2001). The high 
return potential of biotechnological products makes the life science industry particularly 
interesting for VC investments, and many dedicated life science VC firms have emerged 
during the last years. Meanwhile life science firms comprise a significant amount of 
total VC investment. In Germany, e.g., almost one third of total VC investment in 2003 
was in the life science sector. Table 14 provides an overview of life science and other 
VC investments in Germany. 
Year Total VC investment 
Life science VC 
investment 
Life science 
of total 
1997 990 65 7 % 
1998 1250 140 11 % 
1999 2450 180 7 % 
2000 3700 565 15 % 
2001 2800 525 19 % 
2002 1450 210 15 % 
2003 700 225 32 % 
Source: (BVK, 2004; Ernst & Young, 2004) 
Table 14: VC investment in life sciences in Germany in million €. 
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During the hostile financing environment of the years 2002 to 2004 many German life 
science firms did not succeed in closing another VC financing round necessary for 
further company development. Moreover, they could not raise money through an IPO 
since the German stock markets are less developed than, e.g., the markets in the USA or 
the UK, and the IPO window was closed. The German life science industry suffered 
painful insolvencies including even established companies which had received 
significant VC investment before like Axxima (64 million €), Munich Biotech (40 
million €), Apovia (29 million €), and Xerion (26 million €). There is thus an essential 
need for life science VC firms to build up a risk-adjusted portfolio in order to 
compensate for these large potential losses. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse which contribution (if any) to VC’s risk 
reduction strategies diversification can make when their portfolio is specialised on one 
industry. I will conclude that, in contrast to non-industry specialised portfolios, where 
specialisation rather than diversification contributes to risk reduction (Gupta and 
Sapienza, 1992; Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993), the opposite is true in the context of 
industry-specialised portfolios. Specialisation below industry level on technologies or 
product markets does not seem to be a favoured means for VCs to reduce their 
investment risk. Industry-specialised VC portfolios are well-diversified among markets 
and technologies. 
7.2 Framework for the analysis of diversification within life science 
portfolios  
Since the goal of this study is to analyse how diversification within industry-specialised 
portfolios can contribute to reduction of VCs’ investment risk, I first need to define the 
understanding of risk and the unit of analysis in this study. Consistent with existing VC 
literature (e.g., Ruhnka and Young, 1991; Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993), I 
conceptualise risk as the probability that an investment will fail before the VC generates 
a profitable exit. A portfolio is the riskier the more firms face a high individual failure 
risk, i.e., the lower the number of profitable exits the VC will probably generate. VCs 
will accept investments with higher risk (at the individual or the portfolio level) because 
they have a higher chance for large returns (Ruhnka and Young, 1991; Gupta and 
Sapienza, 1992). Based on this conceptualisation, the investment risk of a VC firm at 
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the portfolio level is, at any point in time, described by the portfolio companies it 
currently holds. It is therefore independent of profitable exits the VC had in the past. 
Moreover, it does not depend on the number of funds the VC has under management, 
since every failed investment will mean a loss for the VC. It also does not depend on 
whether funds have been fully invested or not, since non-invested money does not 
comprise risk according to this conceptualisation. The unit of analysis are thus the 
current portfolios of VC firms. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, biotechnology and life sciences are a heterogeneous field 
with various definitions existing in the literature. I draw on the definition of Ernst & 
Young who understand as life science firms “companies that use modern techniques to 
develop products or services to serve the needs of human healthcare or animal health, 
agricultural productivity, food processing, renewable resources or environmental 
affairs” (Ernst & Young, 2000a). Since by far most of these firms focus on development 
of products for human healthcare (Ernst & Young, 2000a), in the context of this 
analysis I will only refer to these firms. However, even these companies develop very 
different technologies and serve different markets. Classical industry categorisations 
such as the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) do not cover this substantial within-
industry diversity (zu Knyphausen-Aufseß et al., 2005). Thus, I use the categories 
below for life science companies active in human healthcare. 
I distinguish between firms that develop medical technology (medtech), drugs and 
diagnostics, and firms offering services and supply of laboratory material. Medtech 
companies, for example, develop technologies for tissue and organ transplantation. 
Drug development firms use modern biotechnological methods to develop 
biopharmaceuticals. Diagnostics companies employ modern biotechnology (e.g., gene 
and protein analysis) to produce a new generation of diagnostic tests for humans. 
Service/supply firms offer, e.g., DNA sequencing services or laboratory equipment like 
protein or DNA purification kits for daily research in industry and research institutes. I 
summarise these categories under the term “business areas”. This expression is loosely 
defined in the literature and often used to describe different product markets firms serve 
(e.g., Frumau, 1992). Thus, it is an appropriate summarising term for this study.  
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Of the life science business areas described, drug development is by far the most risky 
and money-consuming one. As illustrated in Chapter 2 , it takes about 100 million $US 
to bring a drug to market (DiMasi et al., 2003), and the probability that an initial drug 
candidate will reach the market is only about 6 % (Kellog and Charnes, 2000). 
Therefore, drug development companies are particularly likely to fail. Despite this high 
risk, drug development firms comprise the largest fraction of VC-backed life science 
companies, since they have the greatest potential for high returns. In contrast, medtech, 
diagnostics and service/supply firms are often profitable a few years after foundation 
and face a much lower failure risk. However, they do not generate comparable revenues. 
In the framework of this study, I use the fraction of drug development companies in the 
portfolio as an indicator of its business area risk. 
VC firms can also spread risk within their sub-portfolio of drug development firms. 
VCs can invest in start-ups developing drugs for different therapeutic markets (e.g., 
cancer, cardiovascular diseases), and drugs belonging to different lead compound 
technologies (e.g., small molecules, antibodies). From a start-up’s perspective, 
significant synergies arise between projects focusing on the same therapeutic area or the 
same lead compound class since know-how and technologies are overlapping. 
Therefore, many drug development start-up firms are, e.g., “cancer companies” or 
“small molecule companies”, or focus on both and, for example, develop small 
molecules for cancer diseases. However, there is the possibility that a novel technology 
of lead compounds might not be as easily applicable as initially thought. Antisense and 
gene therapy are examples from the past. Similarly, there might arise more problems in 
developing drugs for a certain therapeutic market than expected at foundation of a 
company, as it is the case for some neurological diseases. Thus, VCs ought to diversify 
their drug development sub-portfolio with regard to different lead compound classes 
and therapeutic areas in order to keep their risk low. I measure diversification of the 
sub-portfolio by its entropy S (Palepu, 1985) according to S = Sth + Slc =  - Σ pi, th ln pi, th  
- Σ pi, lc  ln pi, lc, with pi, th and pi, lc representing the fractions of firms developing drugs 
for different therapeutic markets and belonging to different lead compound 
technologies, respectively. According to portfolio theory, the drug development sub-
portfolio risk decreases with increasing diversification and hence increasing entropy 
(Markowitz, 1967). 
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VCs investing in a large portion of risky drug development companies and/or with a 
non-diversified drug development sub-portfolio might reduce their macro risk in 
another way. In the framework of this study I analyse two possibilities of risk reduction 
which potentially interplay with the life science portfolio design of VC firms. Firstly, 
VCs might invest in companies in late development stages (Elango et al., 1995; 
Sapienza and Gupta, 1994). Early stage ventures are particular risky investments since 
they face the liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and therefore a high failure risk 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, technological uncertainty is usually high for young 
ventures since their technologies are new and not yet established. Secondly, the long 
product development cycles make market projections difficult, in particular in the 
hypercompetitive environment of the life science industry. Finally, at early stages life 
science start-ups are often led by inexperienced academic founders and thus face a high 
risk of management failure (Ruhnka and Young, 1991; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994).  
VCs can also reduce macro risk by diversifying their portfolio investments among 
different countries and thus capital markets (Meyer and Shao, 1995; Gupta and 
Sapienza, 1992). This possibility is particularly important for VCs active in less 
developed equity markets like, e.g., Continental Europe. European investors are less 
experienced and much more hesitant to invest in risky start-up firms than their 
counterparts in the USA or the UK. This effect multiplies once a market downturn 
occurs. For example, whereas only one life science firm went public in Germany in 
2004, 30 firms had their IPOs in the US market raising a total of 2.5 billion $US 
(BioCentury, 2005). German VCs can thus more easily achieve exits and reduce their 
macro risk when diversifying their portfolio into the US market. Moreover, these VCs 
may also have better chances to find syndication partners in the USA with more 
liquidity than German VCs, which enhances the probability that their portfolio start-ups 
will finally achieve an IPO. US VCs invested more than 4 billion € in life science firms 
in 2004, as compared to 0.2 billion € of German VCs (BioCentury, 2005). In summary, 
international diversification into more developed and liquid capital markets such as the 
USA is an efficient means for VCs in Continental Europe to reduce their macro risk. 
Figure 19 summarises the framework of this analysis. I analyse the interplay of a VC’s 
focus on geographic scope/development stage of investment, and diversification of the 
life science portfolio with regard to different business areas. I also investigate the 
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relationship between geographic/investment stage focus and diversification within drug 
development sub-portfolios. Finally, I elucidate whether risk of the overall portfolio and 
the drug development sub-portfolio are correlated. 
 
Figure 19: Framework for analysis of life science portfolios 
7.3 Methodology and data collection 
The main objective of this research is to conduct an examination of the diversification 
strategies of industry-specialised life science VC firms. In order to achieve this, I use an 
exploratory case study research approach (Yin, 1994). Yin suggests a case study 
methodology when “a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being asked about a contemporary set 
of events over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 1994: 9). Because I 
aim to analyse ‘how’ VCs diversify their life science portfolios and ‘why’ they do so, a 
case study approach is most useful for this purpose. Case studies have been used 
successfully before in VC and Management Buy-In/Management Buy-Out (MBI/MBO) 
research (e.g., Robbie and Wright, 1995; Kollmann and Kuckertz, 2004). 
In order to select the cases, I identified VC firms with investments in the German life 
science industry from industry reports (mostly those by Ernst & Young), life science 
firm press releases, industry press, and online sources. From this initial list of 46 firms, I 
theoretically derived the sample. Since many variables might influence VC’s risk 
attitude and diversification strategy, it was impossible to analyse the effect of all of 
them simultaneously. I therefore aimed to hold some of the variables constant across 
cases while covering a possibly wide range of others (“polar types”) (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
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I aimed at achieving homogeneity with regard to VC experience, location of the VC’s 
headquarters, syndication strategy, and stage focus in a wider sense (including 
MBO/MBI firms), which are known to impact VC’s risk attitude and investment 
behaviour (Lockett and Wright, 2001; Manigart et al., 2002). Therefore, I first excluded 
all VCs which had less than ten life science investments and were active for less than 
six years in the sector in order to take into account only VCs with significant 
experience.11 Secondly, I included only VCs which either have their headquarters in 
German-speaking countries or have a subsidiary in Germany and their headquarters in a 
neighbouring country. Moreover, I selected only VCs which prefer acting as a lead 
investor according to their own announcements, which controls for different syndication 
strategies to a certain extent. I also excluded MBI/MBO specialists. All VCs in the 
sample have at least some early stage lead investments in Germany (for examples see 
Table 15). Finally, I did not include corporate VCs since these might follow different 
diversification strategies with the aim to integrate their portfolio ventures later.12
From the remaining list of 17 firms I selected seven VCs – a number consistent with 
recommendations for case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989) – with the aim of covering 
maximum heterogeneity with regard to the two variables geographic scope of investees 
and stage focus in a narrow sense (non-MBO/MBI firms) of the framework. I decided to 
analyse portfolios of Techno Venture Management TVM (Germany), HBM Bioventures 
(Switzerland), Deutsche Venture Capital DVC (Germany), Life Science Partners LSP 
(Netherlands), Global Life Science Ventures GLSV (Germany), Heidelberg Innovation 
HI (Germany), and BioM (Germany) (Table 15). Please note that the VCs 
systematically differ in amount of capital under management since VCs with a small 
fund invest in early stage ventures with narrow geographic scope. Small VCs should, 
according to the framework of analysis, thus have a much higher need of risk reduction 
                                                 
11 Please note that the German VC and life science industry, both of which mainly arouse in the mid-
1990s, are much younger than the sectors in the USA and the UK. Therefore six years do mean above-
average experience in the German context, whereas in the USA and the UK these VCs might be classified 
as young and unexperienced. 
12 One might also argue that syndicate partners which are either corporates (e.g., pharma firms) or 
corporate VCs influence the strategy of portfolio firms, e.g., regarding choice of therapeutic area, which 
in turn might influece diversification strategies of VCs in the sample. In the framework of this study I can 
not account for this effect explicitly. However, I do not expect it to significantly influence the results 
since (i) none of the portfolio firms in the sample had a corporate as lead investor in any financing round, 
and (ii) corporate life science VCs such as Novartis Venture Fund, the most prominent syndication 
partner and lead investor in some cases of the sample, claim that “entrepreneurial freedom of funded 
companies is ensured; no formal ties with Novartis are implied” (www.venturefund.novartis.com). 
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by portfolio diversification. Moreover, the two smallest VCs in the sample (BioM and 
HI) were founded as public VCs with the aim of supporting regional development of the 
life science industry in the Munich and Rhine-Neckar region, respectively, by providing 
seed and early stage financing to start-up firms. Meanwhile both firms also have private 
investors and started investing in other regions. Since existing literature is inconsistent 
and suggests that either there is no effect on diversification and VC’s risk attitude 
(Gupta and Sapienza, 1992), or that independent VCs have a higher need to reduce risk 
(Manigart et al., 2002), I included both in order to elucidate possible effects. Finally, 
two of the larger VCs in the sample (TVM, DVC) also have non-life science investees 
in less risky industries such as information technology, which might allow them to 
follow a more risky strategy with regard to diversification within the life science 
portfolio. I analyse this issue below. 
The seven life science VC firms invested in a total of 156 portfolio companies (some of 
which are in the portfolio of more than one VC firm), and are described in Table 15. 
Their age ranges from six to 21 years (average 10 years), and the number of life science 
portfolio companies from 11 to 35 (average 22). Their total capital under management 
varies from 11.2 to 918 million € (average 319 million €). As compared to the overall 
German VC industry, these companies have thus a similar portfolio size (industry 
average 22 firms), but more money under management (industry average 120 million €) 
(BVK, 2004) due to the capital intensity of life science investments. 
Name Year founded 
Head-
quarters 
Capital 
(million €)
Pf- 
firms 
Geogr. 
focus 
Stage 
focus 
Early stage lead 
investments (examples)
Inter-
view 
TVM 1983 G 918  35 EU, NA e/l Curacyte, Morphochem X 
HBM 200113 Sw 588  32 EU, NA e/l TeGenero, Arpida  
DVC 1998 G 300  11 EU e/l elbion, 4SC X 
LSP 1988 NL 170  17 EU e Neuronova, Kiadis X 
 
                                                 
13 Please note that HBM merged in 2003 with New Medical Technologies NMT, which was incorporated 
in 1997 and was the first Swiss VC firm exclusively focusing on life science investments. Therefore 
HBM has significantly more experience than its date of foundation indicates. 
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GLSV 1996 G 143  18 EU e Apovia, DeveloGen  
HI 1997 G 103  21 G e mtm laboratories, Cenix  
BioM 1997 G 11.2  22 G s/e Icon Genetics, PIERIS X 
NA: North America = US, Canada; G: Germany; Sw: Switzerland; NL: Netherlands; s: seed; e: early, l: late 
Table 15: Characteristics of analysed VC firms 
Investigation of portfolio diversification is only possible if I cover the complete set of 
companies in the portfolios of the sample. I think that the coverage is complete for the 
following reasons. Firstly, I used multiple data sources from the present and the past 
including the internet, online publications (e.g., BioCentury), public data base material 
(e.g., biospace), printed industry reports (e.g., Ernst & Young) and journals (e.g. 
|transkript), and press releases of both, VC firms and portfolio companies. I triangulated 
all of these data to perform the analysis and draw conclusions. Secondly, I included 
archival interview data with VC managers of four of the case study firms (see below), 
all of which confirmed completeness of the coverage. Thirdly, one would assume that 
VCs will preferentially keep information on badly-performing portfolio companies 
secret. However, during the course of this analysis several firms which had received 
extensive financing by the sample VCs filed for insolvency (Axxima (TVM, BioM, HI, 
GLSV, HBM), Munich Biotech (HI, GLSV), Apovia (GLSV, HI), Xerion (BioM, HI)). 
All these firms were listed on the web pages of their VCs until their insolvency was 
publicly announced, which suggests that VCs in the sample do not systematically hide 
their badly-performing investees. 
Whereas I will draw the main conclusions from application of the framework and the 
descriptive statistical analysis in the next section, I also rely on archival interviews with 
managers of VC firms. Questions asked in the interviews included, e.g., “How do you 
diversify your portfolio?”, “How important are synergies between firms?”, and “Which 
factors influence diversification?”. Unfortunately, I was only able to get interview data 
from managers of four of the sample firms (TVM, DVC, LSP, BioM), since European 
VCs are generally very reluctant to participate in academic research (Muzyka et al., 
1996). However, these represent well the polar types I analysed (Table 15). To further 
substantiate and extend the results, I also draw on data from archival interviews with 
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four VC managers of firms which I excluded from the sample because they either had 
their headquarters in the UK (Apax, 3i), syndicated preferentially as a non-lead investor 
(Industriekreditbank IKB), or did not support enough life science portfolio companies 
(Earlybird, IKB). 
7.4 Results 
In this section I present the results of the descriptive statistical analysis of life science 
portfolios. I will first illustrate the VCs’ internationalisation and investment stage 
strategies (Section 7.4.1). I will then analyse the portfolios with regard to business area 
diversification (Section 7.4.2) and diversification of the drug development sub-portfolio 
(Section 7.4.3). In Section 7.4.4 I will investigate the risk distribution between the 
overall portfolio and the drug development sub-portfolio. 
7.4.1  Geographic scope and venture development stage 
In order to get an impression how self-reported internationalisation and investment 
stage strategies of the VC firms are quantitatively reflected in the distribution of 
portfolio companies, I analysed the portfolios with regard to these two variables. I 
distinguish between geographic distribution in the home country of the VC firm 
(Germany, Switzerland or the Netherlands), the rest of Europe, and the more developed 
equity markets in North America (USA, Canada). As an indicator of venture 
development stages I use their latest financing rounds, which I categorise as A, B, C, 
and D+ rounds.14 Since venture stages change over time, VC firms with a seed and 
early stage focus will also have late stage companies in their portfolio, although their 
shares are diluted. 
Not surprisingly, the findings largely reflect the investment strategies of the VC firms as 
described in Table 15. Figure 20 shows that large VC firms like TVM and HBM do 
significantly reduce risk by diversifying their investments into other countries, in 
                                                 
14 I was not able to determine the last financing round with certainty for all portfolio firms. The 
percentages of firms I gathered this information for ranges from 71 % (BioM) to 96 % (DVC). Numbers 
in Figure 21 only refer to this percentage. Please note that Figure 21 is only a quantitative illustration of 
self-reported investment strategies described in Table 15. Therefore, incomplete information does not 
influence the conclusions I draw. 
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particular into the more developed capital markets in North America (more than 60 % 
of investments). 
 
Figure 20: Geographic scope of life science portfolio companies 
With regard to risk reduction by selecting late stage investees, Figure 21 demonstrates 
that primarily the large VCs in the sample follow this strategy. At least half of TVM’s 
and HBM’s portfolio companies are in C or D+ financing rounds, which are for many 
firms the last rounds before an IPO. In contrast, smaller firms do not have this 
opportunities of risk reduction to the same extent. In the portfolios of BioM and HI, 
basically all firms are German and most of them have only completed A and B 
financing rounds, respectively.  
 
Figure 21: Development stages of life science portfolio companies 
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In summary, Figure 20 and Figure 21 illustrate that the portfolios of VC firms with 
small funds in the sample comprise substantially more risk concerning geographic scope 
and investment stage focus. 
7.4.2 Business areas of life science portfolio companies 
The following Figure 22 displays the distribution of portfolio companies among the 
business areas diagnostics, drug development, medtech and service/supply. 
 
Figure 22: Business areas of life science portfolio companies 
Results illustrate that drug development companies comprise by far the largest fraction 
in each of the VC portfolios analysed. Percentages, however, differ substantially and 
range form 42 (HI) to 91 (DVC) percent. Please note that DVC, which has no 
specialised life science fund, comprises the highest business area risk. TVM, which has 
dedicated life science funds but also invests in other technology funds, ranges second 
(72 %), followed by all the firms which exclusively invest in life science companies.  
Another striking result is that the portion of drug development portfolio companies and 
thus the business area risk of the portfolio is not correlated to the size of the VC firm, 
although smaller VC companies in the sample do not spread risk by internationalisation 
and late stage investment strategies. 
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7.4.3 Drug development sub-portfolio 
Figure 23 displays the distribution of drug development portfolio firms among 
therapeutic markets. I distinguish therapeutic areas cancer, neurology, infection, 
inflammation, metabolic, cardiovascular, and others. 
 
Figure 23: Therapeutic areas the drug development sub-portfolios 
The results shown in Figure 23 reveal that cancer and infectious diseases are the 
dominant therapeutic areas of drug development companies in the portfolios analysed 
with five of seven VC firms focusing on cancer and two on infection. However, they 
only comprise about one third of all sub-portfolio firms in each case. Since the rest is 
widely spread among all other areas, VCs in the analysed sample do not seem to have a 
strong preference for one particular therapeutic market. 
With regard to lead compound classes I use the categories small molecule, antibody, 
protein/peptide, vaccine, and others. Figure 24 shows the results. 
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Figure 24: Lead compound classes of the drug development sub-portfolios 
Analysis of the lead compound classes of drug development companies reveals that, 
although most companies in all portfolios develop small molecules, some VCs are much 
more specialised than others (Figure 24). In case of LSP, e.g., almost two third of 
portfolio firms are small molecule companies, whereas in the GLSV portfolio they 
comprise less than one third. I conclude that some but not all VCs have a preference for 
a particular lead compound technology. 
For quantification of diversification of the drug development sub-portfolios, I calculated 
their entropy (Figure 25). Values range from 2.58 (HI) to 3.02 (GLSV), meaning that HI 
has the least diversified and GLSV the most diversified drug development sub-portfolio 
with regard to therapeutic markets and lead compound technologies of the portfolio 
companies. Thus, the GLSV sub-portfolio is the less and the HI sub-portfolio the most 
risky one. I do not find any correlation between size of the VC firms and risk of the 
drug development sub-portfolio. 
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Figure 25: Entropies of drug development sub-portfolios 
7.4.4 Risk distribution between overall portfolio and drug development sub-
portfolio 
I finally analysed whether the overall business area risk and the risk within the drug 
development sub-portfolio of the VC firms are correlated. Since I cannot explicitly 
quantify risk, as an approximation I categorise business area risk as high or low, 
depending on whether the portion of drug development companies is above or below 
average of all VC portfolios. Similarly, I distinguish high and low risk of drug 
development sub-portfolios depending on whether the entropy of the sub-portfolio is 
below or above average of all portfolios analysed. The matrix in Figure 26 summarises 
the results. 
 
Figure 26: Distribution of risk between business areas of portfolio firms and drug 
development sub-portfolio 
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Only the quadrants on the upper left and the lower right in the matrix are occupied. Life 
science portfolios with a larger portion of drug development firms and thus a higher 
business area risk have a more diversified drug development sub-portfolio and vice 
versa. These results suggest that VCs in the sample systematically balance risk between 
the business areas they invest in and therapeutic areas/lead compound classes of their 
drug development firms. Low or high risk in both at the same time is obviously not an 
investment strategy these VCs prefer. The strategy chosen is independent of the size of 
the VC firm and thus the risk reduction strategy with regard to geographic scope and 
and development stage focus of the portfolio companies. 
7.5 Discussion 
In this study I introduced a framework for the analysis of investment strategies of life 
science VC firms and applied it to seven VC portfolios. Below I discuss the validity of 
the framework (Section 7.5.1) and the findings I gained by its application (Sections 
7.5.2) and compare both to the interview data (Table 16). I also comment on factors 
which were not part of the applied framework but turned out to influence portfolio 
diversification according to the interview data (Sections 7.5.3 and 7.5.4, Table 17 and 
Table 18). 
7.5.1 Validity and relevance of the framework 
The theoretical framework of this study framework draws on the assumption that VCs 
spread their risk in industry-specialised life science portfolios along the dimensions of 
business areas drug development (high risk) vs. diagnostics, medtech, and 
service/supply firms (low risk). Moreover, I propose that diversification of drug 
development firms among different lead compound technologies and different 
therapeutic markets is a possibility for VCs to reduce investment risk according to 
modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1967). Application of portfolio theory is not self-
evident because it assumes a passive investor and does not take synergies between 
investments into account (Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994). Since VCs have substantial 
influence on the management of their portfolio firms, one could argue that they are 
active investors. In this case corporate diversification theory would apply and 
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diversification and risk would be related in a U-shaped manner with minimal risk at a 
medium degree of diversification (Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994). 
As the quotations in Table 16 show, VCs do indeed aim to diversify their portfolio 
according to the categories of the framework. Moreover, the statements of the VCs 
demonstrate that the framework largely reflects their understanding of risk regarding 
investment stage and internationalisation. The quotations also illustrate that application 
of portfolio theory is valid since VC managers stress the importance of the “stand 
alone” criteria for selection of portfolio firms. Synergies are only relevant as investment 
criteria for large VCs like TVM, which selects investments within “topic clusters”. Of 
the VC firms interviewed which are not parts of the sample, only the manager of 3i, a 
large and publicly traded UK-based company, claimed that potential synergies between 
portfolio companies contribute to their investment decision (Table 16). These findings 
are consistent with previous research showing that fit with other portfolio investees is 
important for only a very minor amount of VCs (Muzyka et al., 1996). 
 
VC firm Quotations (examples) 
DVC “We invest in three big areas: service/tools, diagnostics and therapeutics. Another 
one would be medtech, but this is not our focus. [...] The chances to get a 
therapeutic product through the clinic are minimal. Service companies comprise 
much less risk for investors. [...] You need to balance the risk between the 
therapeutics companies. You need to invest in different [lead compound] 
technologies and address different markets [therapeutic areas]. [...] In early 
investment phases, risk is enormous and you only do it because you get a large 
portion of the company for little money.” 
Apax “We do not invest with the aim to merge companies afterwards within the 
portfolio. They must be able to survive alone. You will never have enough firms 
to follow this strategy of within-portfolio consolidation from the beginning. [...] 
Besides the therapeutics, diagnostics, and service firms we invest in medtech with 
a focus on mature companies.” 
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LSP “We invest our money according to three dimensions: business areas of the 
companies (therapeutics, diagnostics, supply, medtech), investment stage (mostly 
early), and geographic scope – America and Europe. In this pattern we like to 
have at least one investment in each field to spread our risk. We try to avoid 
investing in firms doing more or less the same. [...] I do not think that, from a risk 
perspective, it makes sense to focus on one particular technology. If I now like 
RNAi and do it only and at another point in time I follow another hype – this will 
never work out well and I consider it as very problematic.” 
TVM “Real VC business has to do with high risk and therefore early stage investments. 
[...] We manage our risk by diversification according to geographic scope, 
investment phases, and what the firms do [business areas]. [...] We usually invest 
in different “topic cluster” where we aim to have more than one investment. “ 
Earlybird “It is our philosophy to diversify broadly. [...] We have a small fund, and we need 
to spread our risk.” 
3i “We analyse potential investments with regard to their stand alone capability or 
whether they are a potential donor or acceptor firm in M&As with other portfolio 
firms.” 
Table 16: Examples from interview data illustrating framework validity and 
investment strategies 
7.5.2 Geographic scope and investment stage focus  
The framework of this analysis suggests that, in order to reduce their risk arising from a 
focus on narrow geographic scope and early stage investments, the small VCs of the 
sample should invest less in drug development firms and spread these more across 
different lead compound technologies and therapeutic markets than the large firms, 
which invest with a broader geographic scope and more in late-stage investees. 
However, I do not find systematic differences in diversification strategies. As Figure 26 
demonstrates, BioM and TVM, the smallest and largest firm in the sample, follow a 
similar diversification strategy. HI and HBM, the second smallest and second largest 
firm, also apply a similar strategy, which differs from the one of BioM/TVM. I 
conclude that diversification within the life science portfolio is important for any VC, 
regardless of size, geographic scope and investment stage focus. This interpretation is in 
line with the interview data. Interviewees at TVM, DVC, LSP, and BioM all state in a 
similar manner the importance of diversification between lead compound 
technologies/therapeutic markets and/or the need to invest in business areas medtech, 
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diagnostics, and service/supply as a means to reduce investment risk (Table 16, Table 
17). 
VC firm Quotations (examples) 
BioM “We do not invest in any company. Our aim is to select the good ones – although 
with a regional and very early stage focus – and finally get a profitable exit. This 
is what all is about, also for us.” 
TVM “We introduced specialised life science funds only upon request of our investors 
because they wanted more opportunities to diversify their risk.” 
Apax “We do not diversify our risk systematically within healthcare, because we have 
one large fund comprising six industries. Therefore, it would not make sense. We 
view any portfolio company as sole standing and try to promote it.” 
IKB “We invest 70% in [non-life science] established companies and do only about 
30% venture capital. This is our way of risk diversification since we can transfer 
revenues between both. [...] Our portfolio consists only of drug development 
firms including one company doing cell therapy. We have a strong focus on 
cardiovascular and cancer, we do not invest in, e.g., CNS at the moment.” 
Table 17: Examples from interview data illustrating the effect of geographic 
scope, stage focus, investor base and non-life science investments on 
diversification of life science portfolios 
The findings of this study are in contrast to existing literature on non-industry 
specialised VCs. Specifically, Gupta and Sapienza (1992) found that large firms invest 
more across different industries. Moreover, VC literature claims that non-industry 
specialised VCs that focus on risky early stage ventures tend to have a narrower 
industry focus (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993) because 
industry specialisation allows VCs to build up a knowledge base including 
technological, market, and product expertise, as a means to control risk when judging 
new investments. Although these studies were done in the USA where VCs invest more 
in early stage ventures and have a need for higher returns on investments as compared 
to Continental Europe (Manigart et al., 2002), which in turn might demand a higher 
degree of specialisation than for firms in the sample of this study, these differences 
between industry- and non-industry specialised VCs suggest an interesting 
interpretation. Specifically, specialisation of the VCs’ know-how within the one 
industry on, for example, one business area or one particular technology would not 
contribute to risk reduction. This conclusion is supported by the interview data (Table 
16). Obviously, VCs with experience in the life science field can similarly well select 
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and, after investment, add value to portfolio firms developing diagnostics, drugs, 
medtech, and firms offering service/supply. It appears that specialisation on the industry 
level is the optimum for VCs to build up specific know-how, networks, and reputation. 
7.5.3 Investor base and non-life science investments 
The sample of this study included both, independent VCs as well as VC firms which 
have a mixed investor base of public and private investors (BioM, HI). Existing 
literature is inconsistent with regard to the effect a differing investor base has on risk 
reduction strategies of the companies. Manigart et al. (2002) found that independent 
VCs have a higher required return per investment than public VCs because the latter 
ones might have ‘unlimited access’ to finance and therefore a different risk perception. 
In contrast, Gupta and Sapienza (1992) found no difference between public and 
independent VCs with regard to across-industry diversification. The findings presented 
here are consistent with the latter study. BioM and HI do not follow portfolio 
diversification and risk reduction strategies different from the independent VCs (Figure 
26). Specifically, they do not invest in a riskier portfolio by choosing a strategy 
comprising high business area and high drug development sub-portfolio risk. The 
interviewee at BioM supported the view that risk reduction is crucial for partially public 
VCs as well (Table 17). 
The analysis revealed that the two VC firms which do not only focus on life sciences 
(TVM, DVC) have the highest fractions of drug development firms in their portfolios 
which thus comprise the highest business area risks in the sample of this study. This 
suggests that diversification into industries which are less capital-intensive and risky 
(such as information technology) enables VCs to follow a riskier strategy within their 
life science portfolio.15 The conclusion is supported by VC managers of firms which 
were not part of the portfolio analysis. For example, the interviewee at Apax, a large 
and established VC firm based in the UK, stressed that the company does not follow 
any systematic risk reduction strategy within its life science investments since it has the 
possibility to spread risk between industries (Table 17). Similarly, the interviewee at 
                                                 
15 Please note that this conclusion only holds true under the assumption that diversification within versus 
across funds does only impact the investment risk of VC investors, but not the risk of the VC firm itself, 
which is the focus of this study. The assumption is fundamental and discussed in detail at the beginning 
of Section 7.2. 
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IKB, a German investment bank doing only 30% VC investments (remaining 70% silent 
partnerships in larger firms and MBI/MBOs), mentioned that the possibility to spread 
risk among other industries allows the firm to pick only the life science investees which 
they view as most promising regardless of their specific business area (Table 17). 
7.5.4 Other variables influencing diversification of life science VCs 
The theoretical sampling of this study allowed to control – to a certain extent – for other 
strategies that VCs use for reducing investment risk, which might interfere with their 
diversification strategy. From the interview data with managers of VC firms outside the 
sample, I am able to shed some light on these effects.  
In the sample I included only VCs which prefer investing as a syndicate leader. I gained 
some insight on the effect of syndication strategy on life science VCs’ risk attitude by 
drawing on interview data with a manager at IKB, which prefers to invest as a syndicate 
follower. The life science portfolio of IKB consists of nine firms (overall VC portfolio 
22 firms), all of which focus on biotherapeutics. Additionally, the portfolio has a strong 
cancer and cardiovascular focus. According to the theoretical framework, it would thus 
represent both, high business area risk and high risk within the drug development sub-
portfolio, in contrast to the investment strategies followed by VC firms in the sample of 
this study. The IKB interviewee confirmed that, in addition to investing in more mature 
firms with a non-life science focus, IKB’s syndicate follower strategy aims at risk 
reduction (Table 18). IKB therefore can focus on risky investments with high revenue 
potential. However, also the interviewee at LSP, which does primarily lead investments, 
stressed the importance of syndication in general due to the risky nature of life science 
investments (Table 18). Since there is, to my knowledge, no literature available so far 
which analyses the effect of syndication strategies on portfolio diversification across or 
within industries in detail, I encourage scholars to follow this avenue in future research. 
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VC firm Quotations (examples) 
IKB “In VC, we mainly do co-investments. This allows us to draw on the experience 
of the lead investor. [...] For each investment, we outsource an additional 
technical due diligence to specialists in the field. [...] We try to minimise risk for 
each investment.” 
LSP “The size of syndicates significantly increased over the last years, particularly in 
the risky life sciences field. There is basically no VC who does not try to acquire 
as many syndication partners as possible.” 
TVM “We use our expertise to identify potential projects in different areas. And we 
expand it to new areas like RNAi recently. However, we also have consultants 
from industry which we meet regularly to discuss these potential investments.” 
Earlybird “Although if we have gained expertise in one area, we only do two or three 
investments there.” 
BioM “Sometimes you would indeed prefer the one or the other technology to 
supplement the portfolio. But it is just not always possible to get the right 
company.” 
DVC “You are not always able to get what you want and what would theoretically fit 
best. [...] There are always certain phases. At the moment, most VCs invest in 
firms which develop therapeutics. But there were also phases in which basic 
technologies and tools were the centre of interest. It changes. [...] Of course we try 
to get a balanced portfolio, but it also depends on the opportunities you get.” 
Apax “There are meanwhile therapeutic areas which are overcrowded. For example, I 
would not invest in an early stage cancer venture at the moment. [...] However, 
CNS is very interesting, which was different a few years ago. On the other hand, 
gene therapy is out. [...] All fields are so complex that you will never have 
experience in detail. You always need to draw on the opinion of external experts. 
Your own knowledge is only sufficient for initial [technology] selection.” 
Table 18: Examples from interview data illustrating the effect of syndication, 
expertise, deal flow generation, and technological trends on diversification of life 
science portfolios 
Another variable which I aimed at controlling for by theoretical sampling is the 
difference in experience and expertise of VC firms. I only included firms with 
significant experience in the Continental European market. One might assume that VCs 
only invest in technologies they have knowledge and expertise in and that thus 
diversification among technologies is more limited for inexperienced VCs. However, 
the interview data indicate that inexperienced VCs such as IKB as well as experienced 
VCs such as TVM are not capable of gaining expertise in every technology, in 
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particular when it is new on the market (Table 18). Similarly, the interviewee at Apax, a 
well established VC firm from the UK, claimed that inclusion of external experts is 
essential because of the technological complexity (Table 18). The interviews thus 
suggest that missing expertise in a technological field does not severely limit VC’s 
opportunities of portfolio diversification since this expertise has to be acquired from 
outside even by experienced firms. 
In contrast, a limitation of portfolio diversification mentioned by the interviewees was 
the inability to generate the desired deal flow. Efficient diversification as a means to 
reduce risk is only possible when VCs are able to select life science investments in 
business areas and lead compound technologies/therapeutic markets from a broad pool 
of capital-seeking start-ups. However, two interviewees stressed that it is often 
impossible to get an investment with significant potential in their area of interest. 
Interestingly, one interviewee was from the smallest firm of the sample with regional 
and early stage focus (BioM), whereas the other was from a large VC firm with 
investees in all development stages spread across Europe (DVC) (Table 18). This 
suggests that deal flow generation might be a factor influencing the diversification 
strategies of most VC firms, in particular when focused on one industry. Due to the 
limited research on this issue (Wright and Robbie, 1998), I encourage scholars to 
analyse the variables impacting deal flow generation more systematically. 
Finally, several of the interviewees pointed to the fact that the current development of 
technology has a major influence on diversification of their portfolio. In particular in the 
dynamic life science field new, “disruptive technologies” (DVC), are not seldom. One 
recent example is RNAi technology, which was mainly developed in 2002 and entitled 
as “billion dollar breakthrough” by the Fortune Magazine in 2003. With these 
technologies, VCs need to be quick in capturing the chance to get pioneering investees. 
On the other hand, interviewees also reported that some technologies and markets such 
as cancer become overcrowded and that they would therefore not invest in them again at 
the moment (Table 17, Table 18). 
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7.6 Limitations and future research 
This study is a first step to understand how diversification of industry-specialised 
portfolios can contribute to macro risk reduction strategies of VC firms, and which 
factors might influence portfolio diversification. As all studies, it has limitations which 
suggest avenues for further research. 
Firstly, the generalisability of the findings is limited due to the sample size of only 
seven firms. Large scale studies are necessary to corroborate the findings presented 
here. The framework might also be useful for analysis of a large number of portfolios 
and subsequent statistical data evaluation. Since there is only a limited amount of VCs 
in each country holding a significant number of life science investments, an 
international effort as pursued in previous studies (e.g., Sapienza et al., 1994; Sapienza 
et al., 1995; Manigart et al., 2002) might be necessary.  
Secondly, I investigate only VC firms based in Continental Europe. The largest VC 
companies, however, are located in the USA and the UK. Some of these firms have 
much larger funds than the ones in the sample of this study and hold portfolios with 
more than 100 companies spread all over the world. Risk within these portfolios might 
be balanced differently than in the sample I used, for example with more emphasis on 
potential synergies between the portfolio companies. Moreover, the VC markets in the 
UK and the US are more developed and more liquid than the markets in Continental 
Europe, which might also impact diversification strategies as discussed above. It will be 
interesting to apply the framework of this study to large VC firms from the USA and the 
UK in order to reveal differences to the results presented here. 
Finally, the interview data unravelled a number of possible antecedents of portfolio 
diversification such as syndication, deal flow generation, and technological trends. To 
my knowledge, so far no literature is available on how these factor influence 
diversification of non-industry specialised as well as industry-specialised portfolios. 
Future research might shed light on these certainly interesting issues. 
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8 Conclusions and new avenues of bioentrepreneurship 
research 
In this thesis I introduced five empirical studies all of which investigated important and 
cutting-edge issues of bioentrepreneurship research. I employed qualitative case studies 
as well as a large-scale experimental design, and addressed the studies to practitioners 
as well as management and entrepreneurship scholars. Moreover, I took into account 
perspectives of the industry, bioentrepreneurs, and biotech venture capital investors. In 
the following Section 8.1, I conclude this thesis by briefly summarising the results I 
obtained and the contributions I made. I will close with suggesting new avenues for  
bioentrepreneurship research in Section 8.2. 
8.1 Summary of results and contributions 
In the first of the empirical studies in Chapter 3 I analysed the development of the 
German biotechnology industry during the hostile financing environment in the years 
2002 – 2004. I employed the theoretical perspectives of population ecology and 
evolutionary economics. One of my key findings is that the development of the sector is 
best explained by application of both theoretical lenses in parallel, in agreement with 
recent theoretical work on the evolution of organisations (Valle, 2002). Whereas most 
existing work offers and tests competing hypotheses derived from both approaches 
(e.g., Shane and Kolvereid, 1995), I show that the assumption of external adaptation 
mechanisms (insolvencies and M&As) as postulated by population ecologists, as well as 
internal adaptation mechanisms (changes in organisational routines and strategies) 
according to the predictions of evolutionary economics scholars are necessary to 
understand why the German biotech industry experienced a much weaker consolidation 
in the years 2002 – 2004 than assumed by industry experts. Drawing on in-depth case 
studies of bioventures which successfully adapted their financing routines to the new 
environmental context, I also add to the literature on strategies of entrepreneurial firms. 
I demonstrate that young biotech firms show considerable strategic flexibility and are, 
in times of tight equity markets, able to achieve substantial financing through partnering 
of product candidates in strategic alliances and changing their business model towards 
more service orientation. Biotech ventures also have a remarkable cost saving potential 
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through downsizing of their operations. Finally, M&As with other bioentrepreneurial 
firms may contribute to secure support of investors and lead to further capital infusion 
in difficult environments. These findings do not only extend scientific literature, but 
constitute a valuable agenda for bioentrepreneurs demonstrating how to ensure survival 
of their companies in a hostile financing context. 
In Chapter 4 I introduced a practitioner-oriented empirical study which was addressed 
to managers of bioentrepreneurial firms. This study is one of the first to analyse M&A 
deals between small and young firms. This is particularly important in the 
bioentrepreneurial context, because a failed M&A may severely threaten the life of a 
bioventure due to its limited resource base. By drawing on a comparative case study 
approach, I illustrated motives, benefits, and problems which may arise when two 
entrepreneurial biotech firms decide to merge. I identified several M&A motives 
specific for the bioentrepreneurial context such as the integration of the partners’ 
technologies, the desire to gain a critical mass of projects, and the access to the partner’s 
networks and experienced management team. Among the main benefits were an 
enhanced visibility for investors, a faster rate of product development, an extension of 
the venture’s product pipeline, and the possibility to escape a hostile financing 
environment through an international M&A. Moreover, I was able to unravel major 
problems which may arise when two bioventures merge. In contrast to the majority of 
existing studies, I also analysed problems which arise before the M&A deal such as the 
inability to find the right partner and the opposition of shareholders. Problems that 
occur during post-merger integration include the incompatibility of the partners’ 
technologies and the difficulty to control financial issues in a subsidiary abroad. Besides 
providing valuable insights for bioentrepreneurs which consider an M&A as a strategic 
option for their company, the results also indicate possible future development paths of 
M&A activities in the German biotech industry. In line with industry experts (Ernst & 
Young, 2004) I concluded that M&A hurdles which have their roots in the behaviour of 
management as well as investors will probably continue to exist in the future. 
The scope of the study I introduced in Chapter 5 was to develop and empirically test 
management and entrepreneurship theory. I investigated the motivation of biotech 
managers to seek new alliances with other firms from an ex ante perspective. 
Specifically, I analysed how the situation of a biotech venture before alliance formation 
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influences the decision of its managers to look for new alliance partners. Using an 
experimental design and conjoint analysis, I found that the answer to the question “to 
ally or not to ally” from bioventure managers appears to depend on the capabilities, 
governance, and context of their firm. The decision is complex since these factors 
interact. This finding on its own is remarkable because it provides the tangible evidence 
that resources/capabilities are crucial in the decision policies of managers that the 
capabilities/RBV school of thought requires. Moreover, the results stress the necessity 
for RBV scholars to take into account possible interactions between resources and 
capabilities rather than treating them independently. However, the implications for the 
growing literature on strategic alliances are even more important. Of particular value is 
the illumination of the decision policies venture managers use to consider whether to 
ally. The findings on the centrality of considerations of venture liquidity in biotech 
managers’ decision policies help to explain prior results that find over commitment to 
alliances (Deeds and Hill, 1996), higher rates of renegotiation for alliances entered 
during poor funding environments (Lerner and Tsai, 1999), and that alliances are in fact 
detrimental to venture survival (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). Prior explanations have 
relied primarily on the bounded rationality, hubris, and other non-rational explanations 
for these outcomes. But when the decisions are placed in the context of low levels of 
firm liquidity and the threat this poses to the venture’s survival, biotech managers’ 
decision policies appear to be a rational attempt to make the best of bad circumstances. 
Venture managers seem to prefer internally controlled resources and funds raised via 
the capital markets to those accessed via alliances, which indicates that they recognise 
the risks of alliances and may in fact view entering an alliance as “making a deal with 
the devil”. An important implication for going forward researchers examining alliance 
performance and their impact on firm performance is that they need to assess the 
condition of the venture at the time in which it entered the alliance. This condition 
appears to play a major role in the motivation for the alliance and will quite possibly 
have significant explanatory power for alliance performance and venture survival. 
Chapter 6 was again addressed to biotech practitioners and illustrated how a 
bioentrepreneurial venture can successfully escape a technology breakdown. Because 
young biotech firms are, in contrast to large corporations, often built on one single 
technology, a breakdown means a life-threatening crisis for most of the ventures. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 159 
 
Therefore, it is important for bioentrepreneurs to provide insights how to escape such a 
crisis. I introduced an exploratory case study of Curacyte, a German biotech firm which 
suffered technological breakdown half a year after its foundation and successfully 
managed this situation. I demonstrated that an aggressive business development and 
project acquisition strategy consisting of in-house technology development, in-licensing 
activities, and M&As may enable a bioventure to build up a new technological basis and 
keep support of investors. Since this strategy might be associated with a shift or an 
extension of the venture’s core competencies, managerial flexibility is essential. 
Moreover, I showed that efficient management of financial, organisational, human, and 
social resources is crucial for successful crisis management. In case that a technological 
breakdown is detected, financial resources should be concentrated on corroborating the 
findings in order to ensure a maximum of liquidity for acquisition of the new 
technology. Entering into an M&A with another company may not only contribute to 
technology acquisition, but also to raise further capital from VC investors. Knowledge 
related to the new technology may be integrated in the firm by employing key 
technology developers and entering into long-term collaborations with the institutions 
where the projects are acquired from. I also demonstrated that, in line with literature on 
crisis management in large corporations (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993; Pearson and Clair, 
1998), management of human resources is crucial. Bioentrepreneurs are well advised to 
accept staff turnover and concentrate on hiring of new personnel. Finally, I showed that 
an open and honest communication contributed to keep support of both, employees as 
well as investors, during the crisis management process. The findings of this study may 
not only be interesting for managers of bioentrepreneurial firms but also of larger 
biotech companies as many similarities with the corporate renewal process of Celltech, 
a large UK-based biotech firm, suggest (McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 1999). 
In the final empirical study in Chapter 7 I switched to the perspective of biotech 
investors. The focus of analysis were portfolio diversification strategies of VCs active in 
the biotechnology and life science industry. The study’s aim was to contribute to VC 
literature and extend the concept of portfolio diversification and risk reduction to 
industry-specialised portfolios. As a first contribution to the literature, I introduced a 
theoretical framework for analysis of risk distribution within life science portfolios. 
This framework was derived from practitioner-oriented literature and interviews with 
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VC managers and distinguished between investees active in business areas drug 
development (high risk), and diagnostics, service/supply, and medical technology (low 
risk). Moreover, VCs may reduce their investment risk by distributing their drug 
development investees among different therapeutic markets and lead compound 
technologies. Drawing on a comparative case study approach, I applied this framework 
to the life science portfolios of seven Central European VC firms. One finding was that 
the small VC firms in the sample did not reduce their risk more than the large firms by 
investing in less risky business areas or diversifying their drug development sub-
portfolio more among different therapeutic markets and/or lead compound technologies. 
This was surprising since the small firms invested with a narrower geographic scope 
and focused more on early stage investees and thus had a much riskier portfolio with 
regard to these two variables than the large firms. Instead, two dominant diversification 
strategies emerged from the analysis regardless of the VC firms’ size. VCs invested 
either with a focus on risky drug development firms and distributed these more among 
markets and technologies, or they diversified their drug development sub-portfolio less 
but then invested more in less risky business areas diagnostics, service/supply, and 
medtech. These findings in combination with interview data led to the conclusion that, 
in contrast to non-industry specialised VC portfolios where specialisation rather than 
diversification contributes to reduction of the investment risk (Gupta and Sapienza, 
1992; Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993), the opposite appears to be true in the context of 
industry-specialised portfolios. The latter are well diversified among technologies and 
markets. Thus, specialisation on the industry level is probably the optimum for VCs to 
reduce their investment risk by accumulation of specific knowledge, networks, and 
reputation. Besides this interesting finding, interview data allowed me to unravel some 
determinants of portfolio diversification such as the inability to create the desired deal 
flow or the necessity to follow technological trends, which were undescribed in VC 
literature so far. 
8.2 The road ahead 
At the beginning of this thesis I demonstrated that the biotechnology industry has 
gained significant economic importance over the last two decades and nowadays has a 
significant impact on our everyday life. It is a common opinion that this influence will 
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keep growing over the next decades because the biotech sector is still young and 
entrepreneurial and growing globally (Rifkin, 1999). New technologies are emerging 
continuously and promise not only to contribute to wealth of humankind in the future 
by, e.g., enabling the development of new drugs for so far unmet clinical needs, but also 
to offer plenty of opportunities for bioentrepreneurs to found and grow new ventures. 
Thus, it is important that the literature of bioentrepreneurship, which is even younger 
than the industry it explores, continues to grow as well. 
In this thesis, I contributed to bioentrepreneurship literature with studies in the fields of 
organisational evolution, M&As, strategic alliances, crisis management, and venture 
capital financing. Whereas each of these empirical studies has by itself limitations 
which suggest avenues for future research as I described in the respective chapters, 
there is also a need for scholars to explore other fields. I will close this thesis by 
suggesting roads for researchers which are underexplored in bioentrepreneurship 
literature so far. 
Firstly, an interesting stream of research could focus on project management in 
bioentrepreneurial firms. As I described in Chapter 2, biotechnological R&D projects 
are characterised by enormous capital intensity on the one hand and a high failure risk 
on the other hand. Thus, it is a particular challenge for biotech managers to build up a 
substantial pipeline of product candidates under development. The Curacyte case study 
I introduced in Chapter 6 demonstrated that the management is continuously confronted 
with the decision to continue or stop projects, even if these are in advanced 
development stages and thus have required significant R&D expenditures so far. How 
many R&D projects should a bioventure follow in order to compensate for inevitable 
failures? How related or diversified should the project portfolio be among markets and 
technologies? Do the considerable sunk costs delay the decision of bioentrepreneurs to 
stop an underperforming R&D project and lead to escalating commitment as postulated 
by project management scholars (Garland, 1990)? The last one of these research 
questions appears to be particularly suited for an experimental design as I employed in 
Chapter 5, since conjoint analysis has been used in studies on escalating commitment of 
software projects before (Keil et al., 2000; Sabherwal et al., 2003). 
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A second stream of literature might explore the impact of human capital in 
bioentrepreneurial firms. Since bioventures are research-intensive and have a very 
limited resource base, it is at the same time challenging and important to guarantee the 
acquisition of top scientists and top management. Zucker et al. (1998) showed that local 
proximity to top scientists at universities and research institutes is a precondition for a 
high foundation rate of biotech firms. However, so far little is known about the optimal 
configuration of a research team in a bioventure. Are interdisciplinary teams more 
successful than homogeneous ones? Which team size is the optimum? And how do 
group processes influence the scientific output of the team? Answering these questions 
may enable bioentrepreneurial firms to establish a more efficient and successful R&D 
process and enhance innovative output. With regard to managerial capital, it is known 
that managers’ characteristics and strategic choices are crucial for the performance of 
every corporation (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Carpenter et al., 2004). So far research 
has mostly analysed the characteristics of management teams in large firms (e.g., 
Hambrick et al., 1996; Pegels et al., 2000; Knight et al., 1999). However, in 
entrepreneurial firms the impact of the management team on firm performance is 
particularly high (Reich, 1987; Gersick, 1994). The Curacyte case study I introduced in 
Chapter 6 demonstrated the importance of management skills for survival and success 
of bioventures. Moreover, it is a frequent problem for young biotech firms that they are 
led by scientists who developed the company’s technology, but have no management 
experience (Ernst & Young, 2000b). Replacing these scientists by professional outside 
management may lead to a loss of essential knowledge related to the technology. 
Furthermore, the egos of the scientists may make it difficult to engage outside 
management to take the leading position of the company. Should scientific founders 
continue as part of the top management team or even as CEO? If not, when is the 
optimal time point for succession? How should the other members of the TMT be 
constituted? Which impact does the educational background of team members have on 
the success of the bioventure? It would not only be important for biotech firms to 
explore the impact of TMT characteristics on the company’s success, but also for VC 
investors which often contribute to selection of TMT members in their portfolio firms 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2002). 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 163 
 
Thirdly, there is also a considerable need to study bioentrepreneurship from the 
perspective of investors. In this thesis, I analysed how VCs active in the biotechnology 
and life science field can reduce their investment risk by portfolio diversification among 
different markets and technologies (Chapter 7). However, as described above, 
bioventures have themselves the possibility to diversify their project portfolio according 
to these two variables. Exploratory work by zu Knyphausen-Aufseß et al. (2005) 
suggests that portfolio diversification of biotech VC investors and project 
diversification of their investees may not be independent since VCs are active investors 
with considerable influence on their investees (Sapienza et al., 1994; Lerner, 1995b). 
This influence may enable them to transfer projects between firms, e.g. by M&A 
activities among investees, with the aim of creating more robust companies within their 
portfolio. Moreover, investment strategies of VC fund investors may also influence VC 
portfolio diversification, thus creating a complex, interdependent three-level 
phenomenon (zu Knyphausen-Aufseß et al., 2005) which is so far unexplored in the 
literature.  
Another stream of research on biotech investors may analyse the active role VCs play in 
bioventure development. VCs are known to monitor and control their investees through 
participation in the board of directors, contractual covenants, and other mechanisms 
(Barney, 1994; Lerner, 1995b). Furthermore, they add value to their investees by 
assisting the management in daily business, personnel management, selection of 
executives, strategic analysis, and financial issues (MacMillan et al., 1988; Sapienza, 
1992; Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Fried and Hisrich, 1995). The need for control and 
active involvement appears to be particularly high in bioentrepreneurial firms since 
these demand large amounts of capital and are often led by inexperienced scientific 
founders. However, too tight control may lead to demotivation of the scientists and 
cause a staff turnover. Because biotechnology is knowledge-intensive and the 
knowledge of a firm is mainly embedded in its human capital (Barney and Wright, 
1998), a turnover can lead to the loss of the bioventure’s most important resource. Thus, 
there appears to be a trade-off for VCs in controlling and influencing their high-risk 
investees on the one hand and guaranteeing enough freedom for sustaining motivation 
of staff on the other hand. To my knowledge, little is known on the optimal level of VC 
control and involvement in their portfolio companies. Due to the reasons I mentioned 
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above, the biotechnology industry may constitute an optimal context to address this 
important topic. 
Finally, there are also opportunities for economists to contribute to the understanding of 
processes in the entrepreneurial biotechnology industry. An important and still 
underexplored issue is the role public policy plays in industry development. In 
Germany, an aggressive interventionist government policy (BioRegio Contest) 
promoted the formation of a large number of bioventures in the late 1990s, e.g. by 
providing seed capital to firms and establishing biotech clusters (Dohse, 2000). Existing 
research suggests that the government “efforts of interventionism were not able to 
overcome blockages that exist in the German system of biotech innovation. On the 
contrary, those government strategies have enhanced to a large extent the structural 
inertia that made the German system inappropriate for biotech development needs” 
(Giesecke, 2000: 221). However, it is important to note that this study was performed in 
the late 1990s and that the industry has developed significantly since. Given the fact that 
the German industry is less than a decade old and that Germany does neither have an 
established VC industry nor an entrepreneurial culture like, e.g., the USA, the high 
number of biotech firms in Germany today may lead one to believe that the 
interventionist policy was quite successful. This assumption is supported by the fact that 
the number of bioventures remained surprisingly high during the hostile financing 
environment in the years 2002 – 2004 (Chapter 3). Clearly, more research is needed to 
analyse the impact of policy measures on the development of the biotech industry more 
systematically and over a longer period of time. A new methodological approach may 
be an experimental design as I employed in Chapter 5. Different profiles could describe 
different hypothetical policy programs, and bioentrepreneurs may assess whether these 
programs would meet their needs and facilitate development of their company. These 
studies could provide important insights for both bioentrepreneurs as well as policy 
makers. 
In summary, the discussion above illustrates that, as the biotechnology industry itself, 
bioentrepreneurship research is still an underexplored field with plenty of opportunities 
for researchers. Although we have yet learned a lot, we still know little. This thesis is an 
attempt to further advance our limited understanding of different phenomena in the 
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bioentrepreneurial context. In the future, scholars from different disciplines need to 
explore further issues along the exciting road ahead. 
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10 Summary in German 
Die vorliegende Arbeit trägt den Titel “Bioentrepreneurship in Germany” und 
beschäftigt sich mit unterschiedlichen Themengebieten, die alle im Bereich 
Gründungsforschung an jungen Biotechnologieunternehmen angesiedelt sind. Dieser 
Forschungszweig ist aus mehreren Gründen von Bedeutung. Zum einen zählt die 
Biotechnologie zu den vielversprechendsten Technologiezweigen des 21. Jahrhunderts. 
Moderne biotechnologische Produkte und Verfahren ermöglichen die Erforschung 
molekularer Prozesse in menschlichen, tierischen, pflanzlichen und bakteriellen 
Organismen, wodurch z. B. die Entwicklung neuer Therapeutika und Diagnostika 
ermöglicht wird. Diese tragen nicht nur zum Wohle der Menschheit bei, sondern 
besitzen auch ein enormes Marktpotential. Zum anderen ist die Biotechnologiebranche 
vor allem in Deutschland noch jung und besteht vorwiegend aus Startup-Firmen. Die 
spezifischen Charakteristika der biotechnologischen Produktentwicklung wie lange 
Entwicklungszyklen, hohe technologische und marktseitige Unsicherheiten und ein 
hoher Kapitalbedarf führen dazu, dass Forschungsergebnisse aus anderen Branchen nur 
bedingt auf die Biotechnologiebranche übertragbar sind. Dies macht 
industriespezifische Forschung wie in der vorliegenden Arbeit notwendig. 
Die Arbeit besteht aus fünf empirischen Studien, die sich im biotechnologischen 
Kontext mit den Themen Finanzierungsstrategien, M&A-Aktivitäten, strategischen 
Allianzen, Krisenmanagement und Venture Capital(VC)-Finanzierung 
auseinandersetzen. Die Untersuchungen sind sowohl praxis- als auch theorieorientiert 
und beinhalten die Perspektive der Manager von Biotechnologieunternehmen sowie die 
Perspektive ihrer Investoren. Methodisch wird sowohl auf qualitative Fallstudien als 
auch auf einen großzahligen experimentellen Ansatz zurückgegriffen. 
Die erste der Studien stellt eine detaillierte und theoretisch fundierte Analyse der 
Entwicklung der deutschen Biotechnologieindustrie unter den Bedingungen 
rückläufiger Kapitalmärkte in den Jahren 2002 – 2004 dar. Dabei wird unter den 
theoretischen Blickwinkeln der Populationsökologie und der Evolutionsökonomie 
untersucht, wie organisationsexterne und -interne Anpassungsmechanismen die 
Entwicklung der Branche erklären. Externe Anpassung findet durch eine steigende Zahl 
an Insolvenzen und eine sinkende Anzahl an Gründungen VC-finanzierter Unternehmen 
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statt. Allerdings ist die beobachtete Branchenkonsolidierung deutlich schwächer als von 
Industrieexperten erwartet, da sich viele Biotechnologiefirmen intern an das schwierige 
Finanzierungsumfeld anpassen. Vergleichende Fallstudien von Firmen zeigen, dass eine 
Schrumpfung des Unternehmens, ein Wechsel des Geschäftsmodells hin zu mehr 
Serviceorientierung, sowie ein verstärktes Engagement in strategischen Allianzen und 
M&A-Aktivitäten mit anderen Firmen zum Überleben der Firmen unter diesen 
Bedingungen beitragen können. 
Gegenstand der zweiten empirischen Studie der Arbeit sind M&A-Aktivitäten junger 
Biotechnologie-Startups. Adressaten der Studie sind Manager dieser Unternehmen. 
Unter Verwendung vergleichender Fallstudien werden für den untersuchten Kontext 
spezifische Motive sowie potentielle Vorteile und Probleme von M&A-Transaktionen 
analysiert. Zu den identifizierten Motiven zählen die Integration der Technologien der 
M&A-Partner, das Streben nach einer „kritischen“ Unternehmensmasse und der Zugang 
zu dem Kontaktnetzwerk und den Managementressourcen des Partners. Als mögliche 
Vorteile sind eine erhöhte Sichtbarkeit für Investoren, ein Ausbau der Produkt-Pipeline, 
und der Zugang zu internationalen Kapitalmärkten im Falle eines internationalen M&As 
zu nennen. Probleme können bereits vor der Transaktion auftreten, wenn ein 
Unternehmen nicht den richtigen Partner findet oder keine Unterstützung von seinen 
Investoren erhält. Während der Post-Merger-Integration können sich zudem 
Schwierigkeiten bei der Integration der Technologien oder bei der Kontrolle über die 
Geschäftstätigkeit am neuen Standort ergeben, insbesondere wenn sich dieser im 
Ausland befindet. Neben diesen wichtigen Erkenntnissen für Gründer und Manager 
junger Biotechnologiefirmen unterstützen die Ergebnisse zudem die von 
Industrieexperten vertretene Meinung, dass auch in Zukunft eine effiziente 
Konsolidierung der deutschen Branche über M&A-Aktivitäten auf für viele 
Unternehmen unüberwindbare Hürden stößt. 
Ziel der dritten Studie, die das Kernstück der vorliegenden Arbeit darstellt, ist die 
Erweiterung und empirische Überprüfung von Management- und Entrepreneurship-
Theorie. Hierzu wird ein in der Literatur beschriebenes konzeptionelles Modell für die 
Entstehung strategischer Allianzen für den spezifischen Kontext junger 
Biotechnologieunternehmen operationalisiert und erweitert. Mit einem experimentellen 
Ansatz werden die Entscheidungen von 51 Top-Managern der deutschen 
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Biotechnologiebranche, neue Partner für strategische Allianzen zu suchen, analysiert. 
Dabei zeigt sich, dass diese Entscheidung von der Ressourcenposition, der 
Verfügungsgewalt über intellektuelles Eigentum und von der Umwelt der Firma 
abhängt. Damit trägt die Studie zu den bislang spärlichen empirischen Evidenzen zum 
Einfluss der Ressourcenbasis eines Unternehmens auf strategische Entscheidungen der 
Manager bei, wie sie nach dem ressourcenbasierten Ansatz postuliert wird. Zudem wird 
gezeigt, dass diese Entscheidungen komplex sind und mögliche Interaktionen zwischen 
Ressourcen von Managern berücksichtigt werden. Noch wichtiger jedoch sind die 
Beiträge der Studie zur Literatur über strategische Allianzen. Insbesondere das 
Ergebnis, dass eine geringe Liquidität der Firma und ein rückläufiger Kapitalmarkt die 
Haupttriebkräfte hinter Allianzentscheidungen sind, lassen die Ergebnisse 
vorhergehender Studien anderer Autoren in neuem Licht erscheinen. Diese Autoren 
betonen vor allem mangelnde Rationalität und das Machtstreben der Manager als 
Gründe für ein zu starkes Engagement vieler Firmen in Allianzen. Wird jedoch davon 
ausgegangen, dass viele Manager aufgrund mangelnder Liquidität und drohender 
Firmeninsolvenz Allianzen mit anderen Unternehmen suchen, erscheint diese 
Entscheidung als ein rationaler Versuch, das Beste aus einer schlechten Situation zu 
machen. Zu bezweifeln ist allerdings, dass diese Firmen die nötigen Ressourcen für eine 
erfolgreiche Abwicklung der Allianz besitzen, womit sich zumindest ein Teil des 
oftmals beschriebenen hohen Anteils nicht erfolgreicher Allianzen erklären lässt. Für 
zukünftige Forschungsarbeiten, die sich auf die Untersuchung des Erfolges strategischer 
Allianzen sowie den Beitrag dieser Allianzen zum Unternehmenserfolg konzentrieren, 
lässt sich folgern, dass die Situation der Partner bei Abschluss der Allianz ein wichtiger 
Parameter ist, der in den Studien berücksichtigt werden muss. 
Die vierte empirische Studie dieser Arbeit ist wiederum praxisorientiert und an Manager 
und Gründer von Biotechnologieunternehmen adressiert. Sie zeigt anhand einer 
explorativen Fallstudie, wie eine junge Biotechnologiefirma auch nach dem 
Zusammenbruch ihrer Technologie überleben und weiter wachsen kann. Grundlage des 
erfolgreichen Krisenmanagements des Fallstudienunternehmens ist eine aggressive 
Geschäftsentwicklungs- und Projektakquisitionsstrategie, die aus der Eigenentwicklung 
und Einlizensierung neuer Technologien sowie einer Akquisition über M&A-
Aktivitäten besteht. Daneben erweist sich auch ein effizientes Management von 
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finanziellen, organisatorischen, humanen und sozialen Ressourcen als essentiell für ein 
erfolgreiches Krisenmanagement. Um maximale Liquidität für den 
Krisenmanagementprozess zu garantieren, sollten im Falle eines Verdachts 
technologischer Invalidität alle finanziellen Mittel auf die schnelle Bestätigung dieses 
Verdachts konzentriert werden. Zudem kann ein M&A mit einer anderen Firma die 
weitere Kapitalakquisition von Investoren in dieser Zeit erleichtern. Eine 
Herausforderung für Manager ist die effiziente Integration des Wissens, das der neu 
akquirierten Technologie zugrunde liegt. Dieser Herausforderung kann entweder 
dadurch begegnet werden, dass die ursprünglichen Technologieentwickler in der Firma 
angestellt werden, oder über eine vertraglich vereinbarte, langfristig ausgerichtete 
Zusammenarbeit mit den Institutionen, die die Technologie ursprünglich entwickelt 
haben. Im Bezug auf das Humanressourcenmanagement zeigt sich, dass ein schnelles 
Akzeptieren einer unvermeidlichen Personalfluktuation und die Konzentration auf die 
Beschaffung neuen Personals während des Krisenmanagementprozesses förderlich sind. 
Die Kommunikation mit dem Personal sollte ebenso wie die mit den Investoren offen 
und ehrlich sein. Ein Vergleich mit existierender Literatur zum Krisenmanagement 
eines großen, englischen Biotechnologieunternehmens zeigt viele Parallelen auf und 
deutet an, dass die Ergebnisse der untersuchten Fallstudie auch auf größere Firmen 
übertragbar sind. 
Die fünfte und letzte empirische Studie der vorliegenden Arbeit nimmt schließlich die 
Perspektive von VC-Investoren in der Biotechnologie- und Life Science-Branche ein 
und untersucht, inwiefern eine Diversifikation eines industriespezialisierten 
Investitionsportfolios zur Risikoreduzierung beitragen kann. Ziel der Studie ist ein 
Beitrag zur wissenschaftlichen VC-Literatur. Dieser besteht zum einen aus der 
Einführung eines theoretischen Analyserahmens für die Risikoverteilung in Life 
Science-Portfolios. Ausgehend von praxisorientierter Literatur und Interviews mit VC-
Managern unterscheidet dieser Rahmen zwischen dem Life Science-Geschäftsfeld 
Therapeutikaentwicklung (hohes Risiko) einerseits und den Feldern Diagnostika, 
Auftragsforschung und Medizintechnik (niedriges Risiko) andererseits. Darüber hinaus 
können VCs das Risiko ihres Sub-Portfolios der Therapeutikafirmen durch eine 
Diversifizierung zwischen unterschiedlichen therapeutischen Märkten und 
Technologien (Substanzklassen) erzielen. Eine Anwendung dieses Analyserahmens im 
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Rahmen einer vergleichenden Fallstudienanalyse auf die Portfolios von sieben VC-
Firmen zeigt, dass kleine Firmen (gemessen an dem von ihnen insgesamt verwalteten 
Kapital) ihr Risiko nicht mehr durch eine verstärkte Investition in risikoarme 
Geschäftsfelder oder eine höhere Diversifizierung ihres Sub-Portfolios der 
Therapeutikafirmen reduzieren als große VCs. Dies ist insofern überraschend, als dass 
die kleinen VC-Firmen der untersuchten Stichprobe ein höheres Investitionsrisiko durch 
eine regionale Fokussierung und eine Spezialisierung auf Frühphaseninvestitionen 
ausweisen. Stattdessen können zwei archetypische Portfoliostrategien unabhängig von 
der VC-Firmengröße identifiziert werden. VCs investieren entweder mit einem Fokus 
auf die riskanten Therapeutikaentwickler und diversifizieren dieses Sub-Portfolio dann 
mehr im Bezug auf Märkte und Technologien, oder sie fokussieren dieses Sub-Portfolio 
und investieren dafür verstärkt in weniger risikoreiche Geschäftszweige. In 
Kombination mit Daten aus Interviews mit VC-Managern ergibt sich somit die 
Schlussfolgerung, dass – im Gegensatz zu nicht-industriespezialisierten Portfolios – 
eine Spezialisierung auf bestimmte Märkte und Technologien nicht zu einer 
Risikoreduzierung des VC-Portfolios beiträgt. Spezialisierung auf Industrieebene 
scheint für VCs das Optimum zur Akkumulation spezifischen Wissens und zum Aufbau 
von Netzwerken und Reputation. Neben diesem interessanten Ergebnis zeigt die Studie, 
dass die Diversifikation von VC-Portfolios durch unterschiedliche, in der Literatur 
bislang nicht beschriebene Einflussfaktoren, wie z. B. einem mangelnden Deal-Flow 
oder einer Notwendigkeit zur Verfolgung technologischer Trends, beeinflusst wird. 
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11 Appendix 
The appendix contains original data related to the empirical conjoint study in Chapter 5. 
All material is provided in its original language German. 
11.1 Cover letter for the conjoint experiment 
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11.2 Introduction of the conjoint experiment 
 
Warum gehen Biotechnologie-Start-ups 
Strategische Allianzen ein? 
 
von 
Dr. Holger Patzelt  
 
EXIST-HighTEPP 
Universität Bamberg  
Jäckstr. 3 
96052 Bamberg 
Tel.: 0951 863 2799 
Fax: 0951 863 1198 
holger.patzelt@exist-hightepp.de 
 
Version 4 
 
ZWECK DER STUDIE 
Die vorliegenden Studie untersucht, in welchen Unternehmenssituationen und unter 
welchen Umweltbedingungen Top-Manager von Biotechnologie-Start-ups Partner für 
Strategische Allianzen suchen. 
 
WICHTIGE INFORMATIONEN 
Bitte beantworten Sie alle Fragen der Studie, da nicht vollständig ausgefüllte 
Fragebögen nicht in der statistischen Analyse berücksichtigt werden können. 
Vorausgehende Tests haben ergeben, dass die meisten Teilnehmer nicht mehr als 20-25 
Minuten für eine komplette Bearbeitung benötigen. Sie brauchen pro Seite des Bogens 
nur eine Beurteilung abzugeben. Normalerweise nimmt die Zeit für die Beurteilung 
einer Situation mit der Zahl der bereits bearbeiteten Situationen ab. 
 
Alle Informationen der Studie sind streng vertraulich und werden nur in einer 
Form berichtet, in der keine Rückschlüsse auf Ihr individuelles 
Entscheidungsverhalten gezogen werden können. 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Kooperation! 
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ANLEITUNG 
 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie sind CEO der hypothetischen Firma MegaBio, die biotechnologische 
Produkte entwickelt. Der Sitz der Firma befindet sich in einem Biotech-Cluster in 
Nachbarschaft zu anderen Biotech-Firmen, Universitäten und Forschungseinrichtungen. 
MegaBio beschäftigt 30 Angestellte und besitzt eine proprietäre Technologie zur 
Produktentwicklung, die jedoch nicht kommerzialisiert wird. MegaBio’s hauptsächliche 
Finanzierungsquelle ist Risikokapital; Umsätze durch die Vermarktung von Produkten werden 
noch nicht erzielt. 
 
Sie werden nun gebeten, für die auf den folgenden Seiten dargestellten Situationen von 
MegaBio den Anreiz, sich nach einer Strategischen Allianz mit irgendeinem anderen 
Unternehmen (das hier NICHT näher beschrieben wird) umzusehen, zu beurteilen. Unter 
strategischer Allianz wird dabei jede Art von Partnering verstanden, also z. B. Lizenzierungen, 
Joint Ventures oder Minderheitsbeteiligungen. Bitte beziehen Sie sich bei Ihren Beurteilungen 
auf die Definitionen auf der folgenden Seite.  
 
Bitte antworten Sie für jedes Szenario, indem Sie die Zahl auf der folgenden Skala ankreuzen, 
die Ihrer Beurteilung am nächsten kommt. Auf der nachfolgenden Beispielskala ist die 2 
angekreuzt, um zu demonstrieren, dass Sie den Anreiz für MegaBio, einen Partner für eine 
Strategische Allianz zu suchen, in der vorgegebenen Situation als gering einschätzen (aber nicht 
sehr gering). 
 
Sehr geringer 
Anreiz, eine 
Strategische Allianz 
zu suchen 
 
     
Sehr hoher 
Anreiz, eine 
Strategische Allianz 
zu suchen 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Manche der Situationen auf den folgenden Seiten werden Ihnen vertraut vorkommen, andere 
eher unwahrscheinlich erscheinen. Bitte treffen Sie Ihre Entscheidungen bestmöglich anhand 
der zur Verfügung gestellten Informationen für alle Situationen und gehen Sie davon aus, dass 
nicht beschriebene Unternehmens- und Umweltparameter sowie andere Faktoren für alle 
Situationen konstant sind. 
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Bitte trennen Sie dieses und Blatt ab und beziehen Sie sich während Ihrer Beurteilungen 
auf den folgenden Seiten darauf 
 
Situationsparameter 
Parameter Ausprägung Beschreibung 
Ausgedehnt MegaBio verfügt über ein ausgedehntes Kontaktnetzwerk mit anderen Firmen, Universitäten und Forschungseinrichtungen. Kontakt-
Netzwerk 
Beschränkt MegaBio unterhält nur wenige Kontakte zu anderen Firmen, Universitäten und Forschungseinrichtungen. 
Hoch MegaBio verfolgt sehr kompetitive Projekte und befindet sich zu mehreren Firmen in unmittelbarer Konkurrenz. 
Kompetition 
Niedrig MegaBio verfolgt wenig kompetitive Projekte. Unmittelbare Konkurrenz zu anderen Firmen besteht nicht. 
Hoch MegaBio besitzt beachtliche Liquiditätsreserven für Fortbestand und Wachstum in den nächsten Jahren. 
Liquidität 
Niedrig MegaBio besitzt beschränkte Liquiditätsreserven, die voraussichtlich binnen Jahresfrist erschöpft sind. 
Hoch Das wissenschaftliche Team von MegaBio besteht aus herausragenden und renommierten Spezialisten. 
Qualität des 
wissen-
schaftlichen 
Teams Niedrig 
Das wissenschaftliche Team von MegaBio besteht aus nur 
durchschnittlichen Wissenschaftlern. 
Hoch MegaBio besitzt ein breites Portfolio an gesicherten Patenten. 
Anzahl der 
Patente 
Niedrig MegaBio besitzt nur ein beschränktes Portfolio an Patenten, die zudem durch Patentstreitigkeiten unsicher sind. 
Attraktiv Es bestehen momentan gute Möglichkeiten für MegaBio, Risikokapital zu akquirieren oder an die Börse zu gehen.  Finanzierungs-
umfeld 
Unattraktiv Es bestehen nur beschränkte Möglichkeiten für MegaBio, Risikokapital zu akquirieren; das Börsenfenster ist geschlossen. 
Hoch MegaBio’s Entwicklungspipeline weist eine beachtliche Anzahl an Produkten in frühen Entwicklungsphasen auf. Anzahl der 
frühen 
Produkte Niedrig MegaBio’s Entwicklungspipeline weist nur wenige Produkte in frühen Entwicklungsphasen auf. 
Hoch MegaBio’s Entwicklungspipeline weist eine beachtliche Anzahl an Produkten in späten Entwicklungsphasen auf. Anzahl der 
späten 
Produkte  Niedrig MegoBio’s Entwicklungspipeline weist nur wenige Produkte in späten Entwicklungsphasen auf. 
 
 
Bitte betrachten Sie jede der folgenden Beschreibungen als separate Situation von MegaBio, 
unabhängig von allen anderen. Die Eigenschaften eines potentiellen Partnerunternehmens 
werden, wie bereits beschrieben, nicht spezifiziert. 
Bitte blättern Sie nicht zu bereits beurteilten Situationen zurück. 
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11.3 Example scenario of the conjoint experiment 
 
Situation 1: dxo 
 
1. Kontaktnetzwerk von MegaBio Ausgedehnt 
Viele Kontakte zu anderen Firmen, 
Universitäten und 
Forschungseinrichtungen 
2. Kompetition Niedrig Wenig kompetitive Projekte, keine direkte Konkurrenz 
3. Liquidität von MegaBio Hoch Beachtliche Liquiditätsreserven (mehrere Jahre) 
4. Qualität wissenschaftliches Team Hoch Herausragende und renommierte Spezialisten 
5. Anzahl der Patente von MegaBio Niedrig Beschränktes Portfolio an unsicheren Patenten 
6. Finanzierungsumfeld Attraktiv Gute Möglichkeiten für Risiko-kapitalakquisition oder Börsengang 
7. Anzahl frühe Produkte  Niedrig Wenige Produkte in frühen Entwicklungsphasen 
8. Anzahl späte Produkte Niedrig Wenige Produkte in späten Entwicklungsphasen 
 
 
Beurteilung 
Wenn Sie CEO von MegaBio wären, wie beurteilten Sie in der oben geschilderten 
Situation den Anreiz, eine andere Firma als Partner für eine Strategische Allianz zu 
suchen?  
Bitte kreuzen Sie Ihre Antwort auf folgender Skala an. 
 
Sehr geringer 
Anreiz, eine 
Strategische Allianz 
zu suchen 
 
     
Sehr hoher 
Anreiz, eine 
Strategische Allianz 
zu suchen 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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11.4 Design of the four experiment versions 
Version 1 
Nr Situation patents early late network liquidity compn team finance 
1 dxo low low low high high low high high 
2 piu low high low high high low low high 
3 gnz high low high high high low low low 
4 hae low low low low low low low low 
5 pdp high low low high low high low high 
6 rkw low low low high high high high low 
7 bgm low high high high low high low low 
8 kjl high low low low high low high high 
9 whl high low high low low high high low 
10 smq low high high low high low high low 
11 wer low low high high low low high high 
12 xpv high high high high high high high high 
13 hfa high high high low low low low high 
14 tbd high high low high low low high low 
15 hlv high high low low high high low low 
16 tcy low high low low low high high high 
17 lop low low high low high high low high 
18 whl high low high low low high high low 
19 xpv high high high high high high high high 
20 bgm low high high high low high low low 
21 kjl high low low low high low high high 
22 tbd high high low high low low high low 
23 rkw low low low high high high high low 
24 pdp high low low high low high low high 
25 hae low low low low low low low low 
26 tcy low high low low low high high high 
27 hlv high high low low high high low low 
28 smq low high high low high low high low 
29 piu low high low high high low low high 
30 wer low low high high low low high high 
31 lop low low high low high high low high 
32 hfa high high high low low low low high 
33 gnz high low high high high low low low 
Table 19: Conjoint experiment version 1 
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Version 2 
Nr Situation network compn liquidity team patents finance early late 
1 dxo high low high high low high low low 
2 piu high low high low low high high low 
3 gnz high low high low high low low high 
4 hae low low low low low low low low 
5 pdp high high low low high high low low 
6 rkw high high high high low low low low 
7 bgm high high low low low low high high 
8 kjl low low high high high high low low 
9 whl low high low high high low low high 
10 smq low low high high low low high high 
11 wer high low low high low high low high 
12 xpv high high high high high high high high 
13 hfa low low low low high high high high 
14 tbd high low low high high low high low 
15 hlv low high high low high low high low 
16 tcy low high low high low high high low 
17 lop low high high low low high low high 
18 whl low high low high high low low high 
19 xpv high high high high high high high high 
20 bgm high high low low low low high high 
21 kjl low low high high high high low low 
22 tbd high low low high high low high low 
23 rkw high high high high low low low low 
24 pdp high high low low high high low low 
25 hae low low low low low low low low 
26 tcy low high low high low high high low 
27 hlv low high high low high low high low 
28 smq low low high high low low high high 
29 piu high low high low low high high low 
30 wer high low low high low high low high 
31 lop low high high low low high low high 
32 hfa low low low low high high high high 
33 gnz high low high low high low low high 
Table 20: Conjoint experiment version 2 
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Version 3 
Nr Situation patents early late network liquidity compn team finance 
1 dxo low low low high high low high high 
2 bgm low high high high low high low low 
3 xpv high high high high high high high high 
4 hae low low low low low low low low 
5 tcy low high low low low high high high 
6 smq low high high low high low high low 
7 hfa high high high low low low low high 
8 kjl high low low low high low high high 
9 pdp high low low high low high low high 
10 piu low high low high high low low high 
11 lop low low high low high high low high 
12 wer low low high high low low high high 
13 whl high low high low low high high low 
14 gnz high low high high high low low low 
15 rkw low low low high high high high low 
16 tbd high high low high low low high low 
17 hlv high high low low high high low low 
18 smq low high high low high low high low 
19 hfa high high high low low low low high 
20 xpv high high high high high high high high 
21 pdp high low low high low high low high 
22 hae low low low low low low low low 
23 wer low low high high low low high high 
24 tbd high high low high low low high low 
25 bgm low high high high low high low low 
26 lop low low high low high high low high 
27 gnz high low high high high low low low 
28 whl high low high low low high high low 
29 kjl high low low low high low high high 
30 piu low high low high high low low high 
31 rkw low low low high high high high low 
32 hlv high high low low high high low low 
33 tcy low high low low low high high high 
Table 21: Conjoint experiment version 3 
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Version 4 
Nr Situation network compn liquidity team patents finance early late 
1 dxo high low high high low high low low 
2 bgm high high low low low low high high 
3 xpv high high high high high high high high 
4 hae low low low low low low low low 
5 tcy low high low high low high high low 
6 smq low low high high low low high high 
7 hfa low low low low high high high high 
8 kjl low low high high high high low low 
9 pdp high high low low high high low low 
10 piu high low high low low high high low 
11 lop low high high low low high low high 
12 wer high low low high low high low high 
13 whl low high low high high low low high 
14 gnz high low high low high low low high 
15 rkw high high high high low low low low 
16 tbd high low low high high low high low 
17 hlv low high high low high low high low 
18 smq low low high high low low high high 
19 hfa low low low low high high high high 
20 xpv high high high high high high high high 
21 pdp high high low low high high low low 
22 hae low low low low low low low low 
23 wer high low low high low high low high 
24 tbd high low low high high low high low 
25 bgm high high low low low low high high 
26 lop low high high low low high low high 
27 gnz high low high low high low low high 
28 whl low high low high high low low high 
29 kjl low low high high high high low low 
30 piu high low high low low high high low 
31 rkw high high high high low low low low 
32 hlv low high high low high low high low 
33 tcy low high low high low high high low 
Table 22: Conjoint experiment version 4 
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11.5 Post-experiment questionnaire 
Anleitung: Bitte geben Sie im Folgenden die Wichtigkeit der Kriterien bei ihrer 
Beurteilung des Anreizes, eine Strategische Allianz zu suchen, an. 
(Bitte kreuzen Sie die Nummer an, die Ihrer Beurteilung am nächsten kommt). 
 
 
A) Anzahl der Patente der Firma 
Sehr unwichtig   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Sehr wichtig 
 
B) Anzahl der Produkte in frühen Entwicklungsphasen 
Sehr unwichtig   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Sehr wichtig 
 
C) Anzahl der Produkte in späten Entwicklungsphasen 
Sehr unwichtig   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Sehr wichtig 
 
D) Kontaktnetzwerk der Firma 
Sehr unwichtig   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Sehr wichtig 
 
E) Liquidität der Firma 
Sehr unwichtig   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Sehr wichtig 
 
F) Kompetition 
Sehr unwichtig   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Sehr wichtig 
 
G) Qualität des wissenschaftlichen Teams 
Sehr unwichtig   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Sehr wichtig 
 
H) Finanzierungsumfeld 
Sehr unwichtig   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Sehr wichtig 
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Erfahrung und persönlicher Hintergrund (vertraulich) 
 
 
1. Bitte geben Sie Ihr aktuelles Alter an ___________ 
 
2. Bitte geben Sie die Fachrichtung Ihres höchsten Abschlusses an 
 
   a) Chemie (   )   b) Biologie (   )   c) Wirtschaft (   )   d) Medizin (   )   e) Sonstiges (   ) 
 
3. Welche Position besetzen Sie im Moment in Ihrer aktuellen Firma?  
 
   a) CEO (   )   b) CFO/CSO (   )   c) Vice Precident  (   )   d) BD Manager (   )   e) Sonstige (   ) 
 
4. Sind Sie (wissenschaftlicher) Gründer Ihrer aktuellen Firma? 
 
   a) Wissenschaftl. Gründer (   )   b) Nicht-wissenschaftl. Gründer (   )   c) kein Gründer (   ) 
 
5. In welchem Jahr wurde Ihre aktuelle Firma gegründet? ____________ 
 
6. Wie viele Mitarbeiter hat Ihre aktuelle Firma? ____________ 
 
7. Welches Geschäftsmodell verfolgt Ihre aktuelle Firma? 
 
a) Reine Produktentwicklung (   )   b) Reine Dienstleistung (   )   c) Beides (Hybridstrategie) (   ) 
 
8. Wie viele Jahre waren Sie insgesamt in der Biotechbranche tätig? __________ 
 
9. Wie viele Jahre waren Sie insgesamt in der Pharmabranche tätig? __________ 
 
10. Wie viele Jahre sind Sie in Ihrer aktuellen Firma tätig? _________ 
 
11. Wie viele Jahre waren Sie insgesamt in Top-Management-Positionen tätig? _________ 
 
12. Wie viele Jahre sind Sie in einer Top-Management-Position in Ihrer aktuellen Firma? ____ 
 
13. In wie vielen Firmen waren Sie schon tätig? _________ 
 
14. Wie viele Strategische Allianzen haben Sie schon verhandelt (Verhdl. abgeschlossen) ____ 
 
15. Wie viele dieser Strategischen Allianzen würden Sie als erfolgreich bezeichnen? _____ 
 
16. Wie viele strategische Allianzen hat Ihre momentane Firma mit 
 
   a) Universitäten ________    b) Biotechnologiefirmen ________    c) Pharmafirmen ________ 
 
 
 
 
Ende der Studie. Vielen Dank für Ihre Mithilfe! 
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11.6 Conjoint experiment data 
Version 1 
 Participant number 
Situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
dxo 4 2 2 6 2 2 6 4 2 3 6 2 3 
bgm 5 2 4 7 2 2 6 2 2 4 6 3 3 
xpv 5 4 6 7 5 3 2 4 1 5 6 4 5 
hae 7 7 1 1 7 6 7 7 7 6 6 7 7 
tcy 6 5 2 2 4 4 2 7 7 4 6 5 5 
smq 6 4 3 6 2 3 6 5 6 6 6 5 6 
hfa 6 7 5 7 7 5 7 7 6 7 6 6 5 
kjl 6 2 7 6 2 2 2 3 6 3 6 2 3 
pdp 6 7 5 6 7 5 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 
piu 4 5 6 7 5 1 3 6 1 5 4 3 5 
lop 5 6 4 7 5 3 2 4 5 6 4 4 4 
wer 2 3 2 7 5 2 1 2 1 4 2 1 2 
whl 4 5 5 7 6 2 2 4 4 5 5 3 4 
gnz 6 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 6 6 6 
rkw 5 5 5 7 6 5 5 5 5 6 4 3 5 
tbd 6 5 2 7 5 4 2 6 6 4 5 3 5 
hlv 6 2 6 7 5 2 2 4 4 5 3 3 4 
smq 6 6 2 7 7 5 6 7 5 6 6 6 6 
hfa 1 5 1 7 4 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 2 
xpv 6 7 6 7 7 5 6 7 6 6 6 7 6 
pdp 5 4 6 5 2 2 1 2 3 3 6 2 5 
hae 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 6 5 3 6 5 6 
wer 6 6 6 2 5 3 7 6 6 4 7 4 5 
tbd 6 7 2 3 5 4 6 6 7 4 6 3 5 
bgm 7 7 7 1 7 6 7 7 7 3 7 7 7 
lop 6 4 2 7 4 4 2 5 6 4 6 3 6 
gnz 6 4 5 7 6 5 4 5 3 4 7 3 6 
whl 6 5 6 7 5 1 5 3 2 4 3 5 5 
kjl 6 3 3 7 3 2 2 4 4 4 3 3 4 
piu 6 6 2 7 3 3 2 4 6 4 4 5 5 
rkw 6 4 6 7 4 2 3 3 5 3 5 2 3 
Table 23: Conjoint data version 1 
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Version 2 
 Participant number 
Situation 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2316 24 25 
dxo 6 2 7 5 7 6 6 4 4 6 7 1 
bgm 5 4 2 5 3 4 6 5 6 6 6 1 
xpv 4 2 3 6 5 2 5 7 2 4 4 2 
hae 1 7 6 1 4 7 7 5 6 7 7 6 
tcy 5 7 6 2 5 6 4 3 6 6 7 4 
smq 4 6 6 3 7 6 7 5 6 6 5 3 
hfa 3 7 6 4 3 3 4 6 6 3 7 7 
kjl 5 2 7 4 5 3 6 2 2 6 5 1 
pdp 3 6 7 5 3 5 4 7 6 2 7 7 
piu 4 2 4 6 1 2 5 4 3 3 5 5 
lop 2 2 5 6 3 2 5 6 6 4 6 4 
wer 5 2 1 6 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 1 
whl 3 5 3 6 1 5 3 2 4 4 6 5 
gnz 2 7 6 4 3 6 4 5 6 6 7 7 
rkw 4 5 3 4 3 3 5 4 4 6 5 6 
tbd 2 7 3 4 3 5 5 4 6 6 6 6 
hlv 4 3 5 5 5 2 6 5 3 4 4 2 
smq 2 7 6 5 3 3 4 5 7 4 7 7 
hfa 6 1 1 6 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 
xpv 2 7 6 5 5 4 4 6 6 4 7 7 
pdp 4 1 5 5 5 4 6 2 3 6 5 2 
hae 2 7 6 5 2 6 4 5 6 6 7 6 
wer 4 5 6 4 7 5 7 5 4 7 5 5 
tbd 2 7 6 4 6 5 5 3 5 7 6 5 
bgm 1 7 6 2 4 6 5 6 7 7 7 7 
lop 2 7 4 4 3 4 4 4 6 6 5 4 
gnz 4 7 2 4 5 3 5 4 4 5 5 5 
whl 5 3 2 5 2 1 5 5 4 6 3 3 
kjl 5 5 5 5 5 2 6 4 2 3 5 2 
piu 2 1 6 5 4 4 4 6 4 5 4 4 
rkw 5 2 4 5 4 3 5 6 2 3 5 2 
Table 24: Conjoint data version 2 
                                                 
16 I excluded participant Nr. 23 from the statistical analysis since s/he did not provide any data in the post-
experiment questionnaire 
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Version 3 
 Participant number 
Situation 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
dxo 2 7 6 2 5 1 6 1 1 2 6 7 7 
bgm 7 6 7 5 6 7 7 7 7 4 6 6 4 
xpv 2 1 2 4 2 6 5 1 1 5 4 5 3 
hae 7 7 7 6 6 7 7 7 7 6 5 7 7 
tcy 3 3 5 4 6 2 6 4 6 5 4 6 6 
smq 2 2 6 2 2 4 7 2 2 3 5 5 3 
hfa 5 2 5 5 6 6 4 4 2 2 3 5 4 
kjl 1 1 6 4 6 1 7 1 4 7 4 5 7 
pdp 3 5 7 2 5 6 6 5 6 4 5 7 6 
piu 2 6 6 2 5 4 4 1 2 6 5 6 6 
lop 6 2 3 3 2 7 6 2 5 3 5 4 3 
wer 6 6 6 6 5 5 6 5 6 4 5 5 4 
whl 7 6 7 7 5 6 7 7 6 4 4 7 4 
gnz 6 1 5 5 4 2 6 3 3 6 4 4 3 
rkw 5 6 7 6 5 7 5 1 6 5 4 5 7 
tbd 6 7 7 3 5 6 6 6 6 2 3 6 6 
hlv 4 2 5 4 5 3 7 3 6 1 5 5 6 
smq 6 4 5 2 4 5 7 2 3 1 4 5 3 
hfa 5 2 3 7 5 2 6 4 2 2 3 5 4 
xpv 1 1 2 5 1 1 7 1 1 4 4 4 2 
pdp 2 6 6 4 7 7 5 5 5 5 5 7 6 
hae 4 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 7 6 6 7 7 
wer 2 6 5 3 6 5 7 5 6 5 6 6 6 
tbd 6 6 7 4 6 7 6 7 6 4 5 7 6 
bgm 7 6 7 6 6 7 6 7 6 3 5 7 4 
lop 1 2 2 4 3 2 5 2 6 3 3 4 2 
gnz 3 2 4 2 2 6 5 3 4 4 4 4 2 
whl 7 6 7 5 4 7 7 7 6 5 4 6 3 
kjl 2 5 5 2 6 6 4 1 3 5 6 5 7 
piu 2 2 3 2 6 1 4 1 4 4 6 6 6 
rkw 5 6 6 4 6 5 6 4 6 6 6 5 7 
Table 25: Conjoint data version 3 
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Version 4 
 Participant number 
Situation 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 
dxo 6 4 1 5 1 5 2 2 1 2 2 7 4 1 
bgm 6 5 7 7 7 7 3 7 7 6 6 7 6 7 
xpv 2 2 1 4 7 1 6 6 2 1 5 5 6 1 
hae 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 7 6 6 7 
tcy 5 6 2 7 7 4 4 6 4 7 6 6 7 6 
smq 6 3 2 5 2 5 2 6 5 3 3 5 7 1 
hfa 3 2 1 4 2 3 5 3 4 2 2 6 6 6 
kjl 6 2 2 5 2 4 2 5 2 1 1 6 6 1 
pdp 6 6 7 5 6 6 5 6 7 7 5 5 7 7 
piu 5 3 3 6 2 5 3 3 4 6 7 4 5 1 
lop 6 4 2 4 1 5 4 6 5 7 3 5 7 1 
wer 6 6 1 4 4 3 6 6 6 4 7 6 4 7 
whl 5 6 7 7 7 6 6 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 
gnz 4 6 1 4 4 5 1 7 5 3 4 6 7 1 
rkw 6 6 2 5 3 6 2 3 2 5 2 5 7 6 
tbd 6 4 7 7 7 7 5 6 6 7 5 5 7 7 
hlv 6 4 2 6 6 6 5 6 4 3 5 4 7 2 
smq 3 2 1 3 2 6 2 6 4 1 1 7 6 4 
hfa 2 2 1 5 3 5 6 5 5 2 7 7 7 7 
xpv 3 7 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 6 2 1 
pdp 7 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 5 5 5 5 7 4 
hae 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 3 7 7 
wer 5 7 1 5 5 6 5 6 6 6 6 5 4 7 
tbd 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 7 6 5 6 7 
bgm 6 6 6 7 5 6 6 6 7 7 5 5 7 7 
lop 5 4 1 3 3 5 2 6 3 4 3 6 5 2 
gnz 4 5 1 5 3 5 2 4 4 3 2 6 6 1 
whl 5 6 6 7 6 6 5 6 7 6 7 6 7 7 
kjl 6 4 5 6 4 4 3 6 1 2 1 4 5 1 
piu 4 5 2 5 2 5 3 2 3 4 4 4 5 1 
rkw 4 6 5 6 1 6 4 5 1 5 2 5 7 2 
Table 26: Conjoint data version 4 
 
APPENDIX XXVIII 
11.7 Post-experiment questionnaire data 
 Participant number 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
A) 6 2 5 4 5 6 3 5 6 4 5 5 4 
B) 5 3 5 7 2 3 3 5 5 6 4 4 5 
C) 4 5 6 7 5 5 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 
D) 5 2 5 1 2 2 2 3 5 5 4 4 2 
E) 6 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 5 
F) 5 3 6 2 3 5 2 5 4 6 3 5 5 
G) 5 3 4 7 4 3 6 4 4 5 5 5 3 
H) 6 7 6 1 7 7 7 7 2 6 6 6 6 
1. 53 40 36 29 45 34 41 40 52 42 n.a. 50 37 
2. a c b b a a a b a a b b b 
3. b b a a a d b a a c d b a 
4. a b a c a c c b a c c c a 
5. 2000 2000 2000 1997 1992 2000 1998 2000 1988 1994 1997 1999 2001 
6. 38 18 16 22 132 50 80 29 200 125 180 57 2 
7. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. c c a c n.a. a a c n.a. 
8. 4,5 4 7 12 18 5 2 9 16 5 6 3 4 
9. 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 4 n.a. 10 0 16 n.a. 
10. 4,5 4 4 2 15 5 2 4 16 1 4 3 4 
11. 4,5 8 4 11 15 1 4,5 9 3 5 n.a. 10 4 
12. 4,5 4 4 2 15 1 2 4 16 1 n.a. 3 4 
13. 0 4 1 2 1 0 3 2 1 4 1 2 0 
14. 15 2 10 3 n.a. 2 5 5 2 4 2 5 1 
15. 2 2 2 3 n.a. 1 3 4 1 n.a. 2 2 1 
16 a) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4 4 2 3 n.a. 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
16 b) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 3 2 5 n.a. 1 n.a. 1 n.a. 
16 c) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 0 1 5 n.a. 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
n.a. = not available 
Table 27: Post-experiment questionnaire data 
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 Participant number 
Item 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2317 24 25 26 
A) 4 4 3 5 4 3 6 4 4 n.a. 5 2 5 
B) 2 7 4 4 6 4 6 5 3 n.a. 6 4 2 
C) 5 7 6 7 6 5 7 5 6 n.a. 7 6 7 
D) 1 4 5 3 7 6 1 3 4 n.a. 3 1 4 
E) 7 7 7 6 5 7 7 7 7 n.a. 7 7 6 
F) 4 7 5 5 5 7 1 4 4 n.a. 5 2 5 
G) 3 4 5 5 5 4 3 5 6 n.a. 5 4 3 
H) 2 7 6 6 3 6 6 6 7 n.a. 7 7 6 
1. 50 31 45 42 35 40 33 33 41 n.a. 55 36 45 
2. a c d b b c b c b n.a. d a b 
3. a e c d d a d b c n.a. a d a 
4. a c c c c c c c c n.a. a c a 
5. 1996 1996 1999 1998 1997 2000 1997 2000 1994 n.a. 1997 1997 2000 
6. 65 64 42 80 35 10 180 20 100 n.a. 23 58 38 
7. n.a. n.a. a a c a a c c n.a. a c n.a. 
8. 17 4 4 5 7 3 4 2 12 n.a. 30 6 4 
9. 0 0 20 n.a. 0 0 0 0 0 n.a. 7 n.a. 0 
10. 8 4 3 5 7 1 1 2 2 n.a. 7 3 4 
11. 12 2 7 2 0 8 0 2 6 n.a. 19 3 4 
12. 8 2 3 2 0 1 0 2 2 n.a. 7 3 4 
13. 2 1 3 0 0 4 1 2 2 n.a. 1 1 0 
14. 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 n.a. 2 20 n.a. 14 n.a. 5 
15. 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 n.a. 2 14 n.a. 10 n.a. 1 
16 a) n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 5 3 n.a. 2 0 n.a. 5 n.a. n.a. 
16 b) n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 n.a. 1 n.a. 0 0 n.a. 1 n.a. n.a. 
16 c) n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 n.a. 0 1 0 3 n.a. 3 n.a. n.a. 
n.a. = not available 
Table 28: Post-experiment questionnaire data (continued) 
                                                 
17 Participant number 23 did not provide any information on the post-experiment questionnaire 
 
APPENDIX XXX 
 
 Participant number 
Item 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
A) 6 2 5 5 2 5 3 5 4 6 5 2 6 
B) 2 6 5 5 7 6 3 5 5 6 6 3 6 
C) 6 6 5 5 7 7 6 5 7 4 7 7 6 
D) 1 2 1 3 2 6 3 4 2 4 3 1 3 
E) 7 7 5 6 7 4 7 6 5 6 7 4 6 
F) 5 5 4 4 6 7 4 3 5 6 5 1 5 
G) 3 4 1 5 5 4 5 4 6 5 5 1 5 
H) 4 7 5 5 7 7 6 5 5 6 7 6 7 
1. 45 36 36 37 37 43 51 44 43 42 55 37 35 
2. c c b b a a a b b a d a b 
3. c b d a a d a e b a a a d 
4. c b c b a c c c c c a a c 
5. 1995 2000 1993 2002 2003 2002 1995 1995 1998 1994 1997 2000 1995 
6. 38 25 40 5 9 29 35 42 25 7 23 15 38 
7. n.a. n.a. a c c c c c b c a c n.a. 
8. 3 4 3 7 4,5 8 20 9 5 3 30 8 6 
9. 0 6 6 0 0 n.a. 1 0 10 0 7 0 0 
10. 3 4 3 3 1,5 1 1 9 1 3 7 5 2 
11. 14 4 3 5 4,5 7 5 6 5 3 19 5 2 
12. 3 4 3 3 1,5 1 1 6 1 3 7 5 2 
13. 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 0 1 3,5 1 
14. n.a. 3 3 5 6 2 5 10 19 4 14 4 4 
15. n.a. 2 2 5 2 1 5 10 18 n.a. 10 2 1 
16 a) n.a. n.a. 0 0 0 2 2 5 5 2 5 1 n.a. 
16 b) n.a. n.a. 1 5 4 0 0 5 2 2 1 0 n.a. 
16 c) n.a. n.a. 1 0 0 4 0 5 4 0 3 0 n.a. 
n.a. = not available 
Table 29: Post-experiment questionnaire data (continued) 
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 Participant number 
Item 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 
A) 4 5 3 5 5 2 3 2 5 5 6 7 7 
B) 6 4 5 4 2 2 3 2 3 4 6 7 1 
C) 2 7 2 4 5 3 6 7 5 7 7 7 7 
D) 3 1 3 2 3 3 6 1 5 4 5 1 1 
E) 6 7 7 5 6 2 6 7 7 6 5 7 7 
F) 6 5 3 n.a. 5 6 6 5 3 3 6 2 4 
G) 4 4 3 3 5 4 6 5 5 6 5 2 4 
H) 4 7 7 6 7 6 6 6 7 6 5 7 4 
1. 40 33 38 32 42 49 38 37 48 52 42 35 46 
2. b c c b b b b b b a b c b 
3. a b b b a b a c a b d c d 
4. a c b a c a c c c a c c c 
5. 2001 1999 2000 2000 1999 1999 2000 1994 1999 2002 2000 1998 1997 
6. 18 22 45 25 22 23 17 90 22 114 35 75 60 
7. n.a. a c c c c n.a. a a a c c a 
8. 10 2,5 4 5 10 20 8 4 5 10 4 11 8 
9. 0 2,5 0 1 10 4 0 0 10 15 12 0 8 
10. 3 2,5 4 4 3 4 5 4 1,5 12 4 4 8 
11. 4 3,5 4 4 3 4 5 1 6 4 8 7 8 
12. 3 2,5 4 4 3 4 5 1 1,5 4 4 4 8 
13. 3 2 4 1 2 1 1 0 4 1 2 2 0 
14. 1 n.a. n.a. 7 17,5 n.a. n.a. 4 50 1 15 1 1 
15. 1 n.a. n.a. 5 8 n.a. n.a. 4 n.a. 1 10 1 1 
16 a) n.a. 0 n.a. 6 5 n.a. n.a. 0 4 n.a. 0 20 n.a. 
16 b) n.a. 1 n.a. 0 3 n.a. n.a. 6 3 n.a. 30 6 n.a. 
16 c) n.a. 0 n.a. 1 0 n.a. n.a. 0 0 1 5 4 1 
n.a. = not available 
Table 30: Post-experiment questionnaire data (continued) 
 
 
 
 
